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Abstract
We use statistical techniques to quantify the effects of school attainment on individual
wages, participation rates and employment probabilities in Spain, and to measure the
contribution of education to labour productivity at the regional level. These estimates are
then combined with data on private and public expenditure on education and with
information on taxes and social benefits to construct measures of the private and social returns
to schooling, to explore the effects of public policies on private incentives to invest in human
capital, and to analyse the long-term effects of schooling on public finances. The results are
used, together with estimates of the returns to alternative assets, to draw some tentative
conclusions regarding the adequacy of the aggregate investment patterns observed in the
regions of Spain, and to identify changes in the design of national and EU cohesion and
growth policies that may help enhance their effectiveness.
______________________________
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3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document is the final report on a study on the economic effects of schooling in the
Spanish regions and on the potential role of investment in human capital as a tool for
promoting regional growth and cohesion. It provides estimates of the economic returns to
education in the regions of Spain, both from a private and from a social perspective, analyzes
the impact of various government policies on private incentives to invest in human capital,
and explores the long-term effects of educational expenditure on government finances. It also
attempts to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the adequacy of observed aggregate
investment patterns in the different territories, and to identify changes in the design of
national and EU cohesion and growth policies that may help enhance their effectiveness.
Methodology
We use the methodology developed in de la Fuente (2003) to quantify the micro and
macroeconomic effects of schooling. We calculate the private and social rates of return to
education as the discount rates that equate the present value of the incremental cost and
income streams generated by a marginal increase in the schooling of a representative
individual for each region to whom we attribute the observed average levels of attainment
and either wages or productivity. To construct these rates of return, we use econometric
estimates of wage, employment and participation equations with individual-level data, and
a simple model of growth that is estimated using a panel of regional data. As in de la Fuente
(2003), we construct effective tax rates on human capital that measure the effects of public
policies on private incentives to remain in schoool. In addition, we have extended the
methodology used in the previous report to quantify the long-term impact of schooling on
public finances.
Educational expenditure, performance and attainment
Expenditure on education varies significantly across the regions of Spain. Expenditure per
student at the secondary and university levels in the Basque Country exceeds that in
Andalucia by 66%. Differences in expenditure across territories seem to be driven by two main
factors that work, respectively, through its private and public components: regional income
per capita and the resources available to regional governments. These two factors explain two
thirds of the observed variation in expenditure per student.
Educational attainment, measured by the average years of schooling of the adult
population, also varies greatly across regions and is likely to continue to do so in the
foreseeable future. The dispersion of schooling levels across territories drops by only one third
when we consider the youngest adult cohorts rather than the entire population. This process
of educational convergence across age groups, moreover, is mostly driven by the
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universalization of (mandatory) lower secondary schooling. At higher educational levels,
disparities across regions may actually be expected to increase in the future.
Relative educational performance, as measured by a composite index of access to non-
compulsory schooling and academic success ratios, tends to increase with income per capita.
All Objective 1 regions but two are below the national average in terms of this indicator,
while non-Objective 1 territories are above the national mean with the only significative
exception of Baleares. Expenditure per student and adult attainment seem to have a positive
effect on aggregate educational performance.
Private returns to schooling and the incentive to invest in education
The private rate of return to schooling measures the financial returns to a marginal
increase in attainment that are available to individuals, taking into account only the
privately born costs of education and the expected increase in net income after personal taxes
and social benefits. The estimated return to a one-year increase in average attainment cluster
between 8% and 10% for most Spanish regions and tend to fall with the level of schooling.
When separate returns are estimated for the different educational cycles, payoffs appear to
be highest for advanced university studies and for initial vocational training.
Various public policies have a significant impact on the private return to schooling. On
average, direct subsidies to education raise private returns by 21.5% while personal taxes and
social benefits reduce them by 7.6% and 29.9% respectively. The combined effect of these
policies is an effective tax rate on human capital of 16%. These figures suggest that while the
tax system per se generates only modest disincentives to invest in education, those arising from
unemployment insurance can be considerable. From the point of view of minimizing such
distortions, it would be preferrable to uncap unemployment benefits while reducing
replacement ratios. Efficiency gains, however, must be balanced against the equity
considerations that rightly influence the design of the social protection system
As in previous studies, we find that schooling is an extremely attractive investment
alternative from an individual point of view. Taking as a reference a balanced portfolio of
corporate shares and government bonds, we find that the return to schooling comfortably
doubles that on financial assets in all regions and all post-compulsory educational cycles.
This suggests that the combination of market forces and existing subsidies already provides
more than adequate financial incentives to invest in education.
Education and public finances
Public expenditure on education increases future tax revenues and reduces social insurance
payments. Treating such expenditure as an investment, we have calculated a fiscal rate of
return to schooling that summarizes the long-term impact of educational spending on
government finances under assumptions that try to approximate the marginal return to
5education in general equilibrium. This rate of return can also be interpreted as the maximum
real rate of interest at which the government can borrow to finance educational expenditure
without increasing the present value of future deficits. In addition, we have also computed
the net present fiscal value of a year of schooling, defined as the difference in present value
terms  between the incremental net fiscal revenues induced by an additional year of schooling
and its direct costs to the public budget.
We find that public expenditure on post-compulsory education is self-financing over the
long run and may actually help reduce future budget deficits. For the case of Spain as a whole,
the fiscal rate of return exceeds 5%, implying a positive net present fiscal value of 3,000 euros
per student (assuming a real discount rate of 3%). The estimated net fiscal value is positive
for all post-compulsory levels and exceeds 12,000 euros for advanced university studies.
Social returns to schooling and physical capital and the optimal investment pattern
Our estimates of the contribution of schooling to aggregate productivity indicate that
attainment differences explain around 40% of observed regional productivity differentials,
making educational investment a potentially crucial tool of regional cohesion policy. These
estimates also imply that the social returns to schooling are large (around 11.5% for Spain as
a whole) and, by and large, compare favourably with those available from investment in
physical capital. A mixed picture emerges, however, when we compare the expected returns
to schooling with those on infrastructure investment. In general terms, the expected return on
infrastructures exceeds that on human capital in the richer Spanish regions, but the reverse is
true in most of the poorer territories.
Implications for cohesion policy
Infrastructure investment and training schemes have traditionally been the main
instruments of regional policy and have played a key role in EU efforts to increase internal
cohesion. Our results indicate that both schooling levels and infrastructure endowments are
significant and quantitatively important determinants of income. One direct implication is
that investment in both education and infrastructures can be effective in reducing internal
disequilibria within Spain and in promoting the country's convergence toward average EU
income levels.
Our results also suggest that there are important differences in the role that these two
types of investment can and should play in achieving these two objectives. First, there seems
to be more room for reducing internal inequality through investment in human capital than in
infrastructures. Differences in schooling levels account for a significant fraction of
productivity differentials across regions, while the distribution of infrastructure stocks
contributes very little to such differences and actually reduces them marginally. Second, the
pattern of returns across regions is very different for the two factors. While the expected
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returns to infrastructure are generally higher in the richer regions, the return to education
tends to be higher in the poorest territories. Hence, a conflict between the two goals of
cohesion policy, national convergence to EU income levels and the reduction of internal
disparities, arises in relation to infrastructures, but not with regard to education. These
considerations suggest that it may be possible to increase the effectiveness of both national
and EU cohesion and growth policies by devoting greater resources to investment in human
capital in poorer regions and by redirecting part of EU financing for infrastructures towards
richer areas.
Focusing on human capital, our analysis implies that raising attainment levels in the
poorer regions can have a substantial payoff in the middle and long run both in terms of
overall growth and of increased internal cohesion. Although we have not formally analyzed
the effects of adult training in this report, we believe that EU-financed investment in human
capital should be chanelled through the public school system to a considerably greater extent
than in the past. The reason is that the public school system has two important advantages
over the adult training schemes that have absorbed the bulk of EU expenditure on human
capital in Spain. First, it provides a more efficient vehicle for reaching a broad segment of
the population, and for doing so before skill shortages begin to build up. And second, working
increasingly through this more consolidated and more closely monitored channel can be
expected to increase the quality of training while improving the management and control of
ESF resources. It would also be advisable to exploit any potential synergies and
complementarities between the adult training and public school systems, particularly at the
vocational and university levels. It seems likely that sharing facilities and personnel can
reduce costs and increase the quality of both systems.
The resources required to finance additional investment in human capital should come from
the Spanish national and regional governments as well as from the EU's Structural Funds. In
our view, the central government's main responsibility in this regard is to gradually
eliminate the important differences that we now find across territories in terms of the
resources per capita available to regional governments, which are the administrations that
are directly responsible for the provision of education. EU structural expenditure should co-
finance the building and equipment of schools in needy areas and also subsidize in part their
personnel costs. Such expenditure should be subject to strict additionality requirements so as to
prevent the diversion of resources to other uses. Regional cofinancing rates for operating
expenses should be higher than those for capital investment, and should gradually rise over
time so that regional governments eventually assume the full cost of these programmes as
increased attainment begins to translate into higher income and tax revenues.
71. Introduction
This document is the final report on a study on the economic effects of schooling in the
Spanish regions and on the potential role of investment in human capital as a tool for
promoting regional growth and cohesion. It provides estimates of the economic returns to
education in the regions of Spain, both from a private and from a social perspective, analyzes
the impact of various government policies on private incentives to invest in human capital,
and explores the likely long-term effects of educational investment on government finances. It
also attempts to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the adequacy of the aggregate
investment patterns observed in different territories and to identify changes in the design of
national and EU cohesion and growth policies that may help enhance their effectiveness.
The study is largely a replication at the regional level of a previous report that analyzed
similar issues at the level of EU member states (de la Fuente, 2003), with some extensions that
attempt to increase its policy relevance. In particular, we have constructed specific estimates
of private returns for the different educational levels, explored the budgetary implications of
educational expenditure, and compared the social returns to schooling to those on investment
on infrastructures as well as on other physical capital.
An important change relative to de la Fuente (2003) is that all the parameters that
measure the effects of schooling on individual wages and labour market outcomes have been
estimated econometrically using homogeneous individual-level data. This is a significant
improvement, for data availability problems and the time constraints on this earlier study
forced us to set the values of some key coefficients using potentially heterogeneous estimates
drawn from the literature or rough calculations made with rather coarse aggregate data. One
important result of this methodological change is that our current estimates of the importance
of the employment effects of schooling are considerably larger than those obtained in de la
Fuente (2003) for the case of Spain. In turn, this finding modifies our conclusions regarding the
effects of public policies on educational incentives. Since the distortionary effects of
unemployment insurance rise with the responsiveness of the probability of employment to
educational attainment, our estimate of the effective tax rate on human capital rises sharply
relative to the previous study as a result of a sizable increase in the component of this tax rate
that captures the disincentives generated by the unemployment insurance system.
Since we have been dealing with a single country, concerns about data quality and
heterogeneity, while still significant, are considerably smaller in this study than in our
previous report. Our data on school attainment and educational expenditure have been
constructed using information from the national census and from various publications of the
Spanish government that provide reasonably homogeneous information for all regions. On the
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other hand, many of the other caveats emphasized in de la Fuente (2003) and de la Fuente
and Ciccone (2002) remain applicable. In particular, given the considerable uncertainty that
remains concerning estimates of the returns to schooling and to other assets, our results should
be regarded as indicative of the order of magnitude of the relevant effects rather than as
precise estimates of their values. The margin of error, moreover, increases considerably when
we attempt to draw specific conclusions for different territories rather than for the country as
a whole, as regional estimates of the social returns to schooling are more sensitive to
assumptions concerning funcional forms and to other estimation issues than their counterparts
for the entire sample.
With all the caution this requires, our findings reinforce the conclusions of our previous
reports where we emphasized that schooling is a crucial determinant of labour market
outcomes at the individual level and a strategic growth factor that should play an important
role in growth policies in general and in regional development schemes in particular.
As in previous studies, we find that schooling is an extremely attractive investment
alternative from an individual point of view, as its expected return greatly exceeds those on
the financial assets available to households. Expected returns to schooling in Spain are
particularly high for university and initial vocational training. We also find that the effects
of schooling on employment constitute a significant fraction of its economic payoff, especially
at the lower educational levels and in the poorer regions. As for the effects of public policies
on private incentives to remain in school, we find that while the tax system per se generates
only modest disincentives, those arising from unemployment insurance can be considerable.
From the point of view of minimizing such distortions, it would be preferrable to uncap
unemployment benefits while reducing replacement ratios. Efficiency gains, however, must be
balanced against the equity considerations that rightly influence the design of the social
protection system. We also find that educational expenditure at post-compulsory levels is
self-financing over the long run, as increased tax revenues and savings on unemployment
insurance payments more than offset, in present value terms, government expenditure on
education.
Disparities in educational attainment across the regions of Spain are large and unlikely to
disappear spontaneously in the foreseeable future. Educational differences across regions are
lower for younger cohorts than for the adult population as a whole, but remain considerable
even for this segment of the population. The reduction in regional educational inequality that
we observe for the younger population is largely driven by homogeneization at the bottom,
that is by the achievement of nearly universal lower secondary attainment in all regions. At
the other end of the educational ladder, by contrast, there is no clear pattern of regional
convergence when we focus on younger cohorts, and regional disparities in terms of university
attainment can actually be expected to rise in the future.
9Our estimates of the contribution of schooling to aggregate productivity suggest that
attainment differences can explain a significant fraction of observed regional productivity
differentials, making educational investment a potentially crucial tool of regional cohesion
policy. These estimates also imply that the social returns to schooling are large and, on the
whole, compare favourably with those available from investment in physical capital. A
mixed picture emerges, however, when we compare the expected returns to schooling with
those on infrastructure investment. In general terms, the expected return on infrastructures
exceeds that on human capital in the richer Spanish regions, but the reverse is true in most of
the poorer territories. European and national cohesion and growth policies should take into
account this diversity of regional return patterns.
The rest of the report is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 contain preliminary
material. Section 2 describes the construction of our estimates of educational expenditure and
regional attainment levels. Section 3 then presents econometric estimates of the effects of
schooling on individual wages, employment probabilities and participation rates and on
aggregate productivity. Sections 4-6 contain the core of the analysis. Using the results of the
previous sections, in section 4  we construct measures of the private returns to schooling and
analyze the impact of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. Section 5
deals with the effects of educational investment on public budgets. In section 6 we present
estimates of the social return to schooling and compare them with the expected returns to
investment in alternative assets. Section 7 concludes with a summary of the main conclusions
and some policy recommendations. The Appendix contains technical and data details as well
as the complete results of the different calculations.
2. Educational expenditure and attainment in the Spanish regions
This section describes the construction of two variables that will play an important role in
the analysis that follows: expenditure per student and educational attainment. In subsection a
we estimate average private and public regional expenditure per student at the secondary and
university levels and briefly explore the determinants of regional educational spending. In
subsection b we use census data to construct regional series on educational attainment covering
the period 1960-2001. We also use the last available census data on the attainment of the
different age subgroups to explore the likely future evolution of regional schooling
disparities, present some additional indicators of regional educational performance and
explore the correlation between expenditure and performance.
a. Regional expenditure on secondary and university education
The Spanish educational system has been gradually transferred to the regional
governments over the twenty years following the promulgation of the Constitution of 1978,
which introduced a quasi-federal system for the territorial organization of the state. The
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central government, however, is still responsible for overall curriculum design, maintains
other important supervisory and regulatory functions and finances most of the scholarhip and
grant programmes. It also manages directly the public school system in the two autonomous
North-African cities of Ceuta and Melilla as well as two national and rather atypical
universities, one that provides education at a distance (through the mail and internet) and
another one that specializes in short monographic courses that take place mostly over the
summer vacation period. Public schools and universities are generally managed by the
education departments of the regional governments but there are some exceptions, especially
at the pre-primary level where both local administrations and the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs play a relatively important role. In addition to the public school system, there
is a large number of private centers, many of which are managed by the Catholic Church. The
majority of these centers have "concertation agreements" with the regional administrations
and are heavily subsidized. In principle, concerted schools are free, but they often raise
significant revenues from fees for non-core academic activities and from voluntary
contributions channeled through parents' associations.
We have estimated private and public expenditure per student in formal education at the
secondary and university levels using data from different publications of the Ministries of
Education and Finance and the National Statistical Institute. The details are in section 1 of
the Appendix. Secondary schooling includes basic and advanced vocational training as well
as general academic programmes and the schooling of students with special needs who have
entered this educational level. We leave out the North-African territories of Ceuta and
Melilla and the two national universities mentioned above. Public expenditure includes the
operating costs of public educational institutions (net of research expenditure by universities),
subsidies to concerted private centers, an estimate of the relevant indirect costs (general
administration and support programmes) and two types of subsidies to households: tuition-
related grants (which take almost exclusively the form of tuition waivers at the university
level) and cash subsidies that help defray living expenses and other costs. Private
expenditure is defined as the difference between academic fees paid by households and non-
tuition subsidies received by them (and will be negative when subsidies exceed direct costs as
in the case of Extremadura in Table 1 below). Hence, we do not take into account expenditure
on books, school materials, lodging or transportation. Total expenditure is calculated as the
sum of public and private expenditure. Notice that this definition means that non-tuition
grants will cancel and drop out of the total.
 Table 1 shows average expenditure per student at each level for the entire educational
system, without distinguishing between students enrolled in private and public centers. These
figures are normalized by average expenditure per student in the entire country (excluding
Ceuta and Melilla). The last two columns (labeled combined expenditure) try to approximate
the cost per student of a marginal incease in upper secondary attainment under the assumption
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that half of the new graduates will go on to university. They are weighted averages of
expenditure per student at the secondary and tertiary levels with weights of 2/3 and 1/3
respectively.
Table 1: Average expenditure per student, 2000
(weighted avge. of all regions = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
                                              SECONDARY                UNIVERSITY                               COMBINED
private to ta l pr ivate to ta l pr ivate public to ta l
País Vasco 194.3 154.6 109.0 89.8 132.7 132.9 132.9
Rioja 41.3 104.4 88.5 177.4 75.4 136.1 128.9
Navarra 60.6 147.1 142.4 80.2 119.7 125.3 124.7
Cantabria 32.2 101.4 112.0 137.8 89.9 116.8 113.6
Cataluña 221.8 112.8 167.8 111.9 182.8 103.0 112.5
Aragón 98.8 110.4 100.0 105.6 99.7 110.0 108.8
Canarias 58.8 112.2 29.8 94.6 37.8 115.5 106.3
Valencia 86.4 101.5 76.3 104.8 79.1 105.8 102.6
Cast. y León 46.1 103.5 67.2 98.3 61.3 107.3 101.8
Asturias 80.9 102.8 72.7 99.0 75.0 105.1 101.5
Gal ic ia 56.9 108.9 54.0 86.0 54.8 107.5 101.3
Madrid 242.7 87.1 186.9 121.7 202.4 84.7 98.7
Baleares 104.5 103.2 88.4 72.7 92.9 93.0 93.0
Cast.-Mancha 5.7 92.0 27.3 93.1 21.3 102.0 92.4
Murcia 18.3 84.2 68.5 101.3 54.5 94.7 89.9
Extremadura -23.4 81.3 -8.5 84.5 -12.7 95.2 82.4
Andalucía 14.1 80.7 45.1 78.2 36.5 85.7 79.9
average 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
average, euros 159 3,204 829 3,233 382 2,831 3,214
avge. Obj. 1 37.9 94.2 54.5 91.2 49.9 99.0 93.2
avge. rest 203.1 109.7 160.1 111.6 172.0 102.0 110.3
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: expenditure per student is always calculated by dividing the relevant total expenditure (private,
public or both) by the total number of students, independently of whether they are enrolled in private or in
public institutions. Average secondary and university expenditure in Objective 1 and non-Objective 1
regions are obtained by weighting regional expenditure levels in proportion to enrollments at each level.
Combined expenditure is then obtained by averaging across levels with the same weights as elsewhere (2/3
and 1/3).
As may be expected, expenditure per student rises with income per capita and with the
resources available to regional governments. A regression of combined total expenditure per
student on these two variables, with all magnitudes measured in percentage deviations from
the Spanish average, gives the following results:1
(1) expenditure per student = 0.508*regional financing per capita + 0.367*income per capita
                              (t =)                                   (3.61)                                                                         (3.34)
with an R2 of 0.621. Income per capita is measured by GDP per capita in 1995 and the data on
regional financing per capita, taken from de la Fuente (2000), refer to 1997 (which is the
1
 The ratio of the total number of secondary and university students to the population aged 25 and over
was not significant in equation (1).
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Figure 1: Public expenditure per student vs. regional financing per capita
-20%
-10%
10%
20%
30%
40%
-20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Ri PV
Na
CnCnt
Ba
Va
Ma
An
Mu
Ca CM
As
Ar
Ex
Ga
CL
relative regional financing per capita   
relative public expenditure per student
Figure 2: Private expenditure per student vs. income per capita
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   Notes:
- All variables measured in percentage deviations from their national means.
- Relative income per capita is GDP per capita in percentage deviations from the national average in 1995.
The data used to calculate it are taken from Fundación BBV (2000).
- Key: An = Andalucia; Ar = Aragón; As = Asturias; Ba = Baleares; Cn = Canarias; Cnt = Cantabria; CL =
Castilla y León; CM = Castilla la Mancha; Cat = Cataluña; Va = Valencia; Ex = Extremadura; Ga = Galicia;
Ma = Madrid; Mu = Murcia; Na = Navarra; PV = País Vasco; Ri = Rioja.
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latest year for which they are available) and have been homogenized to correct for
differences across regions in the functions they had assumed in that date.2
Figures 1 and 2 plot the private and public components of expenditure per student against
the two explanatory variables of equation (1), with all variables again measured in
percentage deviations from national averages. The private component of expenditure per
student rises with income per capita, and the public one appears to be quite sensitive to
regional financing.
b. School attainment and other educational indicators
In this section we construct and analyze measures of school attainment by region and cohort
and other educational indicators.
i. The evolution of regional school attainment levels
We have used data from the national census and the municipal registers to construct new
regional series of educational attainment covering the period 1960-2000. (See section 2 of the
Appendix for details). We provide estimates of the fraction of the population aged 25 and
over that has started (but not necessarily completed) each of the following levels of
education: illiterates (L0), primary schooling (L1), lower and upper secondary schooling (L2.1
and L2.2) and two levels of higher education (L3.1 and L3.2).
Table 2: Attainment levels and cumulative durations
______________________________________________________________________
code l e v e l Spanish equivalent duration
L0 Illiterates 0
L1 Primary primaria, graduado escolar 5
L2.1 Lower secondary EGB, bachiller elemental, ESO 8
L2.2 Upper secondary bachillerato, COU, FP I and FP II 12
L3.1 Higher education, first level diplomatura, peritaje 14
L3.2 Higher education, second level licenciatura 17
______________________________________________________________________
Table 2 lists the Spanish equivalents of the different attainment levels (which have
changed over time) and their typical cumulative durations. Tables A.12-A.17 in section 2 of
the Appendix contain detailed results on the composition of the adult population by
educational level between 1960 and 2000. Using these data and the durations given in Table 2,
we have estimated average years of attainment, which is shown in Table 3. The table shows
normalized attainments, with the national average set to 100 in each period and the regions
2 On the other hand, a dummy for Rioja is significant when added to equation (1). Notice that this region is a
clear outlier in Figure 1 because of its very high public expenditure per student at the university level. This
seems to be largely due to the fact that this region's university is of recent creation. As a result, expenditure
includes large set up and investment components.
   When a Rioja dummy is added, the coefficients of regional financing and income per capita in equation (1)
become 0.522 (t = 4.27) and 0.293 (t = 2.94) respectively.
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ordered by decreasing schooling in 2000. The last two rows show, respectively, average
attainment in years for the country as a whole and the coefficient of variation across regions
of relative attainment.
Table 3: Normalized average years of schooling, Spain = 100
______________________________________________________________________
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Madrid 120.9 120.2 119.6 120.2 120.7 118.5 116.8 114.9 114.2
P. Vasco 112.9 111.4 109.9 109.5 109.1 108.8 109.3 109.1 109.8
Navarra 108.3 108.6 108.8 108.0 107.3 106.7 106.9 106.9 108.0
Cantabria 112.1 110.0 108.0 107.0 106.1 104.8 104.3 103.8 104.2
Rioja 107.2 105.3 103.4 102.5 101.7 100.6 100.3 101.2 103.1
Cataluña 105.8 104.4 103.1 103.9 104.6 103.6 103.1 102.1 101.9
Aragón 102.1 102.0 101.8 101.0 100.3 100.1 100.7 100.9 101.9
Asturias 109.1 107.9 106.7 105.2 103.9 102.6 102.2 101.4 101.4
Baleares 98.0 98.4 98.8 99.0 99.1 99.5 100.6 100.1 100.3
Cast. y León 106.2 105.1 104.0 102.6 101.4 100.1 99.7 99.0 99.3
Canarias 91.9 94.4 96.8 97.1 97.4 98.1 99.5 98.4 97.9
Valencia 99.0 98.2 97.5 96.7 96.0 96.0 96.8 96.7 97.3
Murcia 93.2 92.6 92.0 90.8 89.7 91.5 94.3 94.7 95.4
Gal ic ia 97.9 97.3 96.7 95.0 93.6 92.7 92.6 92.7 93.6
Andalucía 86.9 87.7 88.4 88.5 88.6 89.7 91.5 92.0 93.0
Cast.-Man. 86.7 87.0 87.2 85.8 84.4 84.9 86.2 86.7 87.6
Extremadura 85.6 86.1 86.5 85.3 84.3 84.9 86.3 86.4 87.0
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Spain, years 4.97 5.08 5.19 5.53 5.87 6.35 6.84 7.52 8.19
coef. of var. 9.8% 9.2% 8.6% 8.9% 9.2% 8.5% 7.7% 7.3% 7.1%
______________________________________________________________________
Average educational attainment in Spain rose by over 60% between 1960 and 2000 while
the dispersion of attainment levels across regions fell by 28%. Progress on both fronts was
considerably faster during the second half of the sample period. Following some oscillations
in the first two decades of the sample, regional attainment  disparities decrease steadily
after 1980 and the growth rate of years of attainment roughly doubles relative to the first
half of the sample.
Using data for 1995, Figure 3 shows that educational attainment is closely related to
income per capita. The correlation between relative income per capita and relative
attainment (both measured in percentage deviations from the national mean) is 0.773 and the
majority of the regions concentrate on the north-eastern and southwestern quadrants of Figure
3, indicating that below-average income goes hand in hand with below-average attainment.
In particular, all Objective 1 regions3 but two (Asturias and Cantabria) have attainment
levels below the national mean.
3
 Valencia (Va) and all the regions located to its left in Figure 3 were Objective 1 regions in 1995.
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Figure 3: Relative attainment vs. relative GDP per capita in 1995
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- Note: relative income per capita is GDP per capita in percentage deviations from the national average in
1995. The data used to calculate it are taken from Fundación BBV (2000).
- Key: An = Andalucia; Ar = Aragón; As = Asturias; Ba = Baleares; Cn = Canarias; Cnt = Cantabria; CL =
Castilla y León; CM = Castilla la Mancha; Cat = Cataluña; Va = Valencia; Ex = Extremadura; Ga = Galicia;
Ma = Madrid; Mu = Murcia; Na = Navarra; PV = País Vasco; Ri = Rioja.
ii. Attainment by cohort and the likely evolution of educational disparities
Using data from the 2001 Census, we have constructed measures of educational attainment
by cohort for the different regions (see section 2 of the Appendix for details). This section
explores the implications of these data for the likely future evolution of regional educational
disparities. In particular, we construct indicators of educational convergence between regions
as we move to younger and younger cohorts and interpret them as predictors of future trends in
educational convergence. Although the dispersion of schooling levels across regions is
significantly smaller for younger cohorts than for the overall population, we conclude that
sizable disparities are likely to persist in the future. At higher attainment levels,
differences across regions may actually be expected to increase over time.
Table 4 shows average attainment by cohort in each region in 2001. The body of the table
shows values normalized by average Spanish attainment (shown in years in the penultimate
row), and the last row of the table shows the dispersion across regions of relative attainment,
measured by its coefficient of variation. The first column refers to the entire adult population
(25+), and the remaining columns to different age subgroups.
As expected, attainment rises sharply and its dispersion across regions falls as we move
from older to younger cohorts. A comparison between the first and second columns of the table
(i.e. between the entire adult population and its youngest cohort) can be especially
informative, as it tells us how the existing situation is likely to change in the future assuming
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that current enrollment patterns remain unchanged and that there are no significant
migration flows. Under these assumptions, regional disparities in attainment can be expected
to fall by 26.3% in the future (i.e. the coefficient of variation of relative attainment would
drop from 9.2% to 6.8%). This is a rather significant change, but it would still leave a
substantial amount of regional inequality and a difference in relative attainment of over
twenty points between the top and the bottom regions.
Table 4: Average years of schooling by cohort, 2001 (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________
25+ 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Madrid 116.4 110.3 113.2 113.7 118.7 119.9
P. Vasco 113.0 111.9 112.6 110.9 114.3 122.6
Navarra 111.8 107.7 108.4 110.9 118.2 125.9
Cantabria 106.7 102.8 104.7 107.7 114.8 121.3
Rioja 105.7 103.9 104.6 106.9 111.2 117.0
Aragón 103.4 105.6 105.8 107.3 109.3 107.8
Cataluña 102.5 101.1 102.6 102.3 102.9 107.0
Asturias 102.4 105.5 105.7 105.1 106.2 110.2
Baleares 101.1 93.7 96.4 101.3 108.8 107.6
C.-León 100.7 105.2 103.4 103.3 104.6 109.3
Canarias 97.6 92.0 92.9 95.0 95.4 93.4
Valencia 97.3 96.6 96.2 97.6 97.7 98.4
Murcia 93.7 92.1 94.1 93.0 88.4 83.8
Gal ic ia 91.8 100.4 96.4 92.7 91.5 90.4
Andalucía 90.7 92.6 90.6 89.1 85.5 80.8
C.-Mancha 83.5 91.6 89.9 87.0 77.1 69.6
Extremadura 83.1 92.0 88.2 84.4 77.6 71.2
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Spain (years) 7.93 10.61 9.56 8.07 6.32 4.55
coeff. of var. 9.2% 6.8% 7.6% 8.7% 12.9% 17.0%
______________________________________________________________
- Note: estimates for the 25+ population do not coincide exactly with those given in Table 3 for two reasons.
First, they correspond to 2001 rather than to 2000, and second, in this table we are using a finer
breakdown by educational level than in Table 3 (because such a breakdown was not available for earlier
census data).
Figure 4 plots relative attainment of the 25-34 and 25+ age groups against relative income
per capita in 1995. Focusing on the bottom of the income distribution, many of the poorer
regions seem to be doing quite well in terms of raising the relative attainment levels of their
younger citizens. The exceptions are Andalucía, Murcia and Canarias (An, Mu and Cn). In the
first case the gains are rather small, and in the last two relative attainment levels actually
drop when we consider the youngest cohort. At the other end of the income scale, the
evolution of Baleares (Ba) is also worrisome, as this region is clearly heading towards below
average attainment levels in the future.4
4 It is worth noting that the two island regions (Baleares and Canarias) show rather marked declines in
relative attainment for the younger population. It is possible that plentiful job opportunities in the booming
touristic sector may be discouraging youngsters from staying in schoool beyond the compulsory age.
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Figure 4: Relative attainment in years vs. relative income per capita in 1995
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Figure 5: Regional convergence of attainment levels across cohorts
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- Note: percentage decrease in the coefficient of variation across regions as we go from the entire adult
population (25+) to the youngest cohort (20-24 for lower and upper secondary or better and 25-34 for
university).
To see what is driving the process of regional convergence in years of schooling across
cohorts, it is useful to examine how regional disparities vary across age groups for different
educational levels. Figure 5 shows the degree of convergence across cohorts for four different
educational indicators: the average number of years of schooling and the fraction of the
population which has completed at least each of three successively higher educational
levels (lower secondary, upper secondary including vocational training, and the first cycle of
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university). Convergence is measured by the percentage reduction in the coefficient of
variation across regions of the relevant attainment measure that we observe as we go from the
entire population to the youngest relevant cohort. This indicator is computed for all regions
together and for a restricted sample that excludes Madrid (which as we will see shortly
displays rather atypical behaviour in some ways).5
The figure suggests that the process of convergence in years of schooling is driven mainly by
the extension of compulsory schooling to the lower secondary level. Attainment rates at this
level are uniformly very high across regions for younger cohorts. Things are rather different,
however, for post-compulsory cycles. If we exclude Madrid from the sample, there is
absolutely no convergence across cohorts in terms of upper secondary (or better) attainment,
and regional disparities in terms of university attainment can actually be expected to increase
by 30% in the future.
Figure 6: Regional convergence in university attainment across cohorts
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Figure 6 shows what is behind this last finding. It plots the increase in relative university
attainment as we go from the 25+ to the 25-34 age groups against the relative attainment of
the 25+ population. Notice that Madrid is an extreme outlier in this figure. If we keep it in
the sample, there is a broadly negative relationship between the two variables that may be
taken as an indication of convergence (i.e. that intially less educated regions are making
faster progress). In the absence of Madrid, however, this is no longer the case. Moreover, more
than half the regions display divergent behaviour, meaning that university attainment tends
to rise further in regions that are already above the national average (Castilla and León,
5
 Being the seat of the national government, and of most large company headquarters, Madrid has
traditionally attracted large numbers of highly skilled people. Over the last twenty-five years, however,
this factor has become increasingly less important as a result of the  process of decentralization and the
creation of the regional governments.
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Aragón, Navarra and Pais Vasco), and to fall in regions that are below the Spanish mean
(Baleares, Murcia, Andalucía, Canarias and Cantabria).
A region may fail to raise its university attainment level either because it does not succeed
in giving enough of its residents a university education or because a large fraction of those who
do achieve such qualifications migrate to other regions. To get some feeling for the
contribution of migration flows to the evolution of university attainment, Figure 7 plots the
relative attainment level of the 25-34 age group against the relative university graduation
rate, together with the fitted regression line. The (gross) university graduation rate is
originally defined as the ratio between the total number of graduates in the universities of a
region during a given academic year and the total population of the same region with the
theretical age of college graduation. I have corrected this variable so that it approximates
the graduation rate by region of origin (rather than by location of the university).6
Figure 7: Relative university attainment 25-34 vs. relative graduation rate by region of origin
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Large deviations from the fitted regression line in Figure 7 alert us to regions where
migration flows are important determinants of university attainment rates for young cohorts.
As expected, Madrid shows a large positive deviation that signals a large inflow of young
university graduates from other regions (or an inflow of university students who remain in the
region after graduation). At the other extreme, the migration of highly qualified young
6
 The data on gross graduation rates are taken from Ministerio de Educación (2002). Actually, this source
provides two separate graduation rates for short and long univesity courses. I have added both rates to
approximate the overall gross graduation rate. This figure is then multiplied by a correction factor that is
constructed as the quotient between the number of university students whose family residence is in a given
region, and the total number of students enrolled in universities located in the same region. Both the
numerator and the denominator exclude graduate students.
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people appears to be an important problem in Murcia, Castilla la Mancha, Canarias and
Andalucía. In all these regions, however, gross graduation rates are well below the national
average, indicating that migration is not the only cause of the problem.
iii. Other indicators of educational performance
In this section we construct a set of indicators that measure regional educational
performance along two dimensions: access to non-compulsory schooling cycles, and academic
success at different educational levels. Table 5 gives the relative values of the different
indicators, normalized by the corresponding national averages, which are set to 100 in all
cases. The raw values of the different variables are shown in Table A.25 in the Appendix and,
for the case of Spain as a whole, in the last row of Table 5. The information is taken from
Ministerio de Educación (2002) and Consejo de Universidades (2002) and refers to 1999-2000 or
to some nearby year.
The first panel of Table 5 contains several indicators of academic success at different
schooling levels. Success rates in mandatory cycles are measured by regional adequacy ratios
at ages 12 and 15 (adeq12 and adeq15), which are defined as the percentage of students of
those ages that are enrolled in the level that corresponds to them according to their age. The
third and fourth columns contain two variables that try to approximate the probability of
completing upper secondary schooling (uppsec) and university training (univ). Uppsec
corresponds, roughly, to the probability of completing upper secondary schooling on time. Its
raw value is obtained by multiplying the promotion rates for the two courses of this level,
defined as the percentage of enrolled students that successfully complete each grade.7 Univ is
defined as the ratio of graduates from long university cycles in 1999-2000 to the number of
students entering these cycles five years earlier and will therefore approximate the
probability of obtaining a university degree but not necessarily within its theoretical
duration. The last column of the table contains a combined indicator (success) which is
constructed as an unweighted average of the partial indicators given in the previous columns
of the table. Regions are ranked by this combined indicator.
Panel b of Table 5 contains indicators of access to non-compulsory educational levels. Access
to pre-primary education is measured by the expected years of pre-primary schooling in each
region (pre-school), which is calculated using enrollment rates at different pre-primary
levels. Access to post-compulsory schooling is measured by the net enrollment rate in any post-
compulsory cycle at age 17 (enr17pc), and by the net enrollment rate in university at age 20
(enr20univ). Net enrollment rates are defined as the percentage of the population of a given
age that are enrolled in the relevant course. Net enrollment rates for university peak at 20
7
 Since the old and new systems coexist at this level, completion rates are calculated first for the different
systems and then averaged, using as weights the share of students enrolled in each system.
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Table 5: Selected educational indicators
a. Academic success at different educational levels
_________________________________________________________
adeq12 adeq15 uppsec univ success
País Vasco 102.8 113.8 127.2 106.2 112.5
Navarra 104.1 113.0 134.4 98.1 112.4
Cataluña 103.9 129.7 98.0 110.3 110.5
Asturias 102.8 104.1 101.2 123.8 108.0
Madrid 101.3 99.7 100.5 115.6 104.3
Valencia 100.3 95.9 94.5 102.9 98.4
Aragón 102.0 101.9 112.5 75.8 98.0
C.-León 101.4 94.4 91.5 102.8 97.5
Andalucía 97.4 90.3 116.0 83.7 96.9
Rioja 102.7 102.2 105.5 75.8 96.5
Cantabria 102.3 96.2 89.6 84.9 93.3
C.-Mancha 99.4 89.2 97.7 79.0 91.3
Gal ic ia 99.3 94.8 85.6 75.7 88.9
Murcia 98.8 90.1 88.9 76.7 88.6
Extremadura 100.6 89.7 92.4 65.5 87.0
Canarias 94.6 90.8 73.0 68.9 81.8
Baleares 94.6 85.8 92.4 53.2 81.5
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Spain (level) 90.1% 63.9% 49.1% 77.7%
_________________________________________________________
b. Access to non-compulsory schooling
_________________________________________________________
pre-school enr17pc enr20univ access per f
País Vasco 117.12 127.48 118.46 121.02 117.8
Navarra 96.91 124.47 118.95 113.44 115.3
Cast. y León 98.99 108.00 116.78 107.93 101.8
Aragón 99.02 116.66 108.04 107.91 106.7
Asturias 96.78 111.22 114.73 107.58 105.1
Madrid 105.50 110.83 93.75 103.36 101.9
Cataluña 122.39 100.85 81.06 101.43 106.0
Rioja 99.22 110.53 70.58 93.45 98.4
Cast. Mancha 97.20 88.91 93.33 93.15 94.3
Cantabria 96.13 99.66 76.27 90.69 93.4
Valencia 94.24 90.47 86.79 90.50 93.7
Extremadura 95.96 87.43 82.37 88.59 91.4
Murcia 101.46 91.99 71.33 88.26 90.4
Andalucía 83.08 92.99 86.14 87.40 94.3
Gal ic ia 93.26 100.17 65.67 86.37 89.8
Canarias 95.61 94.81 61.43 83.95 85.0
Baleares 99.77 81.96 63.85 81.86 86.4
Spain 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0
Spain (level) 3.07 63.9% 32.0%
_________________________________________________________
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presumably because of late entry of some applicants. As in the previous section (see footnote
6), I have corrected the net university enrollment rate so that it reflects the region of origin of
the student population, rather than the location of the center where they are enrolled. The
last two columns of the table contain a combined indicator of access to non-compulsory
schooling (access) and an overall peformance index (perf). The access indicator is an
unweighted average of the variables in the previous columns, and perf is a simple average of
the success and access indicators. Figure 8 shows the ranking of regions according to the
overall performance indicator.
Figure 8: Relative educational performance (perf)
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Figure 9 shows that there is no apparent trade-off between educational access and success,
as the correlation between these two variables is positive and high. Figure 10 plots the
combined educational peformance index against income per capita in 1995. With only three
significant exceptions (Asturias, Castilla y León and Baleares), Objective 1 regions display
below-average educational performance, and richer territories lie above the national mean in
terms of this indicator.
Table 6 shows the results of regressing different performance indicators on two variables
that can be reasonably expected to have an important effect on them, namely, expenditure per
student and the average attainment of the adult population (which we interpret as a proxy
for parental attainment).8 The estimated coefficients of both variables are positive as
expected, but not always significant (which is perhaps not surprising given the small number
of observations and the coarseness of some of our indicators). Parental attainment seems to be
especially important as a determinant of the decision to continue studying beyond the
8 It is interesting to note that this second variable performs much better than average income per capita in
regressions like the ones summarized in Table 6, suggesting that parental education is more important than
income per se as a determinant of academic success.
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compulsory level (equation [1]), and expenditure per student at the secondary level appears to
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Figure 9: Educational access vs. success
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Figure 10: Combined educational performance (perf) vs. relative income per capita
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be an important determinant of both access and success at pre-university levels (equations [1],
[3] and [4]). Measures of university or combined spending, on the other hand, are not significant
determinants of tertiary access or success (see equations [2] and [5]) even when we add a dummy
to control for Rioja where, as noted above, university expenditure per student may be greatly
overestimated. Both adult attainment and expenditure have positive effects on the overall
performance indicator, although neither coefficient is significant at the 5% level (equation
[6]).
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Table 6: Expenditure, attainment and educational performance
______________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
enr17pc enr20univ adeq15 uppsec univ per f
secondary expenditure 0.251 0.243 0.347
(2.10) (1.88) (1.81)
university expenditure 0.263
(0.92)
combined expenditure 0.297 0.306
(0.64) (1.74)
attainment 25+ 0.762 0.620 0.403 0.339 0.984 0.359
(3.01) (0.92) (1.47) (0.83) (1.99) (1.40)
dummy Rioja -0.239 -0.310 -0.078
(1.38) (1.41) (1.19)
R2 0.661 0.208 0.454 0.350 0.364 0.522
______________________________________________________________________
Notes
- t ratios in parentheses below each coefficient.
- All equations include a constant, whose value is not reported.
3. Econometric estimates of the effects of schooling
In this section we present some econometric estimates of the effects of schooling on
individual wages and labour market outcomes and on aggregate productivity growth. These
estimates will be a key input to the rate of return calculations reported below.
a. Schooling and wages
The 1995 Wage Structure Survey (WSS) is a large employer survey undertaken by the
National Statistical Institute. It provides data on the wages, working hours and personal
characteristics for a sample of 155,000 workers  drawn from a population of around 3.6 million
salaried employees working in private establishments of at least 10 workers in all sectors
except for agriculture and fisheries. Using these data we have estimated two different wage
regressions for each region.9 The first one is a standard Mincerian wage equation of the form
(2) ln Wi = c + qSi + a*potexpi + b*potexpi2 + d*Dsexi + e*Dcoal + ui
where Wi is the gross hourly wage of worker i (before income tax and employee social security
contributions are witheld), c a constant and ui a random disturbance. The explanatory
variables are the number of years of schooling (S), potential experience (potexp, defined as
the time elapsed since the completion of education) and its square, and two dummy variables,
one for the sex of the worker (Dsex) and the other for the coal mining sector (Dcoal). The last
variable is included because coal mining is a peculiar sector that mostly employs workers
without qualifications but pays extremely high wages, in part because it is dominated by a
9
 See de la Fuente and Jimeno (2003) for additional details on the estimates presented in this subsection and
in the following one.
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public enterprise with a highly unionized and militant labour force, and in part as
compensation for the high occupational risks faced by miners.10 The second specification is
identical to equation (2) except that the years of schooling variable (S) is replaced by a set of
dummy variables, one for each of the educational levels listed in Table 7.11
Table 7: Attainment levels used in the WSS and cumulative durations
_________________________________________
cumulative
duration
primary or no schooling 5
lower secondary (EGB) 8
basic vocational training (FP I) 10
upper secondary (bachillerato) 12
advanced vocational training (FP II) 13
university, 1st cycle (diplomatura) 15
university, 2nd cycle (licenciatura) 17
_________________________________________
It is important to note that the WSS is not a random sample comprised of independent
observations drawn from a common distribution with equal probabilities. The probability
that a worker will be included in the sample varies across sectors, establishment sizes and
regions, and it is likely that wages will be highly correlated within a given firm. Since these
features of the data can lead to inconsistent estimates of the relevant coefficients or of their
standard errors when Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used, we have estimated both
specifications using a Weighted Least Squares technique (WLS) that weights observations by
the inverse of their inclusion probabilities (the survey's elevation factors) and we have
allowed for the possible correlation of wages within firms when computing standard errors.12
The detailed results of the estimation are shown in Tables A.26 and A.27 of the Appendix.
Table 8 shows the estimated values of the parameters that measure the effects of schooling on
wages. The first column shows the coefficient of years of schooling in the Mincerian
specification (q), which measures the percentage increase in wages associated with a one-
year increase in attainment. The entries in the other columns (qi with i = ls, us, lv, uv, lu and
uu ) capture the marginal returns per year to each educational level relative to the
immediately preceding school cycle and are constructed using the estimated coefficients of the
educational dummies included in the second specification. Each entry is obtained by dividing
10 In the absence of this variable, the coefficients of the dummies for most non-university levels become
insignificant or even negative in the second specification in those regions where coal mining is important. In
the Mincerian specification, the value of q for these regions becomes atypically low.
11
 Notice that the breakdown by level given in the WSS is finer than the one we have used in the previous
section (because the level of detail is smaller in earlier census reports). The years of schooling used in the
first specification of the wage equation are calculated using the durations given in Table 7.
12
 See Cochran (1977) and Binder (1983). DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) provide a test that can be used
to determine whether the weighted estimator is preferable to OLS. This test suggests that this is indeed the
case with our data.
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the difference between the coefficients of the relevant dummies (those corresponding to the
level of interest and to the one that immediately precedes it) by the difference in their
cumulative durations measured in years.13 Hence, they are directly comparable to the
Mincerian returns parameter (q), which can be seen as a weighted average of all these
coefficients.14
Table 8: Estimated yearly effects of schooling in wage equations
______________________________________________________________________
all levels lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
q qls qus qlv quv qlu quu
Madrid 9.02% 1.45% 9.94% 9.40% 8.55% 11.34% 15.41%
Extremadura 8.52% 6.01% 11.10% 11.28% 1.97% 6.58% 16.18%
Galicia 8.30% 3.45% 11.17% 14.38% 4.76% 9.38% 11.93%
Baleares 8.30% 1.85% 12.66% 21.68% 0.00% 7.58% 4.92%
Cast.-Mancha 8.27% 3.01% 12.25% 13.21% 8.09% 8.82% 6.70%
Canarias 7.99% 2.75% 10.71% 9.05% 5.13% 9.89% 15.23%
Cataluña 7.93% 2.01% 10.33% 12.24% 5.53% 9.55% 12.84%
Andalucía 7.91% 1.47% 11.76% 11.52% 7.47% 7.03% 13.86%
Valencia 7.89% 2.84% 11.12% 9.80% 7.18% 7.30% 9.91%
Murcia 7.86% 7.14% 9.59% 8.97% 1.94% 5.01% 13.60%
Rioja 7.77% 2.75% 11.74% 15.07% 1.55% 5.90% 11.49%
Cast- y León 7.52% 3.04% 10.01% 10.63% 6.47% 7.53% 14.78%
Cantabria 7.04% 4.22% 8.87% 11.27% 1.93% 5.39% 20.04%
P. Vasco 6.08% 0.74% 7.98% 9.39% 3.73% 8.23% 15.61%
Aragón 5.99% 0.00% 8.49% 9.05% 5.71% 7.25% 14.23%
Navarra 5.94% 0.98% 6.51% 10.17% 4.78% 9.92% 12.72%
Asturias 5.89% 0.20% 7.95% 11.22% 1.89% 10.72% 6.44%
Spain 8.38% 1.96% 10.98% 12.53% 6.24% 9.02% 15.32%
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: see footnote no. 14.
Inspection of the table reveals that there is considerable variation across educational
levels and across regions in the estimated wage effects of schooling. Marginal payoffs appear
to be quite low at the lower secondary level, with the exception of some of the poorer regions
(in particular, Extremadura and Murcia). They rise very sharply for the lowest non-
compulsory levels (upper sec and lower voc), fall significantly for the next two, and are
highest for advanced university diplomas.
13
 Completion of lower secondary education is followed either by the two cycles of vocational training or
by upper secondary education and university. The return to upper vocational training shown in the table,
for instance, measures the percentage difference in wages between those who have completed this cycle and
those whose final qualification is basic vocational training, divided by three, which is the duration in
years of the second cycle of vocational training.
14 The zero coefficients shown in bold in Table 8 have been imposed. The original point estimates were
small negative numbers, but not statistically different from zero. When this is done, the estimated marginal
return to the next higher level is also corrected so as to avoid overestating it and the relevant coefficient is
also shown in bold in the table. In particular, the adjustment is carried out directly on the estimated
coefficients of the educational level dummies in the wage equation (whose original values are shown in
Table A.27 in the Appendix). When a given coefficient is smaller than the one corresponding to the
immediately lower educational level, the original value of the former is replaced by the estimated value of
the latter, and then the marginal returns shown in Table 8 are calculated as discussed in the text using the
corrected coefficients.
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Figure 11: Mincerian returns to schooling vs. relative  attaiment in 1995
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- Note: relative attainment is average years of schooling in 1995 measured in percentage deviations from the
national average.
Figure 12: Mincerian returns to schooling vs. relative  GDP per capita in 1995
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- Note: relative income per capita is GDP per capita in percentage deviations from the national average in
1995. The data used to calculate it are taken from Fundación BBV (2000).
Focusing on the Mincerian estimates given in the first column of Table 8, the differences
across regions are considerable but not statistically significant for territories in the middle of
the table. Estimated coefficients range from 5.9 % to 9%, with an average value (weighting
the regions by their respective sample sizes) of 7.7%. Only the three regions at the top of
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Table 8 and the four at the bottom are more than 1.5 standard errors away from this average
value of q.
It is interesting to note that, while q tends to fall across regions with average attainment,
there is no clear correlation between income per capita and the return to schooling. Figures 11
and 12 plot the estimated value of q agains relative attainment and relative income per
capita in 1995 (with both variables measured in percentage deviations from their national
means). The first scatter shows a clear tendency for returns to fall with average attainment,
except in the case of Madrid, which combines the largest value of q with the highest income
level and appears as a clear outlier. The second scatter suggests a U-shaped relationship
between q and relative GDP per capita, with high returns to schooling at both ends of the
income distribution, and relatively low returns in the middle.15
b. Schooling, labour force participation and employment
Following Heckmann (1979), we use a two-stage procedure to estimate the effect of
schooling on labour force participation rates and employment probabilities. First we estimate
a probit model that relates the probability that a given individual will be active (q) to his
or her level of schooling and a series of personal characteristics and other variables that are
listed in Table 9. Then, we estimate a second probit relating the probability of employment
(p) to schooling and to a subset of the same explanatory variables, including as an additional
regressor a variable that measures the propensity of the individual to participate in the
Table 9: Non-schooling variables used in the participation and employment equations
____________________________________________
particip. employm.
sex (male) X X
potential experience X X
potential experience squared X X
university student X X
non-university student X X
yearly dummies (1996-2000) X X
quarterly dummies (Q1-Q3) X X
married X
married*male X
children below six X
children below six * male X
____________________________________________
15 Raymond (2002) also estimates Mincerian wage equations by region using data from the 1990-91
Household Budget Survey. His results are qualitatively similar to ours in that the estimated value of the
Mincerian parameter, q, falls with regional school attainment. There are, however, some important
differences. His estimates are generally higher than ours (the estimated Mincerian return for the country as
a whole is 11.6%), and Madrid goes from the first place in the regional ranking according to our results to
the last place using Raymond's.
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Table 10: Estimated contribution of a year of schooling to the probability of participation (%)
______________________________________________________________________
all levels lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
q' q'ls q'us q'lv q'uv q'lu q'uu
C.-Mancha 3.79 2.90 0.08 5.15 2.05 6.05 2.14
C.-León 3.70 2.41 1.01 4.60 2.71 5.18 2.04
Asturias 3.53 2.72 1.17 6.28 3.12 5.17 3.65
Canarias 3.44 3.36 0.19 3.62 3.40 5.55 1.91
Extremadura 3.35 2.69 0.19 4.25 3.03 6.14 0.95
Andalucía 3.26 2.12 0.18 4.34 3.46 6.88 1.82
Navarra 3.14 0.17 0.01 4.04 2.92 7.54 1.34
P. Vasco 3.12 0.38 0.41 4.92 3.27 5.97 3.88
Aragón 3.03 2.44 0.32 3.74 2.64 4.99 0.83
Galicia 2.98 2.47 0.00 3.05 3.25 5.49 2.67
Rioja 2.93 1.96 0.16 3.73 1.60 5.35 3.59
Murcia 2.79 1.78 0.00 3.40 2.94 5.62 3.81
Cataluña 2.78 2.63 0.38 1.80 2.62 3.55 1.15
Valencia 2.77 1.59 0.00 3.28 2.68 5.41 2.61
Cantabria 2.49 0.42 0.30 2.85 4.28 5.95 4.46
Madrid 2.47 2.41 0.55 4.79 1.01 2.87 3.64
Baleares 1.86 1.15 0.31 4.87 0.94 4.10 1.10
Spain 3.18 2.40 0.27 3.88 2.79 5.41 2.21
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: the zero coefficients shown in bold have been imposed. See footnote no. 14.
Table 11: Estimated contribution of a year of schooling to the probability of being employed,
conditional on labour force participation (%)
______________________________________________________________________
all levels lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
p' p'ls p'us p'lv p'uv p'lu p'uu
Andalucía 2.64 2.67 2.36 0.86 1.65 1.44 0.32
Extremadura 2.52 2.66 2.12 0.00 2.76 0.67 1.39
Valencia 1.65 0.69 1.97 1.22 1.67 0.76 0.38
Canarias 1.60 0.95 1.52 0.41 1.46 1.36 0.22
P. Vasco 1.60 0.00 1.99 1.61 2.04 1.78 0.00
Galicia 1.58 0.85 1.38 0.06 2.20 1.89 0.33
Cantabria 1.56 0.00 1.22 0.29 3.10 2.53 0.39
Cataluña 1.53 0.95 1.48 1.47 0.79 0.81 0.00
Asturias 1.48 0.29 1.98 2.23 0.84 0.96 0.60
C.-Mancha 1.47 1.61 1.33 0.00 1.36 0.80 0.00
Murcia 1.37 1.36 1.37 0.00 1.56 0.76 0.20
C.-León 1.32 1.17 1.52 0.10 1.91 0.49 0.00
Madrid 1.30 0.62 2.04 2.55 0.48 0.24 0.13
Baleares 1.13 0.31 1.06 2.50 0.63 0.38 0.80
Rioja 0.83 0.09 1.28 2.20 0.63 1.17 0.00
Aragón 0.77 0.52 1.01 1.17 0.65 0.16 0.25
Navarra 0.55 0.16 0.00 0.64 0.80 1.53 0.00
Spain 1.83 1.69 1.72 1.10 1.42 0.83 0.11
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: the zero coefficients shown in bold have been imposed. See footnote no. 14.
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labour market.16 This variable, known as the inverse Mill's ratio, is constructed using the
results of the first-stage regression. Its inclusion in the second equation serves to correct the
likely sample selection bias that would arise in its absence.
The data are taken from the Labour Force Survey for the years 1995-2000. As in the
previous section, we estimate two alternative specifications. In the first one education enters
only through the years of schooling of each individual, and in the second we include separate
dummy variables for each educational level. Tables 10 and 11 show the estimated effects of
an additional year of schooling on individual participation and employment probabilities.
(The detailed results are in Tables A.28-A.31 in the Appendix). In all cases, the coefficients
we report are not the direct estimates of the original parameters of the probit model, but the
estimated marginal effects (calculated at the sample means of all the regressors) that
measure the expected change in the relevant probability in response to a marginal increase in
each of the explanatory variables.
The estimates that appear in the first column of Tables 10 and 11 (labelled all levels)
come from the first (Mincerian) specification, where years of schooling is the only
educational variable. The rest of the coefficients are constructed using the estimated
coefficients of the educational dummies included in the second specification. As in the
Figure 13: Marginal employment effects (all levels) vs. relative  attainment in 1995
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16
 In order to avoid identification problems, the explanatory variables used in the second equation should
be a subset of the set of regressors of the first-stage equation (see Wooldridge, 2002). In our case, we assume
that marital status and the number of children under six years of age affect the participation decision but
not the probability of employment conditional on participation.
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Figure 14: Marginal employment effects (all levels) vs. relative  GDP per capita in 1995
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previous section, they should be interpreted as marginal effects per year of schooling at each
level, that is, as the increase in the relevant probability over its expected value for an agent
who has completed the immediately lower level of education, divided by the (incremental)
duration of the relevant level.
Employment effects tend to become smaller as we move to the right in Table 11 to higher
attainment levels. Figures 13 and 14 plot the marginal employment effect of an additional
year of schooling (p' in the first column of Table 11) against relative attainment and relative
income per cápita in 1995. The correlation between p' and each of these variables is clearly
negative. Estimated employment effects are particularly strong in the poorest regions
(Andalucía and Extremadura) and tend to fall with income, although there is considerable
dispersion at the upper end of the income distribution.
c. Schooling and aggregate productivity
In this section we investigate the contribution of investment in human capital to the
growth of regional productivity using a simple growth model developed in de la Fuente
(2002c) and de la Fuente and Doménech (2002a). The model is built around a regional
production function and a technical progress relation that allows for the diffusion of technical
know-how across regions. It is estimated with a panel of regional data covering the period
1965-95 at two-year intervals.
We will assume that the educational attainment of employed workers (SE) is one of the
inputs in a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function which we will write
in intensive form
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(3) qit =  ait + akkit + axxit  + b*seit
where qit is the log of output per employed worker in region i at time t, k and x the logs of the
stocks of (non-infrastructure) physical capital and infrastructures per employed worker, se
the log of the average number of years of schooling of employed workes and ait the log of total
factor productivity (TFP). One difficulty we face when trying to estimate (3) is that our
human capital data (S) generally refer to the adult population rather than to employed
workers. To get around this problem, we will hypothesize that SE increases with population
attainment and decreases with the ratio of employment to the adult population (E), i.e. that
(4) seit = c*sit  - d*eit
where all variables are measured in logarithms. Substituting (4) into (3) we obtain the
reduced-form production function
(5) qit =  ait + akkit + axxit + bhit  - jeit
where
(6)  b = bc   and    j = bd.
We will estimate a growth equation based on (5) using different schooling series and a
common set of other variables. Our specification is obtained by taking differences of (5) and
assuming that the resulting TFP growth term, Dait, incorporates a technological catch-up
effect that favours backward regions. The estimated equation is of the form17
(7) Dqit =  G + mi + ht  + akDkit + axDxit + bDhit - jDeit + lbit + eit
where D denotes annual growth rates (over the subperiod starting at time t) and bit is a
technological gap measure that enters the equation as a determinant of the rate of technical
progress in order to allow for a catch-up effect. This term is the Hicks-neutral TFP gap
between each region and Madrid (M) at the beginning of each subperiod, given by
(8) bit =  (qMt - akkMt -  axxMt - bsMt + jeMt )  -  (qit - akkit -  axxit - bsit  + jeit).
To estimate this specification we substitute (8) into (7) and use non-linear least squares with
data on both factor stocks and their growth rates. In this specification the parameter l
measures the rate of (conditional) technological convergence. Notice that if this parameter is
positive, relative TFP levels eventually stabilize, signalling a common asymptotic rate of
technical progress for all territories, and the regional fixed effects mi capture permanent
differences in relative total factor productivity that will presumably reflect differences in
R&D investment and other omitted variables.
The data on regional employment (number of jobs) and output (gross value added, GVA, at
factor cost) are taken from Fundación BBV (1999 and 2000). GVA is measured in pesetas of 1986
and excludes the value added of the building rental sector, which includes imputed rents on
owner-occupied buildings. Employment in this sector, which is very small, is also deducted
17 Equation (7) is obtained from equation (5) under the assumption that the rate of technological progress is
given by Dait = lbit + mi + ht  The term bit is obtained by solving for TFP in the production function in log
levels and taking differences with Madrid, which we take to be the technologically leading region.
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from overall employment. The series of infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital stocks
have been constructed by Mas, Pérez and Uriel (2002). The (net) stock of physical capital,
which is also measured in 1986 pesetas, is broken down into two components. The
infrastructure component (x) includes publicly financed transportation networks (roads and
highways, ports, airports and railways), water works, sewage, urban structures and
privately-financed toll highways. The stock of non-infrastructure capital (k) includes
private capital, net of the stock of residential housing, and the stock of public capital
associated with the provision of education, health and general administrative services.
These last three items are aggregated with the capital stock of the private sector because our
output measure includes government-provided services.18 For shortness, we will often speak of
private and public capital to refer to the infrastructure and non-infrastructure components of
the stock of physical capital. It should be kept in mind, however, that this is not entirely
accurate.
Table 12: Growth estimates with alternative schooling series and specifications
______________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4]
S data from: MPUSS D&D MPUSS D&D
ak 0.161 0.171 0.161 0.171
(3.05) (3.27) (3.24) (3.50)
ax 0.062 0.0567 0.062 0.0560
(3.52) (3.25) (4.33) (3.88)
b -0.013 0.835 -0.013 0.835
(0.11) (2.04) (0.11) (4.13)
l 0.048 0.045 0.048 0.045
(3.27) (3.30) (7.96) (6.36)
adj. R2 0.749 0.753 0.757 0.763
std. error reg. 0.0097 0.0096 0.0095 0.0094
no. of observ. 255 255 255 255
regional effects a l l a l l signif. signif.
______________________________________________
    Notes:
- All  equations include period dummies.
- White's heteroscedasticity-consistent t ratios in parentheses below each coefficient.
- The employment ratio has been dropped from the equation due to its lack of significance.
The employment ratio, e, that enters equations (7) and (8) has been approximated by the
ratio of total employment to the overall population. This variable, however, is never
significant with our specification and has been dropped from the equation. As a proxy for the
stock of human capital, we use our own attainment series described in section 2.b.i and an
18
 The results are very similar when we exclude the output of the public sector from our productivity
measure and the non-infrastructure component of public capital from k.
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alternative estimate of average years of schooling constructed using Mas et al's (MPUSS,
2002) series on the composition of the working-age population by attainment level which is,
in turn, based on Labor Force Survey data. Section 4 of the Appendix gives estimates of
reliability ratios for these two schooling series. As discussed in de la Fuente and Ciccone
(2002), this variable is a statistical indicator of the information content of a given data set
that can be used to gauge the size of the downward bias caused by measurement error in the
estimation of the growth effects of human capital.
The results obtained with both schooling series are reported in Table 12.19 All equations
contain period dummies. Equations [1] and [2] contain a full set of regional dummies, and
equations [3] and [4] retain only those regional fixed effects that were significant in the first
iteration.
Inspection of the table and a comparison with other studies reveals a number of interesting
results. First, the coefficient of human capital (b) goes from being non-significant when the
MPUSS (2002) data are used to having a large and significant value with our attainment
series. This result is consistent with our estimates of the information content of the two series,
as the relevant reliability ratio is 0.900 for our data and only 0.035 for MPUSS's attainment
series. Second, our estimate of b in this paper (0.835) is higher than those obtained with cross-
country data by de la Fuente and Doménech (D&D 2002a) using similar specifications (0.540
with a full set of country dummies and 0.394 when only the significant fixed effects are
retained). Again, the explanation seems to lie at least partly in the information content of
the different data sets (the relevant reliability ratio for the cross-country attainment series
in D&D was 0.246). In fact, our estimate of b in this report lies well within the range (and
somewhat below the average value) of the meta-estimates obtained by D&D (2002) after
correcting for measurement error.
Our estimate of b  implies that human capital accounts for a substantial fraction of cross-
regional productivity disparities. Figure 15 shows the contribution of schooling to the
relative productivity of the Spanish regions. Relative productivity is defined as log real
output per job measured in deviations from the (unweighted) sample average of the same
variable. Using regression weights to average the different regions (see Box 4 in de la Fuente
and Ciccone (2002) for the details), we find that the share of schooling in average
productivity was 39.86% in 1995 -- that is, that for the typical Spanish region schooling
accounts for 4/10 of the productivity gap with the sample average.
Turning to the remaining coefficients of the model, we find that both the private capital
stock and the stock of infrastructures enter the equation with positive and significant
coefficients. On the other hand, both of these coefficients are smaller than those obtained in
previous studies that have made use of similar regional data together with the MPUSS
19
 See de la Fuente and Doménech (2003) for additional results and some robustness checks.
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Figure 15: Contribution of schooling to relative productivity in 1995
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schooling series.20 The sum of these two coefficients is about 25% below capital's share of
national income, whose average value over the last decade in our sample was 31.4%.21  To be
on the safe side when comparing the social returns to different assets, for our calculations in
section 6.d below we will scale up the coefficient of private capital (ak) so that the sum ak +
20
 See for instance Mas, Maudos, Pérez and Uriel (1995), de la Fuente and Vives (1995), González-
Páramo and Argimon (1997), Dabán and Lamo (1999) and de la Fuente (2002c).
21 The share of capital in output is measured as the ratio between gross operating surplus and GVA for
Spain as a whole after excluding the building rental sector. For this calculation we use Fundación BBV
data and estimate total labour costs by imputing to non-salaried employees the average compensation of
salaried employees in the same sector, except for the fisheries sector where this would yield a negative
operating surplus. For this sector, we impute to non-salaried employees 1/2 of the labour cost per salaried
employee.
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ax is equal to the share of capital in national income. This ad-hoc correction yields a baseline
value of ak of 0.258.22
Using our corrected estimates of the parameters of the production function, Figure 16 shows
the shares of schooling and private and public capital in the relative productivity of a
typical Spanish region in 1965 and 1995. The figure shows that differences in schooling have
become relatively more importance over time as a source of (shrinking) productivity
disparities across regions, making this variable a potentially very powerful instrument of
regional redistribution. By contrast, remaining differences in stocks of private capital account
only for 10% of observed productivity disparities in the last year of our sample, and
infrastructure stocks display a slightly negative correlation with relative productivity.
4. The private return to schooling and the impact of public policies on private incentives
In this section we will present estimates of the private return to post-compulsory schooling
in the Spanish regions using the methodology developed in de la Fuente (2003). Subsection a
discusses the procedure we have used to calculate the rate of return and to construct effective
tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of various public policies on private incentives
to invest in education. Subsection b presents estimates of average returns across all educational
levels based on the Mincerian specifications of the wage and employment equations, and
subsection c gives estimates of returns for different educational levels.
In all cases, our estimates will be obtained under the assumption that our reference
individual is active throughout his working life (i.e. that he is active while attending
school at post-compulsory  levels and remains a member of the labour force until the standard
retirement age) and that he wants to work (but may not succeed in doing so) 20% of a standard
work-year while enrolled in school. Hence, the employment probabilities and related
parameters used in the calculation are conditional on labour force participation.
The calculations will allow for the taxes on labour income to which the representative
individual would be subject in each region (including national and regional income taxes and
employee social security contributions) and for the unemployment benefits for which he would
be eligible, working under the assumptions that i) he is single and has no children (so as to
abstract from family support policies), and ii) that any unemployment spells he suffers are
relatively short-lived and do not exahust contributive benefits.
To properly interpret the results that will be presented below, it is important to keep in
mind that the rates of return we will calculate measure the return to educational investment
in a rather specific and restrictive sense. They capture, in particular, the average payoff to
an additional year of schooling holding its cost and quality constant at the existing level.
22 We scale up ak  alone, rather than ak  and ax together while respecting their ratio, because this yields a
more plausible pattern of relative returns. The coefficient estimates shown in Table 12 imply rates of return
of 5.09% and 14.46% for private and public capital respectively in Spain as a whole. With our correction,
the return to private capital rises to 10.91%.
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They do not, however, tell us anything about the returns to additional spending on quality-
improving policies.23 It should also be noted that the results presented in this section are
estimates of the individual returns to schooling in partial equilibrium -- that is, they capture
the financial rewards available to an individual acting alone, assuming that factor prices
and average school attainment at the aggregate level remain constant.
a. Methodology
The private rate of return to schooling (rp) is defined as the discount rate that equates the
present value of the expected stream of net-of-tax earnings generated by a marginal increase
in school attendance to the present value of the incremental costs of schooling. As discussed in
de la Fuente (2003), under certain assumptions rp is given by
(9)  rp = Rp + g
where g is the exogenous growth rate of productivity and Rp is the value of R that solves the
following equation
(10) 
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where q is the parameter that measures the marginal contribution of education to gross wages,
po stands for the probability of employment of an adult with the relevant attainment level, e
= p'/po captures the employment effects of schooling, f is the fraction of time taken up by full-
time school attendance, ms the direct costs of schooling measured as a fraction of full-time
wages, and H the duration in years of the post-school working life of the reference
individual. The additional terms that appear in this expression are tax and benefit
parameters: t o  and T'  are the average and marginal tax rates applicable to the
representative full-time worker, ts the average tax rate on income from part-time work and a
and b the components of the net replacement ratio for unemployed workers that are,
respectively, linked and not linked to previous earnings. All terms are defined more precisely
in Table 14 below for the case of the calculation of average returns across all educational
levels. The modifications required for the calculation of level-specific rates of return are
discussed in subsection c.
To interpret equation (10), notice that its left-hand side is an increasing function of R
where the term 1-e-RH that appears in the denominator serves to adjust for the fact that the
"useful life" of the asset (the working life of the individual) is finite. The right-hand side is
simply the ratio of the marginal benefits derived from an additional year of schooling
23
 The problem here is empirical rather than conceptual. While it is straightforward to derive the
appropriate rate of return formulas for investment in educational quality, we do not yet have reliable
estimates of the impact of resource inputs on educational quality or of the effects of quality on wages and
productivity that can be entered into these formulas. This is most unfortunate because this is without doubt
the more relevant policy margin in the long run, and because we have reasons to suspect that the quality of
education may be at least as important as its quantity. (See Appendix 3e in D&C, 2002).
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(which we can interpret as the "dividend" paid by human capital) to its cost, with all the
terms expressed as fractions of the expected net-of-tax earnings of an adult worker with
average education. The first term in the numerator (qnet) captures the expected increase in
after-tax earnings and benefits holding the probability of employment constant, and the
second one (enet) the increase in expected net earnings that comes from an increase in the
probability of employment. The denominator measures the total cost of an additional year of
schooling as the sum of two terms. The first one (OPPC) is the opportunity cost of school
attendance (foregone wages), and the second one (DIRC) the direct costs of schooling born by
the student himself.
Public policies influence the private return to schooling in many ways. Educational
subsidies or the direct public provision of educational services will raise the return to
schooling by lowering its direct cost to the individual (DIRC). The effect of taxation is more
complicated. Notice that a flat-rate income tax (i.e. a tax system in which to  = T' = ts) would
have absolutely no effect on the return to schooling whenever there are no direct costs (i.e.
when DIRC = 0) because taxes would then reduce both the costs and the benefits of education
in the same proportion.
Hence, the effects of the tax system will come from differences among the three tax rates
that enter the formula and from their interaction with the direct cost term, DIRC. Notice
that qnet depends only on the progressivity of the tax schedule at the average income level:
as the tax system becomes more progressive (i.e. as the ratio (1-T')/(1-to) declines), the
incentive to invest in education falls. If we fix the degree of progressivity, an increase in to
actually raises the return to schooling by lowering its opportunity cost, while an increase in
the student tax rate, ts, has the opposite effect. Finally, tax rates interact with the direct
cost of schooling term, DIRC. If ms > 0, an increase in the average tax rate, to , increases DIRC
(by lowering its denominator) thus lowering the return to schooling. If students receive a net
subsidy, so that ms < 0, the effect of to  on rp is the opposite one: higher taxes now raise the
return to schooling by increasing the size of the subsidy when measured as a fraction of net
adult earnings.
Unemployment benefits reduce the return to schooling by raising the expected income of
adult workers, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of not being in the (full-time) labour
market, and by reducing the loss of earnings associated with unemployment (i.e. by lowering
enet). Notice that the size of this second effect will be proportional to the value of e, for if
schooling has no effect on employment probabilities the difference in earnings between
employed and unemployed workers is irrelevant for the calculation. When unemployment
benefits are linked to previous earnings and therefore to education (i.e., when a > 0), these
effects are partially offset by an increase in qnet as additional schooling now translates into
an increase in  benefit levels. Notice that qnet is independent of benefit parameters when
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these do not have a fixed-rate component (i.e. when b = 0), and declines with b once this
component of the replacement ratio becomes positive.
Measuring the effect of public policies on private returns
To quantify the contribution of various forms of government intervention to the net private
return to schooling, it will be useful to recalculate the rate of return under a set of different
counterfactual assumptions or scenarios. In the NO GOV'T scenario [1] we assume there is no
government intervention, i.e. that private agents pay the full costs of education and there are
no taxes or social benefits. In scenario [2] we introduce subsidies to education respecting the
remaining assumptions. In [3] we introduce taxes and in [4] social benefits to obtain an estimate
(OBS) that includes the effects of all relevant public policies and mesures the observed
returns to education from the point of view of private agents. Finally, scenario [5] tries to
isolate the impact of differential student unemployment (nodiffstU). This scenario deviates
from OBS only in that it assumes that h = 1, i.e. that the probability of finding part-time
work while in school is the same as the probability of finding full-time work after
graduation. Table 13 summarizes these assumptions.24 In what follows, we will refer to
estimates of rp obtained under the assumptions of the NO GOV'T and OBS scenarios as raw
and all-in returns.
Table 13: Assumptions underlying the scenarios
___________________________________________________________
raw return
NO GOV'T subsidies taxes
all-in return
OBS nodiffstU
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
direct costs total private private private private
taxes none none observed observed observed
benefits none none none observed observed
diffstU correct. yes yes yes yes no
___________________________________________________________
The rate of return estimates estimates obtained under the different scenarios will be used
to construct a set of effective tax and subsidy wedges and rates that measure the impact of
public policies on private incentives to invest in education. We calculate the tax or subsidy
wedge (
  
wedgegov t© ) generated by public policies as the difference between the raw and all-in
rates of return to schooling, and define the effective tax rate on human capital  (
  
etrgov t©) as the
24
 Notice that assumptions underlying these scenarios differ from those used in de la Fuente (2003) and in
the interim version of this report, where h = 1 was assumed in the first four scenarios and the estimated
probability of student employment was used only in the last scenario. The reason for the change is that the
estimate of the correction factor for differential student unemployment used in this study has been obtained
using individual-level data and should be more reliable than the rough approximation used in de la Fuente
(2003) for the EU countries. Given this, it seems more reasonable to compute the rates of return to schooling
and analyze their sensitivity to public policies using the estimated value of the adjustment parameter.
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ratio between the tax wedge and the raw return. Letting ri denote the estimated private rate
of return to schooling under scenario i, we have
(11) 
  
wedge r rgov t no gov t obs© ©= -      and       
  
etr
wedge
rgov t
gov t
no gov t
©
©
©
=
 
.
Notice that 
  
wedgegov t©  and   etrgov t©  capture the joint effect of all the public policies we are
considering. To isolate the impact of each individual policy, it will be useful to note that
  
wedgegov t©  and   etrgov t©  can be written as the sum of three factors that capture the effects of
educational subsidies, personal taxes and social benefits as follows. First, we write 
  
wedgegov t©
in the form25
(12)  
  
wedge r r r r r r r r
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Dividing through by 
  
rno gov t © , the corresponding partial tax and subsidy rates are given by
(13)  
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(Notice that the partial wedges and rates are defined so that their signs are positive under
normal circumstances, that is, whenever taxes and unemployment benefits reduce the private
returns to schooling and educational subsidies increase them).
An alternative approximate decomposition of the overall tax rate will turn out to be very
useful for understanding how effective tax rates vary across regions and educational levels.
Let us denote by R' the right-hand side of the rate of return formula given in equation (10).
The values of R' corresponding to the NO GOV'T and OBS scenarios can be written in the form
(14) 
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where we can think of tq and te as the marginal tax rates on the wage and employment
benefits of schooling and of s as the overall subsidy rate on total schooling costs.
Let us now define a new measure of the overall tax rate, t, by working directly with these
two terms as 
(15) 
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25
 Notice that the definition of the components of the overall effective tax rate has changed relative to the
preliminary version of this report. I now divide all of the tax wedges by rnogov't rather than by the
estimated return in the previous scenario. This makes the tax rates more comparable with each other and
less sensitive to the order in which the different policies are introduced in the analysis.
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Hence, the overall tax factor, 1-t, is a weighted average of the tax factors on the wage and
employment components of the return to schooling, with weights that are proportional to
their shares in the total return. It should be clear that t will not coincide with the effective
tax rate defined above (
  
etrgov t©) but the intuition will carry over since r is an increasing
transformation of R'.
It is worth noting that the effects of taxes and benefits on the denominator of   R obs© will
generally be small (because 1-f and ms are themselves small). As a result, the bulk of the
effects of tax and benefit policies will come through tq and te  Now, these terms are given by
(17) 
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Notice that te is a function of benefit parameters (and employment probabilities) only,
whereas tq depends in principle on both tax and benefit parameters. When benefits are linked
to previous income, however, (i.e. when b = 0), the first term of tq cancels and this factor
depends only on tax parameters.
b. Average returns across all educational levels
 In this section we will present estimates of the average return to schooling across all
educational levels in each Spanish region. The calculations in this section make use of the
results of the Mincerian specification of the wage and employment equations presented in
sections 3.a and 3.b. The rate of return estimates will be constructed by applying equation (10)
to a representative individual in each region endowed with average school attainment. We
will assume that this representative agent's income, when employed, is equal to the gross
earnings of the average salaried worker employed in manufacturing, construction or services
(ASW).
i. Data and sources
Table 14 describes the different variables and parameters used in the computation of the
private rate of return to schooling and gives the sources of these data. The details of the
construction of the different variables are discussed in sections 2 and 3 and in section 5 of the
Appendix.
The expected length of the working life of the representative individual for each region is
calculated as the difference between the estimated average age of retirement and the age at
which average attainment (measured in 2000) has been completed (provided this last figure
is at least fourteen years). The retirement age refers to the entire country in 1995 and is
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calculated by averaging the estimates for males and females reported by Blöndal and
Scarpetta (1999), weighting them by the share of each sex in total employment (using
Eurostat data for 2000 referring to the age group 25-64).
Our estimates of average attainment and educational expenditure have already been
discussed in previous sections. For purposes of calculating private returns, expenditure per
student must be divided by the average gross earnings of full-time salaried workers. This
variable is constructed as discussed in Section 5.a of the Appendix using data for 2000 taken
from wage and hours surveys conducted by the National Statistical Institute.
For the probability of employment of adult workers (po) we use the prediction of the
second-stage employment equation estimated in section 3.b for the average values of the
regressors (using the first specification of this equation where education is measured by
average years of schooling). The employment probability of students is approximated by
adding to this average prediction a weighted average of the coefficients of the dummies for
non-university and university students (with weights 2/3 and 1/3) respectively. The marginal
impact of education on the probability of employment, p'(So), is given by the coefficient of
years of schooling (S) in the same equation (or, more precisely, by the corresponding marginal
effect as given in the first column of Table 11). Combining these two figures, we construct an
estimate of the sensitivity of the probability of employment to educational attainment
(captured by e = p'(So)/p(So)).
The tax and benefit parameters are calculated using the tax and and benefit provisions in
force in 2000 and refer to single individuals with no children.26 The average and marginal
tax rates on adult workers (to  and T') are those applicable to an individual earning the same
salary as the average full-time salaried worker employed in the manufacturing, construction
or service sectors (ASW). The average tax rate on student income (ts) has been been calculated
under the assumption that the income of an employed student is 20% of ASW earnings. All tax
rates incorporate national and regional personal income taxes and employee (but not
employer) social security contributions, so as to be consistent with the data on gross wages
that have been used to estimate the wage equations.
Our estimates of the components of the net replacement ratio induced by unemployment
benefits (a and b) have been constructed using the description of the unemployment protection
scheme given in the country chapter for Spain of the OECD's Benefit Systems and Work
Incentives 1999. We have worked under the assumptions that i) we are dealing with a single
individual with no children whose wage prior to the loss of employment was equal to the
average regional salary as defined above and ii) that any unemployment spells experienced
26
 For the majority of regions, personal income tax is shared by the national and regional governments. The
latter have some power to set tax rates and deductions but differences across territories are minor. The
exception are the two foral regions of Navarre and the Basque Country, where income taxes are set and
collected exclusively by the regional governments. For these two regions we have used the regional tax
codes (and in particular the updated versions of the Norma Foral 8/1998 of Guipuzcoa for the Basque
Country and the Ley Foral 22/98 for Navarra).
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by our representative worker are sufficiently brief that he does not exhaust the contributory
benefits to which he is entitled. While benefit levels are in principle linked to previous
wages, there is also a ceiling that is binding for a worker with average earnings in all but
three regions, effectively turning the system into a fixed rate one. As a result, the component
of the net replacement ratio linked to previous wages is equal to zero in fourteen of the
seventeen regions.
Table 14: Variables and parameters used in the calculation of the private
rate of return on schooling and sources of the data
______________________________________________________________________
parameters
g = 1.5, rate of exogenous productivity growth. Source: Jones (2002).
f = 0.8, fraction of time taken up by (full-time) school attendance; 1-f is the potential labour
supply while in school.
U   = 60.5 = Average retirement age in 1995 in Spain, constructed by averaging separate
estimates for men and women, weighted in proportion to their shares in total employment.
Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999).
variables
So = average years of school attainment of the adult (over 25) population in 2000. Source:
Section 2.b.i.
H = U - Max(6+So, 14) = estimated length of the (post-school) working life of the
representative individual.
q = microeconomic Mincerian returns to schooling parameter. It measures the average (log)
increase in gross wages (wages before income taxes and employee social security
contributions are witheld) resulting from an additional year of schooling. Source: Section
3a.
ms = direct cost of schooling born by the individual, measured as a fraction of average gross
earnings of full-time salaried workers (weighted average of secondary and tertiary levels
with weights 2/3 and 1/3 respectively). Average costs are shown net of direct public
subsidies to students for living costs and other non-tuition expenses and will be negative
when these subsidies exceed tuition charges. Source: section 2.a and section 5.a of the
Appendix.
m = total (private + public) cost of schooling per student measured as a fraction of average
gross earnings of full-time salaried workers (weighted average of secondary and tertiary
levels with weights 2/3 and 1/3 respectively). It excludes an estimate of research
expenditure by universities. Direct subsidies to students for living and non-tuition expenses
are not considered a net cost from the point of view of society as a whole. (We consider
them a transfer to the private sector). Source: section 2.a and section 5.a of the Appendix.
po = probability of employment after leaving school, conditional on participation in the
labour force. Estimated using the results in section 3.b.
______________________________________________________________________
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Table 14: Variables and parameters used in the calculation of the private
rate of return on schooling and sources of the data -- continued
______________________________________________________________________
ps =  probability of employment while attending school, conditional on participation in the
labour force. Estimated using the results in section 3.b.
h  = ps/po, correction factor capturing the greater difficulty of finding part-time employment
while attending school.
e = p'(S)/p(S) measures the responsiveness of the probability of employment of active workers
to their level of schooling. Estimated using the results in section 3.b.
to = average tax rate on labour income (including national and regional income taxes and
employee social security contributions) applicable to the average full-time salaried
worker in 2000.
T' = marginal tax rate on labour income (including national and regional income taxes and
employee social security contributions) applicable to the average full-time salaried
worker in 2000. See section 5.b of the Appendix.
ts = average tax rate on labour income (including national and regional income taxes and
employee social security contributions) applicable to a worker earning 20 of the salary of
the average full-time worker.
a = first component of the net replacement ratio (ratio of net after-tax earnings out of work to
net after-tax earnings while employed) for a single individual with no children whose
previous earnings were equal to the average production worker's salary. This parameter
captures the effects of unemployment benefits that are linked to previous earnings.
b = second component of the net replacement ratio, calculated under the same assumptions as a.
It captures the effects of unemployment and housing benefits whose amount is not linked to
previous earnings. .
______________________________________________________________________
Table 15 shows the actual data used in the rate of return calculations. As a reference, the
last row of each block of the table shows the estimates of the different variables obtained in
de la Fuente (2003). A comparison of these figures with our current estimates for the entire
country reveals a number of significant differences. Discrepancies across studies in
employment parameters arise from differences in the underlying data and in the estimation
procedure. The most significant one is that our current estimate of the parameter that
measures the employment effects of schooling (e) is over three times larger than the previous
one (which as we have already noted was constructed using aggregate rather than individual
data and should therefore be less reliable). Most of the remaining discrepancies seem to be
related to the rather significant difference that exists between our estimates of average
salaries and those provided by the OECD (see footnote 14 in section 5.a of the Appendix).
This factor, however, is insufficient to explain the large difference between the two estimates
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Table 15: Data used in the calculation of the private rate of return on schooling
______________________________________________________________________
So H q ms m po ps
Andalucía 7.62 46.5 7.91% 0.92% 16.92% 72.25% 58.84%
Aragón 8.35 46.1 5.99% 2.24% 20.52% 89.02% 76.84%
Asturias 8.31 46.2 5.89% 1.59% 18.05% 79.81% 54.30%
Baleares 8.22 46.3 8.30% 2.35% 19.75% 90.26% 83.08%
Canarias 8.02 46.5 7.99% 1.00% 23.65% 82.89% 77.39%
Cantabria 8.54 46.0 7.04% 2.09% 22.21% 78.11% 54.50%
Cast. y León 8.14 46.4 7.52% 1.43% 19.97% 82.44% 61.86%
Cast.-Mancha 7.18 46.5 8.27% 0.57% 20.89% 82.10% 64.28%
Cataluña 8.35 46.1 7.93% 3.98% 20.60% 87.17% 79.21%
Valencia 7.98 46.5 7.89% 1.99% 21.72% 82.77% 68.07%
Extremadura 7.13 46.5 8.52% -0.35% 18.95% 74.61% 57.55%
Gal ic ia 7.67 46.5 8.30% 1.42% 21.99% 78.85% 49.71%
Madrid 9.36 45.1 9.02% 3.94% 16.15% 83.67% 69.04%
Murcia 7.82 46.5 7.86% 1.50% 20.83% 80.89% 59.17%
Navarra 8.85 45.7 5.94% 2.52% 22.03% 90.88% 85.86%
P. Vasco 9.00 45.5 6.08% 2.51% 21.11% 83.15% 70.53%
Rioja 8.44 46.1 7.77% 1.83% 26.34% 84.23% 57.02%
Spain 8.19 46.3 8.38% 2.26% 18.99% 80.96% 65.65%
de la F. (2003) 46.5 8.23% 4.05% 25.64% 88.62% 60.00%
h e to T' ts a b
Andalucía 0.814 3.66% 18.58% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 72.5%
Aragón 0.863 0.86% 19.70% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 65.1%
Asturias 0.680 1.86% 20.22% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 61.6%
Baleares 0.921 1.25% 18.55% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 72.7%
Canarias 0.934 1.93% 18.06% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 75.8%
Cantabria 0.698 2.00% 19.36% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 67.4%
C.-León 0.750 1.60% 19.33% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 67.5%
C.-Mancha 0.783 1.79% 17.89% 28.83% 6.35% 75.9% 0.0%
Cataluña 0.909 1.76% 19.97% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 63.3%
Valencia 0.822 2.00% 18.59% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 72.5%
Extremadura 0.771 3.38% 17.69% 28.83% 6.35% 76.0% 0.0%
Gal ic ia 0.630 2.00% 18.32% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 74.2%
Madrid 0.825 1.55% 20.91% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 56.9%
Murcia 0.731 1.70% 17.62% 28.83% 6.35% 76.0% 0.0%
Navarra 0.945 0.60% 20.05% 29.76% 6.35% 0.0% 60.8%
P. Vasco 0.848 1.92% 21.10% 29.76% 6.35% 0.0% 56.8%
Rioja 0.677 0.99% 18.94% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 70.1%
Spain 0.811 2.26% 19.64% 28.83% 6.35% 0.0% 65.5%
Spain (D2003) 0.677 0.66% 18.5% 28.8% 6.35% 74.45% 0.00%
______________________________________________________________________
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of private expenditure on education. Part of this difference may be due to the fact that the
OECD data on the weight of government in total educational expenditure used in de la Fuente
(2003) grouped together all non-university levels whereas here we use more disaggregated
information.27
ii. Results
Figure 17 displays our estimates of the raw and all-in private rates of return to schooling
in the Spanish regions (that is, before and after taking into account the effects of public
policies).28 The all-in rate of return, robs,  ranges between 6.85% in Asturias and 10.73% in
Extremadura with a value of 9.50% for the country as a whole. Baseline returns vary between
7.26% in Navarra and 12.25% in Extremadura. The total tax wedge given by the difference
between these two rates of return is 1.8 percentage points for the entire country with a
maximum of 3.86 points in Andalucía.
Figure 17: Private rate of return to schooling in the Spanish regions
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
11%
12%
13%
Ex Ma CM Ba Cat SP Mu Cn Va CL Ga An Ri PV Cnt Na Ar As
all-in raw
- Key: An = Andalucia; Ar = Aragón; As = Asturias; Ba = Baleares; Cn = Canarias; Cnt = Cantabria; CL =
Castilla y León; CM = Castilla la Mancha; Cat = Cataluña; Va = Valencia; Ex = Extremadura; Ga = Galicia;
Ma = Madrid; Mu = Murcia; Na = Navarra; PV = País Vasco; Ri = Rioja; SP = Spain.
Figures 18 and 19 plot the raw return to schooling against relative attainment and relative
GDP per capita. As in section 3.a, the relationship between the return to schooling and income
per capita seems to be non-linear, with high rates of return at both ends of the income
27
 A second potential explanation for this discrepancy is that the OECD figures may include in private
expenditure the fees paid by households to private centers for non-academic services, which we have
excluded from our calculations.
28
 In this figure, and elsewhere in the report, the rates of return for Spain as a whole are obtained by
entering the relevant parameter values for the entire country in the rate of return formula, and not by
averaging the rates of return across regions.
48
distribution, and returns tend to fall with average attainmentmt, except in the case of Madrid
which continues to be an exception. One possible explanation for this peculiarity of the
capital region may be related to the finding in the literature (see de la Fuente and Ciccone,
2002) that the returns to schooling tend to be higher in territories characterized by greater
technological dynamism.
Figure 18: Raw rate of return to schooling vs. relative GDP per capita in 1995
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Figure 19: Raw rate of return to schooling vs. relative attainment per capita in 1995
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The effect of public policies
A comparison between the raw and all-in rates of return displayed in Figure 17 suggests
that government policies have an often large and rather uneven impact on educational
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returns. Indeed, as shown in Figure 18, the effective tax rate on human capital ranges between
-0.5% in Navarra and 31.6% in Andalucía.
Figure 20: Effective tax rate on human capital (
  
etrgov t©)
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The detailed results of the wedge and tax rate calculations are shown in Tables A.36 and
A.37 in section 5.c of the Appendix, and summarized in Figures 20 and 21. The average subsidy
rate (subs) is substantial (21.5% for the country as a whole) when we consider only the effects
of public educational finance (Figure 21.a). On the other hand, both personal taxes and social
benefits reduce the net return to schooling and these two factors more than offset direct
subsidies to education in all regions but one. The effect of the tax system per se is relatively
small, and most of the disincentive effects are due to social benefits. On average, personal
taxes reduce educational returns by 0.9 percentage points, while unemployment benefits
generate a much larger wedge of 3.4 points. The corresponding effective tax rates are 9.9% and
28.7% respectively (Figures 21.b and 21.c).
These figures imply that public policies impose a positive tax of 16% on human capital.
This result stands in sharp contrast with our previous finding of a negative tax rate of -6.4%
for Spain (de la Fuente, 2003). This change is largely due to the fact that our current estimates
of the parameter that measures the sensitivity of the probability of employment to
educational attainment (e) are considerably higher than those obtained in the previous study
for reasons that have already been discussed. Since the net replacement ratio (a+b) interacts
with e in the rate of return formula (see section 6a), the higher values of this last parameter
used here greatly increase our estimates of the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits.
As can be seen by comparing the last two rows of Table A.37 in the Appendix, the observed
increase in 
  
etrgov t©  relative to de la Fuente (2003) can be attributed almost entirely to its social
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Figure 21: Components of the effective tax rate on human capital
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benefits component, which increases from 7.5% in the previous study to 29.9% in this one.29
In fact, our estimates of the overall effective tax rate on human capital (
  
etrgov t©) are
dominated by their social benefits component (  etrben ). For all Spanish regions,   etrben  is by far
the largest of the two non-subsidy components of 
  
etrgov t© . In addition, the correlation between
the overall tax rate and   etrben  is 0.934, whereas those between   etrgov t©  and its other components
are considerable smaller (-0.081 for the subsidy component and -0.524 for the component
induced by personal taxes). Hence, we conclude that most of the disincentives for investment
in education generated by public policies come from unemployment insurance rather than from
the tax system per se. It should be noted, however, that our estimates will overstate the
effects of unemployment insurance because we have assumed that contributory benefits never
run out, which is certainly not the case. Even so, it seems unlikely that a correction for this
factor will qualitatively affect our results. In recent years, the coverage ratio (the ratio of
recipients of contributory benefits to the total number of unemployed) has stood around 70%
for the industry, services and construction sectors, and it is likely to be considerably higher for
the relatively skilled workers that we are focusing on. A quick correction for this factor,
obtained by multiplying the average replacement ratio by 0.7, reduces the value of   etrben from
29.9% to 21.8%, which is still almost three times larger than the personal tax component of
the effective tax rate on human capital.
A feature of our results that may be puzzling at first sight is the enormous variation of
estimated effective tax rates across a set of territories that share a common tax and social
protection system and where differences in average wage levels are relatively minor (below
30%). As it turns out, the large cross-regional differences in observed tax rates are driven
mainly by two factors: differences across regions in the relative importance of wage and
employment effects, and the ceiling on unemployment benefits, which is binding in some cases
but not in others.
To illustrate this, we need to go back to the second (approximate) decomposition of the tax
rate developed at the end of section 6.a. As noted there, the overall tax rate on human capital
may be seen as a weighted average of the average tax rates on the marginal wage (  tq ) and
employment (  te ) benefits of schooling, weighted by the shares of these two components in the
total return. We have seen, in particular, that
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where t is an increasing transformation of the effective tax rate (
  
etrgov t©) and s the overall
subsidy rate to schooling measured as a fraction of its total (direct + opportunity) cost. It is
also useful to recall that
29
 As noted above, the components of the overall effective tax rate have been computed in slightly different
ways in the two studies and are therefore not stictly comparable. Using the same definition as in de la
Fuente (2003), the effective tax rates induced by personal taxes and unemployment benefits found in the
current study would be 6.25% and 26.3% respectively.
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and to note that this expression may be used to split   tq into two components, one that depends
only on personal tax parameters, and a second one which depends on the components of the
replacement ratio (a and b) and will be different from zero only when the ceiling on
unemployment benefits becomes binding.
Table 16: Effective tax rates by region and their main determinants
______________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
  
etrgov t© e
q e+
  te   tq , total   tq , tax
induced   
m
m
s a+b
Andalucía 31.62% 0.316 78.51% 31.63% 12.59% 5.44% 72.5%
Galicia 18.26% 0.194 78.47% 27.33% 12.86% 6.44% 74.2%
Asturias 17.44% 0.240 66.78% 22.81% 10.78% 8.79% 61.6%
Cantabria 17.22% 0.221 72.54% 25.75% 11.73% 9.41% 67.4%
Valencia 15.47% 0.202 76.07% 24.03% 12.58% 9.17% 72.5%
Canarias 13.37% 0.194 79.12% 24.90% 13.14% 4.23% 75.8%
C.-León 12.75% 0.175 71.63% 22.87% 11.77% 7.17% 67.5%
Extremadura 12.37% 0.284 80.91% 13.53% 13.53% -1.83% 76.0%
Madrid 11.46% 0.147 61.22% 19.01% 10.01% 24.39% 56.9%
P. Vasco 10.77% 0.240 61.23% 20.16% 10.98% 11.88% 56.8%
Cataluña 9.84% 0.181 66.44% 18.64% 11.07% 19.32% 63.3%
Baleares 7.81% 0.131 74.67% 18.97% 12.62% 11.88% 72.7%
Murcia 5.12% 0.178 79.65% 13.61% 13.61% 7.22% 76.0%
Aragón 4.79% 0.126 67.73% 17.96% 11.37% 10.90% 65.1%
Rioja 4.28% 0.113 73.61% 22.39% 12.20% 6.96% 70.1%
C.-Mancha 3.37% 0.178 79.36% 13.32% 13.32% 2.74% 75.9%
Navarra -0.45% 0.092 63.04% 17.20% 12.15% 11.42% 60.8%
Spain 16.05% 0.212 70.14% 23.26% 11.43% 11.90% 65.5%
coeff. var. 0.609 0.296 0.089 0.231 0.082 0.613 0.093
corr w/ 
  
etrgov t© 1.000 0.799 0.238 0.798 -0.066 -0.124 0.110
corr w/wrel -0.085 -0.164 -0.978 0.024 -0.915 0.739 -0.993
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: bold figures in column [7] indicate that the ceiling on unemployment benefits is not binding, given the
average wage in the region.
Table 16 shows the effective tax rate estimated for each region together with a number of
the variables that enter equations (16) and (17). Column [5] shows the component of   tq  that
reflects the operation of the personal tax system per se (which depends on its progressivity as
measured by the last factor on the right-hand side of (17)), column [6] shows the fraction of
the total direct costs of schooling that are paid by students, and column [7] the overall net
replacement ratio (a+b), which is shown in bold type if the ceiling on unemployment benefits
is not binding. The last three rows of the table show, respectively, the coefficient of variation
of each variable and its correlation with 
  
etrgov t©  and with relative wages (average wages in
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percentage deviations from the national average, wrel), treating the whole of Spain as an
additional regional observation.
As can be seen in column [3] the tax rate on the employment benefits of schooling (  te ) is very
high but does not vary much across regions. As a result, the weight of this component in the
overall tax rate (e/(e+q)) is extremely important in determining the value of 
  
etrgov t© . In fact,
the correlation between these two variables is 0.8. The other crucial factor that helps explain
cross-regional variations in 
  
etrgov t©  is the value of   tq , which also displays a correlation of 0.8
with this variable.30 Notice that the average value of   tq  is much lower than that of   te  but
varies considerably more across regions. Most of the variation, however, comes from the social
insurance system and, in particular, from the substantial increase in   tq  that takes place once
the ceiling on unemployment benefits becomes binding. By contrast, the tax-induced component
of   tq (given in column [5]) is both rather low and fairly uniform across regions and displays a
small negative correlation with the overall tax rate.
The correlations of some of these variables with income levels (as measured by relative
wages, wrel) is also of considerable interest. The tax-induced component of   tq , which captures
the progressivity of the personal income tax system, falls with wages. As a result, the
disincentive effects of personal taxes tend to be greater at low income levels. Similarly,   te  is
strongly negatively correlated with wages because net replacement rates fall with income.
These two factors, however, are partly offset by the behaviour of public educational subsidies
(which account for a greater fraction of direct costs in low income regions) and by the effects of
the unemployment benefit ceiling, which substantially increases   tq  in all but the lowest-
wage regions. On the whole, the correlation between effective tax rates and average wages is
negative but very small.
c. Results by educational level
In this section we will present separate rate of return estimates for each of the different
levels of schooling, distinguishing in particular between lower secondary education, general
upper secondary schooling, the two cycles of vocational training and the two university
cycles. The procedure is analogous to the one used above to calculate the average return to an
additional year of schooling. As before, we apply equation (10) in section 4.a to a
hypothetical representative worker for each attainment level whom we continue to assume
active throughout his adult life, single and childless. The relevant tax and subsidy wedges
and rates will also be computed following the procedure described above.
30
 These two variables alone explain 93% of the variation in the overall effective tax rate.
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i. Methodology and data
The definitions of the variables that enter the rate of return formula given in Table 14 in
the previous section continue to be valid with minor changes that will be discussed shortly.
The values of these variables are shown in Tables A.40-A.45 in the Appendix.
The changes in the construction of the relevant variables are as follows. First, when
calculating the marginal returns to schooling at level n, we will use as a reference the average
earnings and employment probabilities of workers who have completed the immediately
preceding educational level, n-1. That is, we will be assuming that the opportunity cost of a
student enrolled in, say, upper secondary school is determined by the average wage and
employment probability of full-time workers who have completed lower secondary schooling
and by the tax and benefit parameters determined by these wage and employment levels. The
value of e for educational level n, is obtained by dividing the estimated value of p'() for level
n  by the average probability of employment in level n-1; that en = pn'/pn-1.
An important complication is that we have had to estimate the average wage and
employment probability of a representative individual for each attainment level and region,
since we lack direct estimates of these magnitudes. This has been done by correcting the
average wages and employment probabilities used for the entire population in the previous
section using the results of the wage and employment equations following the procedure
discussed in section 5.e.i of the Appendix. As in the previous section, student employment
probabilities are obtained by adding to the corresponding adult employment probabilities the
estimated coefficient of the relevant student dummy (university or non-university) in the
second version of the employment equation.
A second key difference in the calculation is that we will now use level-specific estimates
of the marginal wage and employment effects (per year) obtained with our second
specification of the employment and wage equations (columns 2 through 7 of Tables 8 and 11)
rather than the corresponding Mincerian estimates of the relevant parameters (q  and p'(S))
for all school cycles combined.
Third, the private and total direct costs of schooling are allowed to vary across levels as
much as our data permit. Given the limitations of the expenditure data (see section 1 of the
Appendix),  we have had to assume that expenditure per student (measured in euros) does not
vary across university cyles, and that this variable also remains constant across all secondary
and vocational cycles. Expenditure for educational level n is then normalized by the average
wage of workers of attainment n-1 as estimated above. Finally, the length of post-school
working lives will now be estimated as the difference between the mean retirement age
(which is assumed to be the same for all skill levels for lack of better data) and the
theoretical age of completion of each school cycle using the cumulative durations given in
Table 7.
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ii. Results
The detailed results of the rate of return and tax and subsidy calculations for each region
are given in Tables A.46 - A.55 in the Appendix. The discussion in this section will focus on
average results for Spain as a whole.
Figure 22: Marginal returns to schooling by level in Spain as a whole
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Figure 20 shows our raw (NO GOV'T) and all-in (OBS) estimates of the private rate of
return to the different levels of schooling. The estimated return is rather low at the last
compulsory schooling level (lower secondary) but rises sharply for early post-compulsory
cycles (upper secondary and lower vocational training). It then drops somewhat for the next
two levels and increases again for advanced university training. This last cycle displays the
largest estimated return (17.5% before correcting for the effects of public policies), followed
by lower vocational training (13.37%) and by upper secondary schooling (12.68%).
Table 17 shows how the relative returns to the different schooling cycles vary across
regions. To construct this table we first average estimated all-in (OBS) returns across all
educational cycles for each region. The table then shows the return to each educational level
normalized by this average. Large deviations from the national pattern of relative returns
are highlighted by showing in bold type those entries that exceed the corresponding national
average (shown in the last row) by more than thirty points, and in bold italic those that lie
over thirty points below this reference.
Inspection of the table shows considerable differences across regions in the pattern of
relative returns. Returns at the lower secondary level, for instance, are exceptionally high in
two of the poorest regions, Extremadura and Murcia, where the estimated raw returns exceed
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8%, and are actually negative in five of the regions.31 At the other end of the educational
ladder, the return to long-cycle university studies is particularly high, in relative terms, in
País Vasco, Cantabria and Aragón, and especially low in Castilla la Mancha, Baleares,
Valencia, Galicia and Asturias.
Table 17: Relative returns to the different educational levels
______________________________________________________________________
average lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Extremadura 100.0 70.5 126.9 117.7 20.1 75.2 189.6
Madrid 100.0 -1.5 107.2 107.9 90.5 123.4 172.6
Cast. la M. 100.0 38.3 90.7 158.7 103.8 117.4 91.1
Baleares 100.0 9.7 178.7 296.2 -84.8 119.2 81.0
Cataluña 100.0 14.7 120.0 142.5 65.1 104.3 153.4
Murcia 100.0 93.3 122.0 121.9 14.1 70.1 178.7
Canarias 100.0 27.0 117.1 99.5 55.8 121.2 179.4
Valencia 100.0 28.5 145.3 118.3 87.0 94.7 126.1
Cast. y León 100.0 32.2 123.2 121.1 76.7 83.5 163.4
Galicia 100.0 33.7 124.1 143.8 53.3 110.1 135.0
Andalucía 100.0 14.5 130.4 128.2 77.7 88.2 160.9
Rioja 100.0 25.3 139.1 200.2 -0.7 82.7 153.4
País Vasco 100.0 -41.7 130.2 116.7 58.9 116.2 219.7
Cantabria 100.0 42.4 114.9 126.8 27.3 70.6 218.0
Navarra 100.0 -18.1 88.3 139.3 73.5 139.6 177.5
Aragón 100.0 -102.9 118.2 142.6 94.9 119.6 227.5
Asturias 100.0 -93.9 204.9 168.6 12.2 179.1 129.1
Spain 100.0 16.5 118.8 131.7 69.3 96.9 166.8
______________________________________________________________________
The effect of public policies
Figures 23 and 24 display the average effective tax rate on each schooling cycle and its
subsidy, personal tax and social benefit components. Figure 25 shows the relative weight of
the employment benefits in the total benefits of schooling (e/(e+q)) and the tax rates on the
two benefit components, te and tq, distinguishing in the second case between the tax and
benefit-induced components of this variable.
The effective tax rate is extremely high at the lower secondary level, where it exceeds
55%, and drops to values below 18% for all post-compulsory cycles. Tax rates are lowest for
upper secondary and lower vocational training, increase sharply at the upper vocational
level and decline thereafter as we move to the right in Figure 23. As in the previous section,
effective tax rates are quite sensitive to the relative weight of employment benefits in the
total benefits of schooling and to the ceiling on unemployment benefits.
31
 As for all other levels, the rate of return to lower secondary schooling is calculated under the
assumption that the opportunity cost to the agent is determined by the wages of the next lower attainment
level. Since lower secondary schooling is mandatory, however, and school-age children are not allowed to
work regularly, it may be argued that the relevant opportunity cost is in this case zero. Under this
alternative assumption, all regions display positive rates of return.
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Figure 23: Effective tax rate on human capital (
  
etrgov t©), entire Spain by level
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Subsidy rates (subs) drop markedly as we move to the right in Figure 24.a because direct
costs are a greater fraction of wages at lower attainment levels and because raw subsidy rates
(the fraction of total direct costs paid by the government) is lower for university studies than
for secondary or vocational ones.
The tax induced by unemployment benefits (  etrben ) falls as we go from lower secondary
scholing to lower vocational training in Figure 24.c in response to a decline in the relative
weight of employment benefits (Figure 25.a). For these three levels, the net replacement ratio
(which is the main determinant of te shown in Figure 25.c) is practically the same. The value
of   etrben  jumps up at the upper vocational level because the ceiling on unemployment benefits
becomes binding, making the benefit induced component of tq positive as shown in Figure 25.b.
As we move on to university schooling in Figure 24.c,   etrben  declines because replacement ratios
fall (as a fixed benefit becomes relatively less important relative to rising wages as shown in
Figure 25.c).
Finally, the tax-induced component of the effective tax rate (  etrtax in Figure 24.b) is driven
by the tax component of tq, which reflects the progressivity of the tax system at each income
level, and by the relative importance of wages in the overall benefits of schooling. For the
first three schooling levels the degree of progressivity is practically the same, but   etrtax  rises
as a result of the increasing relative importance of wage benefits. For higher attainment
levels, progressivity is lower, although with some oscillations, yielding generally lower
values of   etrtax that peak at the lower university level.
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Figure 24: Components of the effective tax rate on human capital, entire Spain by level
a. Educational subsidies (  subs )
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Figure 25: Determinants of the effective tax rate on human capital
a. relative weight of the employment benefits of schooling (e/(e+q))
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d. How does the private return on schooling compare with that on alternative assets?
In this section we will compare the returns to schooling estimated above to those available
on alternative assets that households can invest in. Table 18 shows the before-tax real returns
on bonds and stocks during the period 1950-99 and different subperiods. These data are taken
from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002). The last column of the table shows the average
return on a portfolio where bonds and shares have the same weight.
Table 18: Real before-tax returns to debt and equity in Spain
____________________________________
equity bonds
avge .
portfolio
1950-59 6.4% -0.7% 2.9%
1960-69 11.3% -1.0% 5.2%
1970-79 -15.1% -7.6% -11.4%
1980-89 18.4% 6.2% 12.3%
1990-99 9.2% 7.6% 8.4%
1950-89 4.5% -0.9% 1.8%
1950-99 5.5% 0.9% 3.2%
____________________________________
Figure 26 shows what we will call the private premium on human capital. This variable
is defined as the difference between the private after-tax rate of return on schooling (under
the all-in scenario, OBS) and the average before-tax return on the equal-weight portfolio
given in Table 18 for the entire period 1950-99. Panel a of the figure refers to the average
(Mincerian) returns across all levels for each region, and panel b to the average marginal
return to each educational level for Spain as a whole. In both cases the estimated private
premia on human capital are generally positive and large, with the only exception of lower
secondary schooling. Across regions, the largest premium corresponds to Extremadura (7.35%)
and the lowest one to Asturias (3.65%) with a mean value of 6.30% for the entire country.
Across levels, the premium lies above 4 percentage points for all post-compulsory levels and
reaches 14% for advanced university courses.
These results reinforce our conclusion in de la Fuente and Ciccone (D&C, 2002) and de la
Fuente (2003) that schooling is a rather attractive investment from an individual point of
view.32 Its expected return is at lest twice that on financial assets in all regions and all post-
32
 As noted in D&C (2002), in order to draw unequivocal conclusions about the relative attractiveness of
education as an investment, we would need to control for the riskiness of its returns. While the variation of
earnings across workers with similar attainment levels is very high, much of this variation is not the result
of random luck but of differences in individual abilities and career choices. I am not aware of any refined
measures of earnings risk that can be used to draw valid comparisons with other assets.
   On a different note, Padula and Pistaferri (2001) provide some evidence that introducing risk
considerations may actually increase the attractiveness of investment in schooling. They find, in particular,
that increases in attainment tend to lower wage risk and, as a result, increase the (risk-adjusted) rate of
return on schooling. (Thanks to G. Brunello for providing this reference).
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compulsory levels. When allowance is made for taxes on capital income, the premium on
schooling will increase significantly.
Figure 26: Private premium on human capital
a. Average across levels (Mincerian estimates) for each region
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5. The long-term impact of schooling expenditure on public finances
Public expenditure on education increases future tax revenues and reduces social insurance
payments. Proceeding as in the previous section, we can treat such expenditure as an
investment and compute a fiscal rate of return to schooling that will summarize the long-term
impact of educational spending on government finances. This variable, which we will denote
by rf, will be defined as the discount rate that equates the present value of public schooling
expenditure (which includes also an opportunity cost component as school attendance reduces
wage income and hence current tax payments) with the present value of the induced
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incremental flows of tax revenues and savings on social protection payments. This fiscal rate
of return can also be interpreted as the maximum real rate of interest at which the government
can borrow to finance educational expenditure without increasing the present value of future
deficits. In addition, we will also compute the net present fiscal value of an additional year
of schooling, defined as the difference in present value terms between incremental net fiscal
revenues and educational expenditures. In all calculations, we will take into account the
effects of education on labour force participation, and will try to approximate the marginal
effects of schooling on tax revenues in general equilibrium, that is, when aggregate attainment
levels are allowed to change and to affect factor prices.
a. Methodology
Proceeding as sketched in de la Fuente (2003), but focusing only on public educational
expenditure and on the tax and benefit flows induced by a one-year increase in attainment, it
can be shown that the fiscal rate of return on schooling is given by
(19)  rf = Rf + g
where g is the exogenous growth rate of productivity and Rf  is the value of R that solves the
following equation
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where mg is public expenditure per student measured as a fraction of the gross wage of the
reference worker and q(S) denotes the probability that a worker will be active as a function of
his school attainment. In particular, qo = q(So) is the participation rate of adult workers, eq =
q'(So)/q(So) measures the sensitivity of the participation rate to the level of schooling and hq
= qs/qo the ratio between the participation rates of full-time workers and students of the
relevant attainment level. The remaining variables have the same meaning as in section 4.
The net present fiscal value of a year of schooling at a given discount rate, ro, can be
approximated by
(21) NPFV(ro) = 
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where R' is the benefit to cost ratio that appears on right-hand side of equation (20) and Wo
the average gross salary of a full-time worker with the relevant level of schooling. 
Equation (20) has essentially the same interpretation as the private returns formula given
in section 4. That is, rf  is the ratio of the marginal (budget) benefits of an additional year of
schooling to its costs, adjusted for the finiteness of working lives. We have written R' so that
all its cost and benefit components are measured as fractions of an adult worker's gross wages.
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Notice that the term D that enters both the numerator and the denominator of R' corresponds
to the expected increase in tax revenues per worker (net of incremental social benefits) that is
generated by an additional year of schooling. This variable, which can have either a
positive or a negative sign, will vary across regions and educational cycles depending on
employment probabilities and wages, which determine both average tax rates and
unemployment benefit levels. 
The numerator of R' in equation (20) measures the expected net annual contribution to the
public budget of an additional year of schooling. Its first term, Deq, captures the impact of an
increase in the labour force participation rate. Since inactive workers pay no taxes on labour
income and are not entitled to unemployment benefits, increasing the labour force
participation rate will increase net tax revenues provided tax payments by newly active
workers exceed the social benefits paid to them. The second term, N1q, captures the net
revenue effects of higher salaries, which increase tax payments by employed workers but also
the insurance entitlements of the unemployed. The third term, N2e, reflects the impact of the
increase in the probability of employment and is unambiguously positive since greater
employment implies both higher tax revenues and lower social insurance payments.
The denominator of R' is the sum of the opportunity and direct budget costs of schooling.
The opportunity cost term, D-N3, is the difference between expected net tax receipts from a
full-time worker and net receipts from a part-time student worker. The direct cost component,
finally, is equal to government expenditure per student divided by the labour force
participation rate. This correction is required because expenditure is incurred for all students,
but only those that enter the labour force pay taxes on labour income or are entitled to
unemployment benefits.
We will use equations (20) and (21) to explore the fiscal consequences of increasing average
attainment by one year in each region and to compute the fiscal rate of return to each post-
compulsory educational level for Spain as a whole. Hence, our raw data are the same that
have already been used to calculate the private returns to schooling in sections 4.b and 4.c. We
will, however, introduce a number of deviations from our previous assumptions to try to obtain
a more realistic estimate of the impact of schooling on public finances. First, we will now take
into account the effects of schooling on labour force participation rates. Hence, our calculations
in this section will apply to a representative individual who may or may not be active with
probabilities based on observed labour force participation rates, rather than to an individual
who remains active throughout his student and adult life, as was the case in the previous
section. Equation (20) already incorporates participation effects, and the values of the
relevant parameters will be set using the participation equations estimated in section 3.b
following exactly the same procedure we used above to construct the analogous parameters
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that capture the effects of education on the probability of employment conditional on labour
force participation.33
Second, since trying to account for pension benefits would take us too far afield, we will
abstract from pension financing in our analysis of the budget effects of schooling by
eliminating from our calculations that part of social security contributions that goes to finance
pension (and sick leave) benefits. This will be done by subtracting this contribution (which is
levied at a flat rate of 4.7%) from our previous estimates of the average and marginal income
tax rates.
Finally, we will try to approximate the general equilibrium effects of schooling on wages
and employment probabilities. As has already been noted, the estimates of the wage (q) and
employment (e) benefits of schooling reported in sections 3.a and 3.b are partial equilibrium
estimates that capture the returns that a single individual can expect when he increases his
attainment level holding constant aggregate factor stocks and prices.  It should be expected,
however, that the realized marginal returns to schooling will be smaller when the
government undertakes policies that raise average attainment at the aggregate level. As
discussed in de la Fuente (2003)34 the required correction to the wage benefits of schooling can
be approximated by multiplying the estimated value of q by one minus the share of capital in
national income (which we have estimated at 0.314 in section 3.c). For the case of the
employment and participation parameters (e and eq) we will introduce an ad-hoc correction
that consists in reducing the original estimates of both coefficients by two thirds.
b. Results
Table 19 shows our estimates of the fiscal rate of return and the net present fiscal value per
student (assuming a real discount rate of 3%) for the case of a one-year increase in average
attainment in each region. These calculations are carried out under three alternative sets of
assumptions concerning the unemployment coverage ratio (i.e. the fraction of unemployed
workers drawing benefits) and the financing of the additional expenditure required to
increase enrollments. Column [1] assumes a coverage ratio of 100% and that private
expenditures increase in step with public expenditure so that their ratio remains constant.
Column [2] maintains the second assumption but assumes a coverage ratio of 70% for all regions
(which is the observed national average as of 2003) and column [3] assumes that all the
required new expenditure comes from the public sector with a coverage ratio of 70%. Regions
are ordered by the estimated fiscal rate of return given in column [3].
33 Thus, the value of qo for the Mincerian calculations by region is the prediction of the Mincerian
participation equation estimated in section 3.b for the mean values of all regressors. We use this value and
the results of the second specification of the participation equation (with dummies by educational level) to
recover an estimate of the average participation rate at each attainment level, as discussed in section 5.e.i of
the Appendix for the case of the analogous employment probabilities. The corrections required to estimate
student participation rates and the calculation of eq also follow the procedures discussed in sections 4b.
and 4.c
34
 See in particular section 8 of the Appendix.
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Table 19: Fiscal rate of return and net present fiscal value per student
of an additional year of schooling by region
______________________________________________________________________
                                                        fiscal rate of return                                             net present fiscal value        .
financing = priv+pub priv+pub only public priv+pub priv+pub only public
coverage ratio = 100% 70% 70% 100% 70% 70%
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Andalucía 9.67% 7.21% 6.79% 4,872 3,697 3,477
Madrid 8.05% 7.16% 5.81% 5,733 5,050 3,954
Baleares 6.16% 5.56% 4.99% 3,446 2,890 2,407
Cataluña 6.54% 5.84% 4.88% 4,258 3,563 2,645
Valencia 6.29% 5.35% 4.85% 3,403 2,600 2,179
Gal ic ia 6.16% 5.13% 4.76% 3,107 2,300 1,990
C.-León 5.52% 4.84% 4.48% 2,799 2,185 1,842
Canarias 5.05% 4.35% 4.14% 2,345 1,637 1,415
Extremadura 3.73% 3.73% 3.83% 470 578 650
P. Vasco 4.49% 3.92% 3.40% 2,120 1,367 642
Cantabria 4.67% 3.86% 3.38% 1,881 1,042 498
C.-Mancha 3.29% 3.44% 3.31% 245 428 309
Asturias 4.23% 3.64% 3.25% 1,475 824 332
Aragón 3.85% 3.49% 3.06% 1,015 610 75
Rioja 3.74% 3.34% 3.02% 948 450 32
Murcia 2.99% 3.13% 2.79% -8 115 -195
Navarra 3.40% 3.17% 2.74% 543 240 -393
Spain 7.15% 6.13% 5.45% 4,528 3,692 3,133
______________________________________________________________________
For the country as a whole, the fiscal rate of return ranges between 5.45% and 7.15%
depending on the scenario, and imply positive net fiscal values of between 3,000 and 4,500
euros per student. For scenario [3], which is arguably the more realistic one, the fiscal rate of
return exceeds 3% in all regions but two, and the present value of net tax revenues exceeds 1,000
euros per student in half the regions.
Table 20: Fiscal rate of return and net present fiscal value per student
of an additional year of schooling by level in Spain as a whole
______________________________________________________________________
                                                        fiscal rate of return                                             net present fiscal value        .
financing = priv+pub priv+pub only public priv+pub priv+pub only public
coverage ratio = 100% 70% 70% 100% 70% 70%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
upper sec 3.99% 3.95% 3.66% 841 910 656
lower voc 3.59% 4.26% 3.98% 780 1,946 1,560
upper voc 4.75% 3.88% 3.62% 1,588 852 627
lower univ 9.29% 8.56% 6.97% 6,374 6,015 4,967
upper univ 12.71% 12.14% 10.56% 14,200 13,927 12,893
______________________________________________________________________
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Table 20 shows the results of similar calculations for each post-compulsory educational
cycles in the case of Spain as a whole. Focusing on scenario [3], the estimated fiscal rates of
return lie between 3% and 4% for secondary and vocational training and are much higher at
the university level, where the net present fiscal value per student of an additional year of
training shoots up to around 5,000 for the first cycle and to over 12,000 for the second one.
Figure 25: Incremental annual net tax revenue per student and year of schooling
 after graduation, in euros of 2000
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
These results suggest that any increase in public educational expenditure required to
marginally raise current attainement levels would more than pay for itself over the long run
through higher tax revenues and lower social insurance payments.35 The fiscal surplus per
student is considerable for some cycles and regions and can potentially make a modest positive
contribution to public budgets in the future.36 Figure 25 shows the incremental annual net tax
revenues per student generated by an additional year of schooling at each level.37 To get
some feeling for the macroeconomic implications of our results, we have calculated that
increasing by 100.000 the number of graduates at each university cycle would increase net tax
revenues by 325 million euros per year, or 0.05% of Spain's GDP in 2000.
35
 Barceinas et al (2000) reach the same conclusion for Spain as a whole using a more elaborate
procedure. Their calculations are based on uncorrected partial equilibrium estimates of the relevant wage
and employment effects, but they discount the entire expected profile of net tax revenues over the life-cycle
using the "elaborate method" to allow for marriage, child benefits and tax deductions for home purchases.
Our approach can be seen as an approximation to this procedure that considerably simplifies the required
calculations, making it feasible to obtain region-specific results.
36
 One limitation of these calculations is that they do not take into account years of schooling that are
"wasted" because of repeats and dropouts. A reasonable allowance for these factors should not, however,
qualitatively change the results.
37
 These figures refer to the expected yearly increase in net tax revenues after the completion of schooling.
They are obtained by multiplying the numerator of the benefit to cost ratio R' in equation (20) by the
estimated average wage in 2000.
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6. The social rate of return to schooling and the optimal investment pattern
In this section we will present estimates of the social return to schooling and to alternative
assets in the Spanish regions. The procedure used to estimate the rate of return to schooling is
similar to the one described in section 4 except for the fact that we will now be concerned with
the social, rather than private, costs and benefits of an additional year of schooling. As a
result, we need to consider the effects of education on aggregate output rather than on
individual income, and its contribution to faster technological progress. On the other hand,
taxes and social benefits are no longer relevant, as we are not interested in flows of resources
between the public and private sectors.
Box 1 outlines a simple model of growth with human capital that specifies the connections
between the educational attainment of the labour force and the level and growth rate of
aggregate productivity. As in our previous reports, the model allows for two types of links
between average schooling and aggregate output to which we will refer as "level" and "rate"
effects. First, the level of output is assumed to be an increasing function of average attainment
through a standard aggregate production function with human capital as an input.38 And
second, the model assumes that the rate of technical progress is also an increasing function of
average schooling through an external effect that cannot be privately appropriated by
individuals in the form of higher wages.
Box 1 also gives the formula for the calculation of the social rate of return under the
assumptions of the model. The choice of values for the key parameters of this formula will be
discussed below. It must be kept in mind that, as their private counterparts in section 4, the
social rates of return reported in this section capture the marginal return to an increase in the
quantity of schooling holding cost and quality constant at the existing level. An additional
problem is that the social returns estimates in this section are less likely to capture
differences in quality levels across regions than the private returns reported above. One of the
key inputs for the social returns calculation is an econometric estimate of the contribution of
school attainment to productivity which essentially measures the strength of this connection
in the case of a hypothetical average region.39 Hence, our social rate of return estimates
38 The functional form of the production function is very important in cross-regional comparisons. As
shown in Box 1, the Cobb-Douglas function in years of schooling that underlies our calculations forces the
aggregate Mincerian returns parameter (r) for each territory to be inversely proportional to its average
attainment. An alternative ("Mincerian") specification that has often been used in the recent literature, by
contrast, imposes a common value of r for the whole sample (see Box 2 in section 3b.ii of D&C (2002)). This
makes little difference when we are interested in drawing conclusions for a hypothetical average region but
becomes crucial when we want to compare rates of return across territories. While we find the Cobb-
Douglas specification intuitively more appealing than the Mincerian functional form and have found that it
fits the OECD data better, it may still be too restrictive. If this is the case, cross-regional results may be
distorted in a way that will depend on the true sensitivity of r to average attainment.
39
 This problem does not arise in the calculation of the private returns to schooling because the relevant
parameter is estimated separately for each region using individual data and can therefore pick up cross-
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Box 1: A simple model of human capital and growth
and the social rate of return to schooling
____________________________________________________________
Our estimates of the social return to schooling will be based on a simple model of human
capital and growth with two components: an aggregate production function and a technical
progress function. The production function will be assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas type:
(1) Yit = Ait Kit
akSit
aSLit
al
where Yit denotes the aggregate output of region i at time t, Lit is the level of employment, Kit
the stock of physical capital, Sit the average stock of human capital per worker, measured by
the average years of schooling of the adult population, and Ait an index of technical
efficiency or total factor productivity (TFP) which summarizes the current state of the
technology and, possibly, omitted factors such as geographical location, climate, institutions
and endowments of natural resources. The coefficients a i (with i = k, s, l) measure the
elasticity of output with respect to the stocks of the different factors. An increase of 1% in the
stock of human capital per worker, for instance, would increase output by aS% holding
constant the stocks of the other factors and the level of technical efficiency.
Under the standard assumption that (1) displays constant returns to scale in capital,
labour and total human capital, LS , (i.e. that a k + a l = 1) we can define a per capita
production function that will relate average productivity to average schooling and the stock
of capital per worker. Letting Q = Y/L denote output per worker, Z = K/L the stock of capital
per worker, and dividing both sides of (1) by total employment, L, we have:
(2) Q  = f(S) = AZakSaS
The aggregate Mincerian returns parameter that appears in the rate of return formula shown
below is given by
(3) r = 
f'(S)
f (S)
 = 
AZakaSS
aS-1
AZakSaS
 = 
aS
S
This parameter measures the percentage increase in output resulting from a one-year increase
in average attainment.
The technical progress function describes the determinants of the growth rate of total
factor productivity. We will assume that region i's TFP level can be written in the form:
(4)Ait = BtXit
where Bt denotes the national "technological frontier" (i.e. the maximum attainable level of
efficiency in production given the current state of scientific and technological knowledge in
the country) and Xit = Ait/Bt the "technological gap" between territory i and the frontier. It
will be assumed that Bt grows at a constant and exogenous rate, g, and that the growth rate of
Xit is given by
(5) Dxit = gio - lxit + gSit
where xit is the log of Xit and gio a fixed regional effect that helps control for omitted
variables such as R&D investment. Notice that this specification incorporates a
technological diffusion or catch-up effect. If l > 0, regions that are closer to the technological
frontier will experience lower rates of TFP growth. As a result, relative TFP levels will tend
to stabilize and their steady-state values will be partly determined by the level of
schooling.
Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the social rate of return to schooling, rs, is
given by
(6) rs = Rs + g
where g is the rate of exogenous productivity growth at the frontier and Rs the value of R
____________________________________________________________
regional differences in the quality of education. We cannot follow a similar strategy to estimate the
aggregate parameter because there are not enough data, and not enough variation in the available aggregate
data, to obtain precise region-specific estimates.
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Box 1 -- continued
______________________________________________________________________
that solves the following equation:
(7)  
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where m is the total direct cost of a year of schooling measured as a fraction of average output
per worker, r  is the aggregate Mincerian returns coefficient, g the rate effects parameter that
captures the contribution of schooling to technical progress and l the rate of technological
diffusion. The remaining parameters have the same interpretation as in section 4. Notice that
equation (7) has the same form as the private returns formula derived in section 4.a, except for
the absence of tax and benefit parameters and for the inclusion of a new term (EXT) that
captures the externality or rate effects of human capital. Aside from this, the interpretation
of the formula remains unchanged: the rate of return to schooling is the ratio of its marginal
benefits to its marginal costs, adjusted for the finite life of the asset.
______________________________________________________________________
implicitly assume that the quality of a year of schooling is the same everywhere,
irrespective of its cost or indeed of any other factor. This implies that our calcuations will
understate the aggregate return to schooling in regions with educational systems of above-
average quality. If quality is positively correlated with resource input (an issue that remains
controversial, as discussed in D&C (2002)), our results will also underestimate the returns to
education in territories with high expenditure per student.
a. Data and sources
Table 21 defines the variables that enter the social rate of return formula and Table 22
shows the relevant data. The cost and employment parameters have been taken from the
same sources as those used in the private return calculations.
An important difference with the calculations presented in section 4 is that we will now
consider the total effect of education on employment, rather than just the increase in the
probability of employment of active workers. That is, we will consider as part of the social
benefits of education the induced increase in the rate of labour force participation. Hence, the
values of po, e and h used in this section are based on data on the absolute probability of
employment (i.e. the fraction of the adult population that is employed) rather than on the
probability of employment conditional on labour force participation, as was the case in
section 4. A second difference is that the variable that measures the cost of education, m, now
refers to total rather than private expenditure, and is normalized by average labour
productivity rather than by the average earnings of full-time salaried workers.
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Table 21: Variables used in the calculation of the social
rate of return on schooling and sources of the data
______________________________________________________________________
r, rmin = macroeconomic Mincerian returns to schooling parameter. It measures the average
(log) increase in output per employed worker resulting from an additional year of
schooling of the adult population. It is obtained by dividing the estimated elasticity of
output with respect to the stock of human capital (aS) by average attainment in each
region, using the results in D&D (2002) and in section 3.c and this report's estimates of
regional attainment. Our baseline estimates of r are based on an estimate of aS that is
corrected for measurement error bias, but we also use an uncorrected estimate to obtain a
lower bound on the value of r, which is denoted by rmin.
U  = 60.5, average retirement age in 1995.
So = average years of school attainment of the adult (over 25) population in 1995. Source:
Section 2.b.
H = U - Max(6+So, 14) = estimated length of the (post-school) working life of the
representative individual.
m = total costs of schooling per student measured as a fraction of GDP per employed worker.
Calculated as described in Table 14 except that the denominator is GDP per employed
worker in 2000 (at market prices, taken from Contabilidad Regional de España, published
by the National Statistical Institute).
po  = total probability of employment after leaving school, taking into account the
probabilities of employment and labour force participation. Estimated using the results in
section 3.b.
h  = correction factor capturing lower student labour force participation and employment rates.
Estimated using the results in section 3.b.
e = p'(S)/p(S) = sensitivity of the total probability of employment to the level of schooling.
Estimated using the results in section 3.b.
______________________________________________________________________
The probability of employment of adult workers and students are estimated using the
predictions of the participation and employment equations estimated in section 3.b (using the
first specification where education is measured by average years of schooling). The total
probability of employment of adult workers (po) is constructed as the product of the
predictions of the participation and employment models for the the average values of the
regressors. In the case of students, we adjust each of these probabilities by adding to them a
weighted average of the coefficients of the dummies for non-university and university
students in the corresponding equation (with weights 2/3 and 1/3) respectively, and then
multiply the results to obtain ps. The student correction factor (h) is then calculated as ps/po.
Finally, for  each of the (participation and employment) equations we calculate the ratio
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between the marginal effect of schooling (p'(S)) and the model's average probability
prediction and sum the results to obtain a raw estimate of e that now measures the sensitiviy
of the total probability of employment to schooling. This figure is then divided by three to
obtain the number shown in Table 22. As in the previous section, the reason for this adjustment
is that the original result is obtained in conditions of partial equilibrium and measures the
response of the relevant probabilities to additional schooling for the case of a single
individual under the implicit assumption that the agent acts alone and, in particular, that
economy-wide attainment levels remain constant. It can be expected, however, that the
impact on employment of an increase in aggregate attainment will be substantially smaller.
Table 22: Data used in the calculation of the social rate of return to schooling
______________________________________________________________________
So r rmin m po e h
Andalucía 6.91 8.49% 5.70% 7.50% 45.87% 2.93% 0.149
Aragón 7.58 7.74% 5.20% 9.03% 63.40% 1.70% 0.300
Asturias 7.62 7.70% 5.17% 8.72% 46.48% 2.64% 0.030
Baleares 7.52 7.80% 5.24% 7.14% 66.39% 1.26% 0.233
Canarias 7.40 7.93% 5.33% 9.38% 54.11% 2.40% 0.294
Cantabria 7.80 7.53% 5.05% 9.25% 49.27% 1.98% 0.024
Cast. y León 7.44 7.89% 5.29% 8.67% 56.38% 2.33% 0.216
Cast.-Mancha 6.51 9.01% 6.05% 8.54% 56.15% 2.44% 0.176
Cataluña 7.67 7.65% 5.14% 8.84% 66.37% 1.80% 0.289
Valencia 7.27 8.07% 5.42% 9.47% 59.45% 1.95% 0.267
Extremadura 6.50 9.04% 6.07% 8.79% 50.26% 2.79% 0.109
Gal ic ia 6.97 8.42% 5.65% 10.57% 53.32% 2.14% 0.123
Madrid 8.64 6.80% 4.56% 6.94% 59.06% 1.69% 0.103
Murcia 7.12 8.25% 5.54% 8.86% 54.40% 1.95% 0.178
Navarra 8.04 7.30% 4.90% 9.37% 65.75% 1.65% 0.242
P. Vasco 8.20 7.16% 4.80% 9.71% 58.17% 2.13% 0.206
Rioja 7.61 7.72% 5.18% 10.47% 58.10% 1.75% 0.036
Spain 7.52 7.81% 5.24% 8.40% 55.38% 2.30% 0.189
Spain (D2003) 7.10 8.27% 5.55% 8.16% 70.61% 1.36% 0.154
______________________________________________________________________
For the calculation of the social rate of return, the microeconomic Mincerian returns
parameter (q) used in section 4 must be replaced by its macroeconomic or aggregate counterpart
(r), which measures the contribution of an additional year of schooling to aggregate
productivity rather than to labour earnings. This variable is constructed by dividing the
estimated coefficient of human capital in the aggregate production function (aS) by average
attainment in each country, as indicated in Box 1. The estimate of aS is based on the results of
growth regressions that are estimataed with panel data by country or region rather than on
those of wage equations estimated separately for each territory with individual-level wage
data. The choice of baseline values for aS will be discussed in greater detail in the following
section.
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The last row of Table 22 shows the estimates of the different variables obtained in de la
Fuente (2003) for Spain as a whole. One difference between the two studies is that  we now
focus on attainment in 1995 rather than in 1990. The increase in average schooling over this
period translates into lower estimates of the Mincerian return parameter (r) in this report. A
second and more important difference has to do with the employment parameters and, as in
section 4, arises from differences in the underlying data and in the estimation procedure. Our
current estimates of the average probability of employment (po) is significantly lower because
it refers to the entire working-age population rather than to prime-age cohorts as was the
case in the previous study. As in section 4, our current estimate of e is considerably larger than
the previous one (which as we have already noted was constructed using aggregate rather
than individual data and should therefore be less reliable).
b. Parameter values
Table 23 lists the values or ranges of values of the parameters that will be used below to
compute the social return to investment in human and physical capital, with our baseline
estimates shown in italics. As in section 4, we assume an exogenous (steady-state) rate of
productivity growth of 1.5% per annum and a value of f equal to 0.8. The depreciation rates
for infrastructures and for non-infrastructure physical capital have been recovered from the
corresponding investment and capital stock series using the data from Mas et al (2002)
discussed in section 3.c. The estimates of dk and dp given in the table are average values over
the last 10 years in our sample of the depreciation rates for Spain as a whole .
Table 23:  Parameter values used in the calculations
__________________________________
    human capital:
level effects: aS 0.394-0.587
rate effects: g 0-0.15%
    others:
physical capital: ak 0.258
infrastructures: ax 0.056
technological diffusion: l 0.045
rate of tech. progress: g 0.015
time used in school: f 0.80
depreciation of ph. cap.: dk 7.86%
depreciation of infrast..: dk 4.33%
__________________________________
The remaining coefficients shown in the table are the key parameters of the growth model
outlined in Box 1 once the production function given there has been extended to include
infrastructures as an additional input separate from other physical capital. Three of these
parameters are the elasticities of aggregate output with respect to average educational
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attainment (aS) and to the stocks of physical capital (ak) and infrastructures (ax). These
parameters measure the percentage increase in output that would result from a 1% increase in
the stocks of the different productive factors. The fourth coefficient (g) captures the intensity
of rate effects, i.e. the contribution of one additional year of schooling to the growth rate of
total factor productivity (TFP). The last parameter of interest (l) can be interpreted as the
rate of technological diffusion across regions. Notice that the technological diffusion process
assumed in the model implies that increases in schooling have only transitory effects on the
growth rate of TFP and, in the long run, affect only the level of this variable. The percentage
increase in steady-state TFP induced by a one-year increase in average attainment is given by
g/l.
The range of values of the parameter that measures the level effects of human capital (aS)
shown in Table 23 are those used in de la Fuente (2003)40 and were set drawing on the results
of D&D (2002) for a sample of OECD countries. The rate effects parameter (g) has been set
using the results obtained in section 3.c and the baseline value of aS. Proceeding as in de la
Fuente (2003), we interpret the estimate of the human capital coefficient (b) given in Table 12
in section 3.c as the sum of the level and rate effects in a steady state, and recover the implied
value of g working under the assumption that aS = 0.587.41 The reported values of l and ax are
taken from Table 12 in section 3.c. As noted in that section,  the value given in the table for ak
has been obtained by scaling up the original estimate of this parameter so that the sum of the
coefficients of public and private capital is equal to the observed share of capital in gross
value added (which is 31.4%).
c. Results
Figure 28 shows two alternative estimates of the social rate of return to schooling (rs) in
the Spanish regions. Both sets of figures are all-in estimates that take into account rate
effects (using our  baseline estimate of 0.15% for g) and induced changes in employment and
correct for differential student employment probabilities. The only difference between them
has to do with the assumed value of the level effects parameter (aS), which is corrected for
measurement error bias in one case (labeled baseline in the figure) but not in the other (min).
 According to our baseline estimates, the social rate of return to schooling ranges from
10.10% in Madrid to 12.55% in Extremadura, with an average value of 11.41% for the entire
country. Under the more pessimistic (min) assumption on the size of the level effects, the
40
 See section 4b of that report for a discussion of how these values were chosen.
41 Hence, we are assuming that the parameters of interest satisfy the following relation, 
  
b g
lS S
= +
0 587.
,
where S is average attainment for Spain as a whole in 1995. Notice that the left-hand side is the total
estimated effect of an additional year of schooling on steady-state output per worker and the right-hand
side breaks down this total into its level and rate effect components. Since S is known and b and l have
been estimated in section 3.c, the equation can be solved for the rate effects parameter, g, which is the only
unknown.
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Figure 28: Social rate of return to schooling in Spain
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average return drops to  9.15% and the lowest value of rs to 8.07%. Under both assumptions,
estimated returns to human capital are highest in the poorest regions (Castilla la Mancha,
Extremadura and Andalucía) and lowest in Madrid, Cantabria and Rioja.
As in section 4, it will be convenient to recalculate the rate of return to schooling under a
variety of scenarios in order to isolate the contribution of different factors to this return and to
check the sensitivity of the results to various assumptions. Using the two alternative
assumptions about the size of level effects discussed above, we will construct baseline and min
estimates of the return to schooling under three different scenarios. The first one (level)
considers only the direct level effects of human capital on average productivity. In the second
one (employment), we introduce employment effects and in the third one (OBS) we add rate
effects under the assumption that g = 0.15% to obtain the all-in estimates that correspond to
Figure 28. In all cases, we use the estimated value of h  to correct for the low participation and
employment rates of students in many regions.
Tables A.56 and A.57 in the Appendix show the detailed results of the calculations for all
regions and Figure 29 summarizes the findings for Spain as a whole. The bulk of the return to
human capital can be traced back to its direct (level) effects on productivity. Considering only
this factor, the baseline estimate of rs goes from 7.23% in the Madrid to 9.36% in Castilla la
Mancha with a national average of 8.19%. For the country as a whole, the sequential
introduction of employment and rate effects adds 2.24 and 0.98 percentage points respectively
to the baseline returns arising from level effects.
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Figure 29: Social returns to schooling under different scenarios
in Spain as a whole
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d. The relative returns to investment in schooling and in physical capital
In this section we will compare the social return to schooling (using the baseline and min
estimates under the last, all-in scenario) with the returns to non-infrastructure physical
capital and to infrastructures (rk and rx). Our estimates of rk and rx are calculated as ri = MPi -
d i + g  where MPi is the marginal product of factor i, d i its rate of depreciation and g the rate
of technical progress (which is assumed to be 1.5% as in the previous sections).42 For these
calculations we use the data on regional output and factor stocks in 1995 discussed in section 3.c
and our baseline estimates of the relevant output elasticities and depreciation rates given in
Table 23.
The detailed results of the calculations are shown in Table A.58 in the Appendix. Figure 30
summarizes the results of this section and the previous one for the case of the entire country. If
we exclude the lowest bound scenario (our min  estimate when only level effects are
considered), our calculations suggest that, at the national level, the economic returns on
human capital are at least comparable to and probably slightly higher than those on non-
infrastructure physical capital. On the other hand, the estimated return to infrastructure
investment appears to be significantly higher than those on private and human capital.43
42
 This formula comes out of a calculation analogous to the one described in Box 1, which is much simpler
in the case of physical capital because of the absence of delays and rate effects.
43
 The contribution of infrastructures to productivity has been an extremely controversial issue in the
literature. Recent evidence for the US states suggests that the economic returns to infrastructure investment
have been rather low or even negligible over the last three decades, but practically all the evidence
available for Spain points to the opposite conclusion. One possible explanation for these contrasting
results is that the payoff to infrastructures may fall sharply once the stock of this factor becomes large
enough to adequately serve the needs of a given territory. If this is the case, existing results suggest that
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Figure 30: Social rate of return to schooling under different scenarios and
returns on physical capital and infrastructures in Spain
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
only level effects  + employment
effects
 + 0.15% rate effects
= OBS
physical capital infrastructures
baseline min/max
- Note: the "min" estimate of the return on physical capital makes use of the direct estimate of ak given in
Table 12 in section 3.c.
The situation, however, varies greatly across regions, particularly in terms of the relative
returns to education and infrastructures. Figure 31 displays two estimates of the social
premium on human capital relative to both private capital and to infrastructures. These
social premia are defined as the difference between the social rate of return on schooling and
the expected returns to the two (private and infrastructure) components of the stock of
physical capital. For each of these two factors, we show two estimates of the human capital
premium that are obtained by comparing, respectively, our baseline and min estimates of the
return to human capital with the estimated (baseline) returns on the other assets.
For about two thirds of the regions, our baseline estimate of the human capital premium
relative to private capital is positive, suggesting that education should be favoured over
physical capital as an investment alternative. When we use as a reference the lower bound on
rs, the premium on human capital becomes zero or slightly negative for the intermediate
range of regions shown in Figure 31.a.
When we turn to infrastructures, the situation is reversed: according to our baseline
estimates, the return on public capital exceeds that on human capital in ten out seventeen
regions. But education continues to yield the highest return in most of the poorer territories.
This is illustrated in Figure 32, which plots the human capital premium relative to
infrastructures against relative income per capita in 1995. For the richest Spanish regions
(Madrid, Baleares and Cataluña) the expected returns on infrastructure investment are
Spain has not yet reached this "saturation" point. See de la Fuente (2002b) for a survey of the relevant
literature.
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Figure 31: Social premium on human capital
a. relative to non-infrastructure physical capital
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extremely high and exceed those on education by over ten percentage points. For the rest of
the regions the differences in estimated returns are much lower and the human capital
premium is generally positive in the poorer regions and tends to decline with income per
capita. This suggests that public investment strategies should differ across regions.
Infrastructure stocks appear to be the critical bottleneck at the top of the income distribution,
while increasing educational attainment seems to be crucial for low income-regions.
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Figure 32: Human capital premium relative to infrastructures
vs. relative income per capita in 1995
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e. A typology of regions
Drawing on previous results, in this section we will attempt to classify the regions of Spain
into several groups according to the priority that should be accorded to education relative to
infrastructures in the allocation of the available investment resources. Since such priority
may be justifiable on either equity or efficiency grounds, we will construct a typology of
regions by combining an index of relative educational needs with a measure of the returns to
schooling relative to those on infrastructure investment.
The relative return indicator (rreturn) will be the ratio betwen our baseline estimate of the
social return to schooling in each region and the expected return on infrastructure investment,
as calculated in section 6.c (see Table A.58 in the Appendix). The (inverse) need indicator
(need) will be constructed as an unweighted average of four variables, all of which will be
measured in relative terms, i.e. as ratios to the corresponding national average. These four
variables are the following:
1) Expenditure on education (exp), measured by combined total expenditure per student at
the secondary and university levels as defined in section 2.a.
2) and 3) The educational attainment of the adult (25+) population in 2001 (att25+) and of
the 25-34 cohort in the same year (att25-34), measured in average years of schooling. (See
section 2.b.ii).
4) The performance of the regional school system (perf) as measured by the combined
indicator constructed by averaging the access and success indices given in Table 5 of section
2.b.iii.
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Table 24: Regional indicators of relative educational needs and returns
_______________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
exp att25+ att25-34 per f need rreturn
Andalucia 79.9 90.7 92.6 94.3 89.4 134.8
Aragón 108.8 103.4 105.6 106.7 106.1 104.0
Asturias 101.5 102.4 105.5 105.1 103.6 122.8
Baleares 93.0 101.1 93.7 86.4 93.5 39.5
Canarias 106.3 97.6 92.0 85.0 95.2 71.3
Cantabria 113.6 106.7 102.8 93.4 104.1 104.8
C.-León 92.4 100.7 105.2 101.8 100.0 120.0
C.-Mancha 101.8 83.5 91.6 94.3 92.8 183.2
Cataluña 112.5 102.5 101.1 106.0 105.5 53.4
Valencia 102.6 97.3 96.6 93.7 97.5 71.3
Extremadura 82.4 83.1 92.0 91.4 87.2 182.6
Gal ic ia 101.3 91.8 100.4 89.8 95.8 85.0
Madrid 98.7 116.4 110.3 101.9 106.8 32.9
Murcia 89.9 93.7 92.1 90.4 91.5 86.4
Navarra 124.7 111.8 107.7 115.3 114.8 91.9
P. Vasco 132.9 113.0 111.9 117.8 118.9 76.8
Rioja 128.9 105.7 103.9 98.4 109.2 96.1
_______________________________________________________________
Figure 33: Relative need vs. relative return
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Table 24 shows the values of the relative need and return indicators and the information
required to construct them. Figure 33 plots these two variables against each other, identifying
those regions that are included in Objective 1 territory. The figure shows that, with the
partial exception of Baleares (Ba), educational needs and relative returns are generally
higher in Objective 1 regions than in the rest of Spain. Within the assisted territory,
moreover, there is a group of regions (Extremadura, Andalucía and Castilla la Mancha) were
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human capital should be given special priority since needs are high and the expected return
to education clearly exceeds that on infrastructure. For the remaining Objective 1 regions there
is a of trade-off between our two target variables, as expected returns are high in regions with
low need indices (Castilla and León, Asturias and Cantabria) while the opposite is true in
Murcia, Canarias, Valencia and Galicia.
7. Conclusions and policy recommendations
In this report we have constructed measures of school attainment and educational
investment in the Spanish regions and analyzed the private and social returns to such
investment and its implications for government finances. The main conclusions of the analysis
contained in the previous sections can be summarized as follows.
1) Expenditure on education varies significantly across territories. Expenditure per student
at the secondary and university levels in the Basque Country exceeds that in Andalucia by
66%. Differences in expenditure across regions seem to be driven by two main factors that
work, respectively, through its private and public components: regional income per capita and
the amount of resources available to regional governments. These two factors explain two
thirds of the observed variation in expenditure per student.
2) Attainment levels, measured by the average years of schooling of the adult population,
also vary greatly across regions and are likely to continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
The dispersion of attainment levels across regions drops by only one third when we consider
the youngest adult cohorts rather than the entire population. The decline in inequality that
we observe across cohorts, moreover, is mostly driven by the universalization of (mandatory)
lower secondary schooling. At higher educational levels, disparities across regions are likely
to remain constant or even increase over time.
3) Relative educational performance, as measured by a composite index of access to non-
compulsory schooling cycles and academic success ratios, tends to increase with income per
capita. All Objective 1 regions but two (Asturias and Castilla y León) are below the national
average in terms of this indicator, while non-Objective 1 territories are above the national
mean with the only significative exception of Baleares. Expenditure per student and adult
attainment seem to have a positive effect on at least some indicators of aggregate educational
performance.
4) Educational attainment is a primary determinant of wage levels, employment
probabilities and participation rates at the individual level. The wage effects of schooling
tend to fall with average attainment (but not necessarily with income), and employment
effects are particularly strong in the poorest regions, where unemployment rates are also
especially high.
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5) At the aggregate level, educational attainment is also a primary determinant of labour
productivity. Disparities in schooling levels account for 40% of the observed productivity
differentials across the Spanish regions.
6) The private return to schooling is considerable in all regions and for all post-compulsory
educational levels and remains so after accounting for the effects of personal taxes and
unemployment insurance. The return to schooling compares quite favourably to the expected
returns to financial assets, suggesting that financial incentives to invest in education are quite
adequate.
7) On the whole, public policies introduce modest disincentives to invest in human capital.
Unemployment insurance seems to generate a greater distortion than personal taxes,
particularly at low attainment levels.
8)  Public expenditure on post-compulsory education seems to be self-financing over the long
run and may actually help reduce future budget deficits by increasing tax revenues and
reducing social insurance payments.
9) The social return to schooling is at last comparable to the return on investment in non-
infrastructure physical capital. The return on infrastructure investment is higher than than
on human capital for the country as a whole and for its richest territories. In most of the
poorest regions, however, human capital appears to be the investment alternative with the
highest expected social payoff.
Implications for cohesion policy
Infrastructure investment and training schemes, together with location incentives for
private investment, have traditionally been the main instruments of regional policy and
have played a key role in EU efforts to increase internal cohesion. Our results indicate that
both schooling levels and infrastructure endowments are significant and quantitatively
important determinants of income. One direct implication is that investment in both
education and infrastructures can be effective in reducing internal disequilibria within Spain
and in promoting the country's convergence toward average EU income levels.
Our results also suggest that there are important differences in the role that these two
types of investment can and should play in achieving these two objectives. First, there seems
to be more room for reducing internal inequality through investment in human capital than in
infrastructures. Differences in schooling levels account for around 40% of productivity
differentials across regions, while the distribution of infrastructure stocks contributes very
little to such differences and actually reduces them marginally. Second, the pattern of returns
across regions is very different for the two factors. While the expected returns to
infrastructure are generally higher in the richer regions and reach extremely high levels in
Madrid, Baleares and Cataluña, the return to education tends to be higher in the poorest
territories, where it also exceeds that on infrastructures. Hence, a conflict between the two
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goals of cohesion policy, national convergence to EU income levels and the reduction of
internal disparities, arises in relation to infrastructures, but not with regard to education.
These considerations suggest that it may be possible to increase the effectiveness of both
national and EU cohesion and growth policies by devoting greater resources to investment in
human capital in poorer regions and by redirecting part of EU and national financing for
infrastructures towards richer regions. As one of us has argued elsewhere (see de la Fuente,
2002d), a shift in the pattern of infrastructure investment in this direction, by itself, is likely
to generate a net welfare gain because the operation of the standard mechanisms for personal
redistribution within Spain will channel a substantial part of the resulting output gains back
to the poorer regions and to the needier segments of the population. If part of the reduction in
infrastructure investment in Objective 1 regions is compensated by an increase in educational
funding, the net welfare gains are likely to be considerably larger, for aggregate output will
rise faster without a substantial increase in internal inequality.
Focusing on human capital, our analysis suggests that raising attainment levels in the
poorer regions can have a substantial payoff in the middle and long run both in terms of
overall growth and of increased internal cohesion. Although we have not formally analyzed
the effects of adult training in this report, we believe that EU-financed investment in human
capital should be chanelled through the public school system to a considerably greater extent
than in the past. The reason is that public schools have two important advantages over the
adult training schemes that have absorbed the bulk of EU expenditure on human capital in
Spain. First, they provide a more efficient vehicle for reaching a broad segment of the
population, and for doing so before skill shortages begin to build up. And second, working
increasingly through this more consolidated and more closely monitored channel can be
expected to increase the quality of training while improving the management and control of
ESF resources. A determined effort should also be made to identify and exploit any potential
synergies and complementarities between the adult training and public school systems,
particularly at the vocational and university levels. Sharing  facilities and personnel can
help reduce costs and increase the quality of both systems. Increased collaboration between
them would also make it possible to draw on the experience of the social partners to help
make the formal school system more responsive to the needs of the productive sector.
Our finding that the private returns to schooling compare quite favourably to those
available from financial assets suggest that our previous conclusion that the private
incentives to invest in schooling are generally adequate in Europe applies to all the Spanish
regions as well. As in previous reports, we interpret this as an indication that the main
obstacles to increased educational attainment have little to do with an insufficient financial
return, and are more likely related with the skill deficits with which many students from
disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds reach the end of mandatory schooling, and with
liquidity constraints that prevent a large fraction of these students from continuing their
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training. If our diagnostic is correct, additional educational expenditure should target these
problems directly. Increasing pre-primary enrollments and giving special attention to
disadvantaged students and low performers at early ages is likely to be crucial to compensate
for socioeconomic handicaps and to ensure a true equality of opportunities later on. At the
university level, student loans and means-tested grants are likely to be more effective in
increasing access by working-class youngsters than further reductions of already very low
tuition fees because this last alternative would divert an important fraction of any increase in
funding towards additional subsidies to high income groups.
The resources required to finance additional investment in these areas should come from
the Spanish national and regional governments as well as from the EU's Structural Funds. In
our view, the central government's main responsibility in this regard is to gradually
eliminate the important differences that we now find across territories in terms of the
resources per capita available to regional governments,44 which are the administrations
that are directly responsible for the provision of education and health care as well as other
basic services. EU structural expenditure should co-finance the building and equipment of
schools in needy areas and also subsidize in part their personnel costs to ensure that adequate
human resources are available to broaden access, strengthen remedial programmes and raise
overall academic standards. Such expenditure should be subject to strict additionality
requirements so as to prevent the diversion of resources to other uses. Regional cofinancing
rates for operating expenses should be higher than those for capital investment, and should
gradually rise over time so that regional governments eventually assume the full cost of these
programmes as increased attainment begins to translate into higher income and tax revenues.
44
 Some progress in this direction may have already taken place through the last revision of the regional
financing system which took place in 2001, but the data required to analyze its effects are still not
available.
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APPENDIX
1. Expenditure on secondary and university education in 2000
This section discusses the construction of our estimates of private and public expenditure in
secondary and university education at the regional level. Table A.1 lists the sources of the
data used in the calculation. Table A.2 disaggregates total educational expenditure for the
country as a whole in the year 2000 by source of funds and by educational level.
Table A.1: Sources used to estimate expenditure in education by region
______________________________________________________________________
PUBEXP = Estadística del Gasto Público en  Educación (Statistics on Public Expenditure on
Education). Ministry of Education (http://www.mec.es/ estadistica/Gasto.html).
PRIVEXP = Encuesta de financiación y gastos de la enseñanza privada, curso 1999-2000.
(Survey of financing and expenditure of the private eduational sector). National
Statistical Institute (http://www.ine.es/inebase/cgi/um?M=2Ft132Fp122&O=ine
base&N=&L=).
SCH = Estadística de becas (Statistics on scholarships and grants). Ministry of Education
(http://www.mec.es/estadistica/Becas.html).
R&D = Estadística de I+D. Indicadores básicos año 2000 (R&D statistics, basic indicators).
National Statistical Institute.
UNIV = Estadística Universitaria (University statistics). Ministry of Education
(http://www.mec.es/consejou/estadis/index.html).
LOC  = Liquidación de presupuestos de las Entidades Locales. Ejercicio 2000. (Budget
liquidation for the local administrations). Ministry of Finance.
INF = Informe sobre el estado y situación del sistema educativo español (various years).
(Report on the state of the Spanish Educational System). Consejo Escolar del Estado.
Ministerio de Educación, Madrid.
CIF = Las cifras de la educación en España. Estadísticas e indicadores. (Facts and Figures of
Education). Ministerio de Educación, Madrid, 2002.
______________________________________________________________________
The first three columns of Table A.2 refer to public expenditure. The data are taken from
PUBEXP, which is published by the Ministry of Education using information supplied in part
by the regional governments and by other public administrations. They are based on
liquidated budgets (recognized budget obligations) rather than on ex-ante appropriations and
include all (current and capital) educational expenditure financed with public funds,
independently of whether it was chanelled through private or public educational
institutions. These figures include the cost of administrative and support programmes,
subsidies to concerted private educational centers and scholarships and other transfers to
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households (many of which take the form of tuition waivers at the university level).
PUBEXP also gives a global estimate (not disaggregated by administration or by educational
level) of the social contributions imputable to the teaching staff who are public servants.
This figure is shown separately as part of the last column of Table A.2. Public expenditure is
disaggregated by administrations distinguishing between the national Ministry of Education,
the education departments of the regional governments and other administrations. This last
item includes educational expenditure by other national and regional departments and by the
local administrations (diputaciones provinciales, cabildos insulares and municipalities),
with local expenditure accounting for 80 of the total. The budgets of the different
administrations are consolidated to avoid double counting, and expenditure is allocated to its
final executor.
Table A.2: Public Expenditure in Education in Spain in 2000 (Meuros)
______________________________________________________________________
Ministry of
Education
Regional
ed. depts.
Other pub.
administr.
private sec.
(households) total
NON-UNIVERSITY EDUCATION
educational programmes
   childhood and primary 260.3 7,436.7 825.5 8,522.5
   secondary and vocational training 213.0 7,448.2 146.2 7,807.4
   other programmes 114.9 924.9 320.9 1,360.7
   not allocated by programme 235.0 1,455.7 1,690.7
total direct expenditure 588.2 16,044.8 1,292.6 1,455.7 19,381.3
administration and service programmes 120.8 1,161.8 237.4 1,520.0
total non-university 709.0 17,206.6 1,530.0 1,455.7 20,901.3
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION
direct expenditure 92.9 4,529.4 40.1 1,525.7 6,188.1
tuition waivers 173.3 7.0 180.3
total university 266.2 4,536.4 40.1 1,525.7 6,368.4
ALL LEVELS COMBINED
other scholarships and grants 448.1 72.6 30.9 551.6
imputed social contr. of teaching staff 1,833.2
total, all levels combined 448.1 72.6 30.9 0.0 2,384.8
TOTAL 1,423.3 21,815.6 1,601.0 2,981.4 29,654.5
______________________________________________________________________
- Sources: PUBEXP and PRIVEXP (see Table A.1).
Tuition fees paid by households to public universities have been subtracted from the
expenditures of these institutions and are shown as part of private expenditure in the fourth
column of the table together with academic fees charged by private institutions. This last
variable has  been taken from PRIVEXP, which is based on an exahustive survey of private
educational centers that is carried out periodically by the National Statistical Institute.
This source, however, does not disaggregate the revenues of private centers by educational
level.
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Within each column, expenditure is broken down into three main components: non-
university formal education, university education, and a third component that includes two
items that are not broken down by educational level in our main source, namely scholarships
(excluding university tuition waivers) and the imputed social contributions of teachers. There
is also some information on how non-university expenditure is allocated across educational
levels. This breakdown, however, is incomplete and not very reliable because some regions do
not disaggregate their expenditure by programme and some of those who do mix secondary and
vocational expenditure with that of other programmes for various reasons.
This section describes the construction of our estimates of private and public expenditure in
each region in formal education at the secondary and university levels. We will leave out the
North-African territories of Ceuta and Melilla and the two national univerities mentioned in
section 2 of the text. Table A.3 describes how our expenditure variables are computed. Public
expenditure includes the operating costs of public educational institutions (net of research
expenditure by universities),45 subsidies to concerted private centers, an estimate of the
relevant indirect costs and two types of subsidies to households: tuition-related grants (which
take almost exclusively the form of tuition waivers at the university level), and other
subsidies to households to help defray living expenses and other costs. Private expenditure is
defined as the difference between academic fees paid by households and non-tuition subsidies
paid to them. Hence, we do not take into account expenditure on books, school materials or
(aside from a minor exception) transportation. Total expenditure is defined as the sum of
public and private expenditure. Notice that this definition means that non-tuiton grants will
cancel and drop out of the total.
Table A.3: Construction of private and public expenditure on education
______________________________________________________________________
public expenditure on education
= direct expenditure by regional governments on educational centers (including subsidies to
private centers)
+ imputed indirect costs (administration and support programmes)
+ imputed social contributions of the public teaching staff
+ expenditure by other administrations
+ university tuition waivers
+ non-tuition subsidies
- R&D expenditure by universities
private expenditure on education
= academic fees paid by households
- non-tuition subsidies
______________________________________________________________________
45
 Because the available data does not allow us to disaggregate it, we are implicitly assuming that all
research expenditure is carried out in public universities. This is probably a good approximation, as
private universities are generally much more teaching-oriented and, in any event, has no effect at all on the
variables we will use in the rate of return calculations, for the likely misclassification of expenditure will
not affect either the total or the private costs of education.
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The remainder of the section is divided into five parts. First, we consider the expenditure
of the regional education departments. Second, we discuss the allocation across levels and
regions of scholarhsips and grants using additional information from SCH. Next, we turn to
private expenditure and to the allocation of expenditure by other public administrations and
imputed social contributions. In the final subsection we calculate average expenditure by
student at the university and secondary levels by dividing total expenditure by student
enrollment. The main difficulties that arise have to do with the estimation of the
distribution by levels of non-university spending. This task is complicated due to the
limitations of the existing information, which arise in part from differences across regions in
accounting practices. As a result, we have had to use a number of indirect indicators in order to
estimate the breakdown of expenditure. Similar problems also arise in connection with the
regional allocation of public expenditure not chanelled through regional education
departments.
a. Direct expenditure by regional education departments
i. Secondary and vocational education
Table A.4 summarizes the information provided in PUBEXP about the distribution by
region and programme of non-university expenditure by the regional education departments.
The bulk of this expenditure corresponds to two main programmes: i) early childhood and
primary schooling and ii) secondary and vocational training. In addition, there are a number
of other expenditure programmes that may be classified into two groups. The first one includes
other educational programmes (for various disadvantaged groups, arts and foreign language
training, adult education, educational services abroad, military training, etc.), and the second
one refers to service and administration services that generally support several educational
programmes (general administration, educational research, teacher training, and complemen-
tary services).
Inspection of the table reveals several anomalies. First, Cantabria provides no
disaggregation of expenditure on non-university education. Second, Castilla and León
disaggregates only between primary, secondary and special education and, in addition, its
reported figures do not seem reliable. In particular, the ratio of secondary to primary
expenditure in this region is several times smaller than in the rest of the country. Third, some
regions do not separate special or compensatory education46 or some service programmes, and
46
 Special education refers to the schooling of students with special needs derived from physical or mental
handicaps. The compensatory education programme finances various measures, both in and out of school,
aimed at children from socially disadvantaged groups (mainly gipsies, recent immigrants and migrant rural
workers). In both cases there is a considerable overlap with the regular school system, as most of these
students are enrolled in ordinary schools. They may, however, be assigned to special classrooms, with
specialized personnel and low student/teacher ratios, and participate in remedial and other special
programmes.
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presumably impute the relevant costs to primary and secondary education. Finally, the
methodological notes to PUBEXP warn that in the cases of Andalucía, Galicia and Canarias
some expenditure in secondary programmes is counted as primary spending because centers
that offer both primary and secondary courses are included in the first category for budget
purposes.
To try to increase the comparability of expenditure estimates across regions, we have used
other data to estimate the breakdown of expenditure in regions where the data are
incomplete or unreliable and introduced a number of corrections that try to neutralize the
effect of cross-regional differences in accounting practices. The adjustments are discussed
below and the relevant calculations are summarized in the upper part of Table A.5.
Imputation of special and compensatory education and overhead costs
Since the budget treatment of special and compensatory education varies across regions, we
have allocated expenditure in these two programmes to primary and secondary education in
those regions that report it separately. For each region, expenditure in special education has
been distributed between primary and secondary education in proportion to the number of
special education students that are enrolled in each of these two levels.47 In the case of
compensatory education, the only relevant piece of information we could find is the number of
primary and secondary students who benefitted from special actions during the 1998-99 school
year within the territory then managed directly by the Ministry of Education (INF). We
apply the weight of secondary students in the total number of beneficiaries (0.181) to allocate
expenditure across programmes in all regions.
We have also imputed overhead costs (expenditure in general administration and in
support programmes) to the different educational levels. This is necessary to correct
differences in accounting practices regarding some of these programmes but is also important to
obtain an accurate estimate of the full costs of education. For most programmes, the
imputation is proportional to their direct cost (after the adjustments discussed in the previous
paragraph). The one exception to this rule is the programme called "complementary
services," which finances transport, school meals and residential services for students from
rural areas who attend schools located far from their residences. Since these services are only
provided to students enrolled in compulsory schooling levels (primary and lower secondary
education), their cost in each region is allocated between primary and secondary education in
proportion to their public-school enrollments.
47
 Enrollment figures correspond to the school year 1999-2000 and are taken from CIF. They refer to
special education students enrolled in ordinary public and private institutions. Some students are enrolled
in special centers, but enrollment in these institutions is not broken down between primary and secondary
education.
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Estimation of secondary expenditure in special cases
The calculations we have just described yield an estimate of a magnitude we will call
adjusted direct expenditure by regional governments. The figures obtained in this manner seem
to be reasonably homogeneous for 12 out of the 17 Spanish regions. In the remaining five,
however, the breakdown of expenditure by level is incomplete or unreliable for reasons that
have already been discussed. We estimate this breakdown as follows. First, we regress the
ratio of adjusted seconday to primary expenditure on the ratio of secondary to primary
enrollment using the 12 regions where the data do not seem to be problematic.48 The
estimated equation is of the form:
(A.1) expenditure ratio = 0.2504 + 1.0046* student ratio,       R2 = 0.605
                               (t =)             (1.10)         (3.92)
Using the estimated equation and the observed secondary to primary student ratio, we
estimate the ratio of secondary to primary expenditure in each of the five problem regions
and then apply it to the sum of adjusted direct public expenditures in primary and secondary
programmes to obtain an estimate of secondary spending. Before carrying out this last
calculation, in the case of Cantabria and Castilla y León we have to estimate the part of
total adjusted expenditure that corresponds to primary and secondary programmes. To do this,
we assume that the combined weight of these programmes (including imputed overhead costs
and special and compensatory education) in total expenditure is the same as for the average
of all other regions (96.71). The estimates of adjusted direct secondary expenditure shown in
bold type in the first block of Table A.5 are constructed using this indirect procedure. The
second block of the same table shows the relevant (observed and estimated) primary to
secondary student and expenditure ratios. The first entry for each region in Table A.6 gives
adjusted direct expenditure on secondary education, which is the main component of public
educational spending. The estimation of the remaining components will be discussed below.
ii. University education
PUBEXP reports the total consolidated expenditure of public universities and regional
education departments at the university level. We adjust this figure by subtracting from it
tuition payments by households, scholarships that take the form of tuition waivers (which
are mostly financed by the national government) and R&D expenditure by universities. The
first two figures are taken from PUBEXP and will be included in other categories of university
expenditure as discussed below. R&D figures are taken from the R&D statistics published by
the National Statistical Institute (R&D) . The lower part of Table A.5 contains all the
relevant data. Table A.7 lists adjusted direct expenditure on university education together
with other expenditure items that will be discussed below.
48
 The data on the number of students are taken from CIF. We use total enrollment in public and private
centers during the 1999-2000 school year.
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b. Scholarships and grants
PUBEXP reports the total amount of public scholarhips and grants during 2000 broken down
by the administration that finances them. With the exception of scholarships that take the
form of university tuition wavers, however, these grants are not disaggregated by educational
level or by the region of residence of their beneficiaries. There is also no information in this
source regarding the breakdown of aid into tuition grants and transfers to finance living and
other expenditures. To get around these limitations, we have used the information provided
by SCH concerning the distribution by regions and levels of scholarhips and grants given
during the school year 1999-2000 by the national ministry and the regional education
departments. Total expenditure by these administrations according to PUBEXP is allocated
across levels and regions in proportion to their respective weights in total grants awarded as
given in SCH.49
It remains to break down scholarship expenditures into two types: grants earmarked to pay
for tuition charges and those designed to help cover living expenses or other educational costs
such as books, materials or transport. In the case of Spain, tuition grants at the university
level take almost exclusively the form of tuition wavers (that is, the government pays the
relevant fees directly to the university). At the secondary level, public and concerted schools
are free even beyond the compulsory stage, and there are no cash grants for tuition purposes.
Hence, we assume that all grants at the secondary level are for non-tuition purposes. At the
university level, we subtract from the estimate obtained in this manner of total grants in each
region the amount of tuition waivers according PUBEXP to obtain the amount of non-tuition
subsidies. Tables A.6 and A.7 show our estimates of the various educational subsidies received
by households.
c. Private expenditure
Private expenditure in education is defined as the difference between the academic fees
paid by households and the non-tuition subsidies they receive. We have already discussed
how the second of these variables is estimated.
i. Secondary and vocational education
We count as private expenditure on non-university education the fees paid by households
to private educational centers for educational services (tuition fees and fees for other
extracurricular and complementary activities) and "other revenues of private origin." This
second item (which amounts to 13.1 of the total estimated expenditure) is included here
because it seems likely it is comprised essentially of quotas paid through parents'
49 The total expenditure figures given by the two sources are close but do not coincide exactly. The reason
is that PUBEXP refers to expenditure liquidated during the natural year 2000 and SCH to the grants
awarded during the1999-2000 school year.
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associations that may be considered as voluntary tuition payments in the case of concerted
centers. We do not take into account payments for other services such as transport, cafeteria
and housing.
Since the data provided by PRIVEXP are disaggregated by region but not by educational
level, we need to estimate the fraction of total expenditure that corresponds to secondary and
vocational training (including the relevant part of special education). To do this, we will use
the information provided by the same source regarding enrollments and average current
revenues per student (including concertation subsidies and fees for complementary services) at
each educational level.
We proceed as follows. First, for each region we divide average current revenue per student
for each educational level by the average revenue per student for all educational levels
combined to obtain an index of relative revenues per student that will vary both across levels
and across regions. We will use these indices to weigh enrollments before using them to
allocate various revenue items across educational levels.
We allocate "other private revenues" in proportion to the number of students of each level
that are enrolled in concerted units, after weighting enrollments by relative revenues per
capita. In the case of special education, we use data on the fraction of students that are
enrolled in secondary-level courses to estimate the part of special education revenues that
should be imputed to secondary schooling.50 Tuition fees, in the strict sense of term, are
allocated in proportion to the number of students enrolled in non-concerted units, weighted as
above by relative revenues, and fees for extracurricular and complementary activities are
allocated in proportion to total enrollment in each level, similarly weighted. The results of
the calculations are shown in Table A.6.
ii. University education
Tuition fees paid by households to public and private universities are taken from PUBEXP
and PRIVEXP respectively. In the case of private universities, we consider only academic
fees, excluding those charged for other services (such as housing and meals). PRIVEXP
provides an incomplete regional breakdown of revenues that aggregates together several
regions where private university enrollment is relatively unimportant. We allocate total
expenditure for this territory across regions in proportion to their private university
enrollments, which are taken from UNIV.51 The results are shown in Table A.7.
50
 We use the same procedure to estimate the amount of concertation subsidies that corresponds to
secondary education. We apply the weights constructed as discussed in the text to total concertation
subsidies in each region according to PUBEXP. This estimate is used below to allocate imputed social
security contributions across regions and levels.
51
 We use a weighted average of enrollment in the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 academic years with weights
of 2/3 and 1/3 respectively.
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d. Other public expenditures and adjustments
Imputed social contributions of the public teaching staff
PUBEXP reports a single figure for this item that should be allocated among all regionos
and educational levels in proportion to their shares in the payroll of teachers who are civil
servants. Since this information is unavailable, we have attributed to each educational level
and region a share of total social contributions that is equal to the ratio between the two
quantities described in Table A.8.
In all cases, the denominator is an estimate of the relevant expenditure at all educational
levels in the country as a whole. This magnitude measures total consolidated expenditure by
the national ministry, the public universities and the regional education departments in the
entire country, excluding only subsidies to private educational centers (whose staff are not
civil servants and therefore pay full social security contributions) and non-tuition subsidies to
households. Notice that this variable includes overhead costs (because of differences in their
treatment across regions and, more importantly, because these costs are not identified
separately at the university level) and all expenditure by public universities, including R&D
(because this contains a share of faculty salaries) and expenditures financed by tuition fees
paid by families and by the central government through tuition wavers. The numerator is
constructed in a similar way, but working only with the expenditure imputable to the
relevant educational level and region and excluding research expenditure by universities.
Educational expenditure by other administrations
Educational expenditures at the secondary level by local corporations and by non-
education departments of other administrations is allocated across regions in proportion to
their respective shares in total educational expenditure by local administrations, which is
taken from LOC. We use this criterion because, as noted above, local administrations account
for around 80 of this expenditure and because we could find no additional information on the
distribution of the rest of the expenditure. Prior to this calculation, secondary spending is
augmented by a share of expenditure in special education (based on enrollment by level in
special education in Spain as a whole, using ordinary public centers) and by its share in
overhead costs (which are allocated in proportion to direct expenditure in each program as in
subsection a). University expenditure by this administations is ignored because it is almost
negligible and seems to correspond mostly to the military academies.
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Table A.8: Construction of the variables used in the imputation of imputed social security
contributions of the public teaching staff
______________________________________________________________________
 National public expenditure over which social contributions must be distributed  =
NON-UNIVERSITY
= total national expenditure by the Ministry of Education and regional education departments
for all levels of schooling, excluding scholarships and grants
- subsidies to private educational centers
UNIVERSITY
= total national expenditure by the Ministry of Education and regional education departments
excluding non-tuition subsidies (but including tuition waivers, tuition fees paid by
households and research expenditure by universities).
Regional public expenditure used to calculate the region's share in contributions =
SECONDARY AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING
= adjusted direct expenditure by the education department of the region in secondary and
vocational training (including imputed overhead costs and a share of expenditure in
compensatory and special education)
- estimated subsidies to private educational centers at this level
UNIVERSITY
= total consolidated university expenditure by public universities and the regional education
department (including tuition waivers, tuition fees paid by households and research
expenditure by universities)
- research expenditure by universities
______________________________________________________________________
Finally, we have to consider the direct expenditure of the national Ministry of Education,
aside from that devoted to scholarhips and grants, which has already been allocated.
Remaining expenditure corresponds to educational centers managed directly by it (and in
particular to the two national universities and the north-african territories), and to
overhead programmes that should be allocated across regions and educational levels. We
have been unable to do so due to the lack of information that may be used to approximate this
second component of central expenditure, but given that its size is minor relative to the other
items considered above, this will not have a significant effect on our estimates.
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e. Enrollments and expenditure per capita
Table A.9 shows student enrollments in 2000 at the university and secondary levels.
University enrollments are taken from UNIV and are weighted averages of enrollments
during the school years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 with weights of 2/3 and 1/3 respectively.
Secondary and vocational enrollments are taken from CIF and refer to the school year 1999-
2000 (which is the last one for which data are available). We have counted in this category
an estimate of special education enrollment at the secondary level.52 The last column of the
table shows the percentage of secondary students in private institutions (including special
education) that are enrolled in concerted units. The information is taken from PRIVEXP.
Table A.9: Student enrollments in 2000
______________________________________________________________________
                                                            UNIVERSITY                                 SECONDARY AND VOCATIONAL
tota l public private t o ta l public private concert.
Andalucía 269,720 260,324 9,396 668,846 515,930 152,916 83.8
Aragón 42,602 39,280 3,322 85,640 53,808 31,832 80.9
Asturias 40,190 38,396 1,795 84,073 62,036 22,037 72.0
Baleares 13,578 12,129 1,449 58,646 37,879 20,768 85.0
Canarias 49,680 49,680 0 163,021 135,935 27,086 64.5
Cantabria 13,626 12,827 799 45,118 30,953 14,165 86.6
C-M 32,583 32,583 0 138,014 113,520 24,494 83.4
CyL 104,982 93,717 11,265 198,686 138,497 60,190 81.8
Cataluña 205,481 163,479 42,002 439,011 259,046 179,965 81.8
Valencia 140,259 132,442 7,817 317,416 227,115 90,301 79.7
Extremadura 27,591 26,831 759 91,967 75,307 16,660 85.9
Galicia 98,249 93,977 4,272 224,775 175,545 49,230 72.7
Madrid 250,956 198,060 52,895 422,317 256,291 166,026 61.3
Murcia 37,876 35,499 2,376 102,077 80,418 21,659 82.8
Navarra 21,031 9,562 11,469 38,557 23,928 14,630 96.9
País Vasco 76,070 57,198 18,873 159,489 74,506 84,983 87.5
Rioja 7,240 6,480 760 20,404 13,847 6,557 82.7
TOTAL 1,431,714 1,262,465 169,249 3,258,058 2,274,560 983,498 78.3
______________________________________________________________________
Dividing the expenditure totals calculated above by the total enrollments shown in Table
A.9, we obtain average expenditure per student. Table A.10 shows the results of this
calculation at the secondary and university levels. Notice that since the denominator is total
enrollment, without distinguishing between students enrolled in private and public centers,
our average cost estimates refer to a hypothetical average student. The last row of the table
shows average expenditure per student in euros in Spain as a whole (again, excluding Ceuta
and Melilla).
52
 CIF breaks down special education enrollment by educational level only for the case of students
enrolled in special units of ordinary schools, but not the enrollment in special education centers. To
allocate this last figure by level we have assumed that for each region the weight of secondary in total
special education enrollment is the same as in ordinary centers.
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Table A.10: Average expenditure per student in 2000
euros per capita
______________________________________________________________________
                                                     UNIVERSITY                    SECONDARY                          COMBINED
private t o ta l private t o ta l private t o ta l
Andalucía 374 2,530 22 2,585 140 2,567
Aragón 829 3,413 157 3,538 381 3,496
Asturias 603 3,200 129 3,294 287 3,263
Baleares 733 2,350 166 3,308 355 2,988
Canarias 247 3,059 94 3,593 145 3,415
Cantabria 929 4,454 51 3,249 344 3,650
C-M 226 3,010 9 2,949 81 2,969
CyL 557 3,179 73 3,317 235 3,271
Cataluña 1,390 3,619 353 3,615 699 3,616
Valencia 632 3,388 138 3,252 302 3,297
Extremadura -71 2,731 -37 2,606 -48 2,647
Galicia 448 2,782 91 3,490 210 3,254
Madrid 1,549 3,936 386 2,791 774 3,173
Murcia 567 3,274 29 2,698 209 2,890
Navarra 1,180 2,594 96 4,712 458 4,006
País Vasco 904 2,903 309 4,953 507 4,269
Rioja 734 5,736 66 3,346 288 4,143
average 829 3,233 159 3,204 382 3,214
______________________________________________________________________
2. Estimates of educational attainment by region and cohort
This section describes the procedure used to estimate educational attainment levels of the
population aged 25 and over between 1960 and 2000 and gives the detailed results by region
and year.53
Attainment levels at the national level have been taken from de la Fuente and Doménech
(2002b) and from the advance of the results of the 2001 Census published by the National
Statistical Institute. These estimates are taken directly from the 1981, 1991 and 2001 Census
reports and use census data from 1961 and 1970 after some minor corrections. In the case of the
1960 census, the breakdown of the population by educational level is coarser than in latter
reports and its results appear implausible in the light of more recent data. Hence, we do not
use this source (except for illiterates), and construct attainment estimates for 1960 using the
1970 census (which gives a very fine breakdown by age), and the actual age structure of the
population in 1960. We interpolate to estimate missing observations. For the 1970 Census, the
only problem concerns the reported illiteracy rate, which appears implausibly high when
compared with the 1960 figure and with a backward extrapolation using the 1981 census data.
Hence, we ignore this figure and estimate L0 in 1970 by interpolation between the 1960 and
53
 See de la Fuente and Doménech (2002b and 2003) for additional details.
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1981 estimates. Then, we estimate L1 so that the sum of the shares of the different attainment
levels is equal to 1. Table A.11 shows our estimates of national attainment levels in
benchmark years. As indicated in the notes to the table, different types are used to identify
the source of the data.
Table A.11: National attainment levels in benchmark years
____________________________________________________
L0 L1 L2.1 L2.2 L3.1 L3.2
1960 0.1120 0.8153 0.0217 0.0203 0.0159 0.0148
1970 0.1005 0.8012 0.0324 0.0261 0.0211 0.0187
1975 0.0948 0.7590 0.0521 0.0400 0.0277 0.0264
1981 0.0879 0.7084 0.0757 0.0567 0.0356 0.0357
1986 0.0657 0.6602 0.1082 0.0875 0.0391 0.0393
1991 0.0435 0.6120 0.1406 0.1184 0.0427 0.0428
2001 0.0295 0.3997 0.2565 0.1759 0.0649 0.0736
____________________________________________________
    - Note: Different character types are used to distinguish between original census data and those
constructed in various different ways as follows:
 bold = original census data
bold italic = backward estimate using data from the 1970 census broken down by age group.
italic = estimated so that attainment levels add up to 1.0 (L1 in 1970)
normal = lineal interpolation between existing census observations
To obtain estimates of attainment levels by region, we have proceeded in a similar way.
The main difference with the procedure described above is that we have not used a backward
extrapolation to estimate 1960 attainments using 1970 data broken down by age group because
this may yield misleading results as a result of heavy interregional migration in those years.
Instead, we have used the census data for 1960 and 1975 data from the municipal register to
calculate regional attainments in 1960 relative to the national average.54 These ratios are
then applied to our original estimate of 1960 attainment for Spain as a whole to obtain
preliminary estimates of attainment levels by region in 1960. Since the population shares
obtained in this manner do not add up across educational levels exactly to 1.00 for each region,
we renormalize our preliminary estimates by their sum (across levels for each region) so that
they do add up.
Detailed results
Tables A.12-A.17 contain our estimates of the percentage of the adult population of each
region that has attained each of the educational levels described in the text. Table A.18
shows our estimates of average years of schooling.
54
 As noted, the 1960 census data are less detailed than those available for later years. In particular this
census does not disaggregate secondary schooling into its two cycles, L2.1 and L2.2. To estimate their
relative weights in each region, we use the ratio L2.1/L2.2 observed in the population over 40 in 1975
according to the municipal register for this year.
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Table A.12: University attainment, second level, percentage  (L3.2)
______________________________________________________________________
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Andalucía 0.87 1.11 1.36 2.01 2.66 2.98 3.22 4.24 5.47
Aragón 1.50 1.66 1.82 2.52 3.22 3.71 4.15 5.35 6.78
Asturias 1.43 1.50 1.57 2.20 2.83 3.21 3.55 4.70 6.09
Baleares 1.43 1.57 1.72 2.43 3.14 3.40 3.56 4.31 5.22
Canarias 1.02 1.37 1.73 2.45 3.18 3.50 3.71 4.53 5.52
Cantabria 1.35 1.47 1.59 2.17 2.75 3.18 3.57 4.68 5.99
C. y León 1.60 1.70 1.81 2.44 3.08 3.49 3.84 5.00 6.40
C.-Mancha 0.58 0.78 0.98 1.35 1.72 1.99 2.23 3.11 4.18
Cataluña 1.46 1.57 1.68 2.54 3.39 3.84 4.20 5.47 7.02
Valencia 1.28 1.36 1.43 2.08 2.72 3.15 3.54 4.72 6.14
Extremadura 0.62 0.85 1.08 1.57 2.06 2.26 2.37 3.18 4.18
Galicia 1.09 1.15 1.21 1.74 2.27 2.56 2.80 3.96 5.39
Madrid 4.10 4.35 4.60 5.96 7.32 7.97 8.44 10.62 13.29
Murcia 1.42 1.42 1.42 2.00 2.58 2.97 3.32 4.22 5.29
Navarra 2.10 2.26 2.42 3.02 3.62 4.24 4.87 6.31 7.99
P. Vasco 1.75 1.90 2.04 2.82 3.60 4.37 5.15 6.93 9.03
Rioja 1.99 1.79 1.59 2.13 2.66 3.06 3.44 4.65 6.11
Spain 1.48 1.67 1.87 2.64 3.41 3.82 4.22 5.65 7.08
______________________________________________________________________
Table A.13: University attainment, first level, percentage (L3.1)
______________________________________________________________________
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Andalucía 1.13 1.45 1.78 2.53 3.28 3.74 4.12 5.03 6.10
Aragón 1.36 1.74 2.12 2.68 3.24 3.80 4.37 5.62 7.08
Asturias 1.90 2.13 2.37 2.93 3.50 4.04 4.59 5.63 6.85
Baleares 1.02 1.38 1.75 2.28 2.82 3.23 3.61 4.44 5.41
Canarias 1.98 2.12 2.26 3.10 3.93 4.45 4.89 5.52 6.22
Cantabria 3.06 2.79 2.52 3.15 3.77 4.19 4.55 5.42 6.45
C. y León 0.95 1.59 2.24 2.92 3.59 4.07 4.51 5.66 7.03
C.-Mancha 0.40 0.96 1.51 2.05 2.59 2.86 3.07 3.91 4.93
Cataluña 2.18 2.12 2.06 2.68 3.31 3.63 3.89 4.86 6.03
Valencia 1.80 1.81 1.82 2.48 3.13 3.52 3.85 4.63 5.54
Extremadura 0.54 1.07 1.61 2.27 2.93 3.26 3.51 4.60 5.92
Galicia 0.84 1.31 1.78 2.32 2.85 3.13 3.35 4.16 5.14
Madrid 3.37 3.27 3.17 3.92 4.67 5.01 5.25 6.30 7.58
Murcia 1.39 1.62 1.85 2.39 2.94 3.49 4.06 4.97 6.00
Navarra 0.68 1.55 2.41 3.21 4.01 4.50 4.93 6.15 7.60
P. Vasco 2.79 2.70 2.61 3.07 3.53 4.12 4.74 5.75 6.88
Rioja 1.25 1.63 2.01 2.57 3.14 3.62 4.09 5.35 6.85
Spain 1.59 1.85 2.11 2.77 3.43 3.82 4.20 5.24 6.28
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.14: Upper secondary attainment, percentage (L2.2)
______________________________________________________________________
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Andalucía 1.30 1.56 1.82 2.79 3.77 6.11 8.84 11.43 14.11
Aragón 1.91 2.03 2.15 3.17 4.18 6.95 10.21 13.48 16.91
Asturias 2.18 2.49 2.80 4.22 5.64 8.51 11.82 14.96 18.22
Baleares 2.10 2.53 2.96 4.38 5.81 8.62 11.82 14.97 18.25
Canarias 1.78 2.54 3.29 4.40 5.51 8.21 11.37 14.44 17.62
Cantabria 2.51 2.75 2.99 4.55 6.11 9.34 13.04 16.51 20.07
C. y León 2.35 2.15 1.96 3.13 4.29 7.01 10.18 12.95 15.76
C.-Mancha 1.06 1.02 0.97 1.68 2.39 4.47 6.95 9.35 11.83
Cataluña 2.04 2.42 2.80 4.94 7.08 9.98 13.12 16.02 19.01
Valencia 1.85 2.04 2.24 3.14 4.04 6.55 9.51 12.50 15.63
Extremadura 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.78 2.44 4.41 6.74 8.73 10.72
Galicia 1.79 1.82 1.86 2.77 3.69 5.99 8.68 11.56 14.61
Madrid 4.27 4.92 5.58 7.41 9.25 12.50 16.18 18.79 21.27
Murcia 1.59 1.80 2.02 2.77 3.52 6.11 9.21 12.18 15.24
Navarra 2.46 2.65 2.85 4.26 5.67 9.20 13.32 16.50 19.62
P. Vasco 2.69 3.07 3.45 5.55 7.66 11.36 15.53 19.11 22.71
Rioja 2.66 2.45 2.24 3.58 4.92 7.80 11.13 14.75 18.59
Spain 2.03 2.32 2.61 4.00 5.40 8.34 11.28 14.17 17.07
______________________________________________________________________
Table A.15: Lower secondary attainment, percentage (L2.1)
______________________________________________________________________
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Andalucía 1.56 2.05 2.55 4.02 5.49 8.42 11.77 17.25 23.47
Aragón 2.19 2.45 2.71 4.65 6.58 9.90 13.64 19.59 26.31
Asturias 2.14 2.59 3.04 4.93 6.82 9.85 13.24 18.55 24.55
Baleares 2.20 2.84 3.48 5.99 8.50 12.43 16.80 23.74 31.59
Canarias 1.91 3.62 5.34 6.37 7.41 11.02 15.36 20.35 25.72
Cantabria 2.84 3.11 3.38 5.66 7.94 11.05 14.42 21.17 29.01
C. y León 2.27 2.23 2.19 3.73 5.26 8.07 11.26 16.75 23.02
C.-Mancha 1.15 1.23 1.31 2.36 3.41 6.52 10.21 15.96 22.43
Cataluña 2.37 2.86 3.36 6.16 8.97 11.95 15.04 20.02 25.67
Valencia 2.15 2.54 2.92 4.63 6.33 9.71 13.57 19.55 26.29
Extremadura 1.21 1.41 1.62 2.58 3.53 6.58 10.21 15.52 21.45
Galicia 1.68 1.90 2.11 3.49 4.86 7.51 10.52 15.92 22.11
Madrid 4.21 5.51 6.80 9.50 12.21 14.59 16.94 19.98 23.32
Murcia 2.11 2.33 2.55 3.89 5.23 8.86 13.13 19.21 25.97
Navarra 2.56 2.98 3.40 5.69 7.98 10.80 13.81 21.00 29.47
P. Vasco 2.56 3.16 3.77 5.97 8.18 11.13 14.33 19.50 25.36
Rioja 2.48 2.54 2.60 4.77 6.93 9.77 12.82 19.80 27.99
Spain 2.17 2.70 3.24 5.21 7.18 10.33 13.47 19.03 24.59
______________________________________________________________________
102
Table A.16: Primary attainment, percentage (L1)
______________________________________________________________________
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Andalucía 74.62 74.20 73.78 70.83 67.88 65.26 62.66 54.77 45.31
Aragón 84.50 84.30 84.10 80.61 77.12 71.42 65.05 54.01 41.42
Asturias 89.57 88.41 87.25 82.64 78.04 71.99 65.45 55.05 43.30
Baleares 81.06 80.14 79.23 74.70 70.17 65.24 60.12 49.46 37.06
Canarias 74.95 73.42 71.89 69.62 67.34 62.97 57.98 49.91 40.77
Cantabria 87.63 87.37 87.12 82.17 77.23 70.59 63.40 51.41 37.78
C. y León 88.11 87.75 87.39 83.53 79.66 74.20 68.24 58.13 46.62
C.-Mancha 78.60 78.59 78.57 76.68 74.79 71.93 68.77 60.78 51.33
Cataluña 85.34 84.39 83.45 76.99 70.52 65.35 60.40 50.75 39.58
Valencia 81.14 81.17 81.19 77.98 74.76 70.15 65.10 55.11 43.55
Extremadura 76.77 76.54 76.31 74.26 72.22 70.00 67.70 60.47 51.79
Galicia 84.28 83.86 83.44 80.45 77.45 73.92 70.19 61.04 50.23
Madrid 79.81 77.60 75.40 68.65 61.91 56.11 50.44 41.95 32.42
Murcia 76.69 76.64 76.59 73.99 71.40 67.50 63.21 54.08 43.45
Navarra 88.55 87.14 85.73 80.87 76.01 69.19 61.74 48.91 34.27
P. Vasco 87.80 86.71 85.62 80.02 74.41 66.82 58.60 47.33 34.86
Rioja 85.92 86.37 86.82 82.71 78.59 72.98 66.87 54.24 39.55
Spain 81.53 80.83 80.12 75.90 71.68 66.88 62.08 51.99 41.90
______________________________________________________________________
Table A.17:  Illiteracy rates (percentage)
______________________________________________________________________
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Andalucía 20.53 19.62 18.72 17.82 16.91 13.50 9.39 7.28 5.54
Aragón 8.54 7.82 7.10 6.38 5.65 4.22 2.59 1.95 1.50
Asturias 2.78 2.88 2.98 3.08 3.18 2.39 1.36 1.09 0.99
Baleares 12.19 11.53 10.87 10.22 9.56 7.08 4.09 3.08 2.47
Canarias 18.36 16.93 15.49 14.06 12.63 9.86 6.69 5.26 4.15
Cantabria 2.61 2.50 2.40 2.30 2.20 1.66 1.01 0.81 0.71
C. y León 4.71 4.56 4.41 4.26 4.11 3.15 1.97 1.50 1.17
C.-Mancha 18.20 17.42 16.65 15.88 15.10 12.22 8.75 6.89 5.31
Cataluña 6.59 6.63 6.66 6.69 6.72 5.25 3.36 2.88 2.68
Valencia 11.78 11.09 10.40 9.70 9.01 6.92 4.43 3.49 2.84
Extremadura 19.70 18.98 18.26 17.54 16.81 13.50 9.47 7.51 5.95
Galicia 10.32 9.96 9.59 9.23 8.87 6.89 4.46 3.36 2.52
Madrid 4.25 4.35 4.46 4.56 4.66 3.83 2.75 2.37 2.12
Murcia 16.80 16.19 15.57 14.95 14.34 11.07 7.07 5.34 4.04
Navarra 3.65 3.41 3.18 2.95 2.72 2.08 1.32 1.13 1.05
P. Vasco 2.41 2.46% 2.51% 2.57% 2.62% 2.20% 1.65% 1.38% 1.16%
Rioja 5.71% 5.22% 4.73% 4.24% 3.76% 2.77% 1.64% 1.21% 0.91%
Spain 11.20% 10.63% 10.05% 9.48% 8.90% 6.83% 4.75% 3.91% 3.07%
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.18: Average years of schooling
______________________________________________________________________
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Andalucía 4.32 4.45 4.59 4.89 5.20 5.70 6.26 6.91 7.62
Aragón 5.07 5.18 5.29 5.59 5.89 6.36 6.89 7.58 8.35
Asturias 5.42 5.48 5.54 5.82 6.09 6.52 6.99 7.62 8.31
Baleares 4.87 5.00 5.13 5.47 5.81 6.32 6.88 7.52 8.22
Canarias 4.56 4.80 5.03 5.37 5.71 6.23 6.81 7.40 8.02
Cantabria 5.57 5.59 5.61 5.92 6.23 6.66 7.13 7.80 8.54
C. y León 5.27 5.34 5.40 5.67 5.95 6.36 6.82 7.44 8.14
C.-Mancha 4.31 4.42 4.53 4.74 4.95 5.39 5.90 6.51 7.18
Cataluña 5.26 5.30 5.35 5.74 6.13 6.58 7.05 7.67 8.35
Valencia 4.92 4.99 5.06 5.35 5.63 6.10 6.62 7.27 7.98
Extremadura 4.25 4.37 4.49 4.72 4.95 5.39 5.91 6.50 7.13
Galicia 4.87 4.94 5.02 5.26 5.49 5.89 6.34 6.97 7.67
Madrid 6.01 6.11 6.21 6.64 7.08 7.53 7.99 8.64 9.36
Murcia 4.63 4.70 4.78 5.02 5.26 5.81 6.45 7.12 7.82
Navarra 5.38 5.52 5.65 5.97 6.30 6.78 7.31 8.04 8.85
P. Vasco 5.61 5.66 5.71 6.05 6.40 6.91 7.48 8.20 9.00
Rioja 5.33 5.35 5.37 5.67 5.97 6.39 6.86 7.61 8.44
Spain 4.97 5.08 5.19 5.53 5.87 6.35 6.84 7.52 8.19
______________________________________________________________________
Attainment by cohort
The 2001 Census has a rather fine breakdown of the population by age group and by
educational level (see Table A.19). Using these data, we have constructed estimates of
attainment levels and average years of schooling by cohort. The main results are given in
Tables A.20-A.23.
Table A.19: Attainment levels used in the 2001 census and cumulative durations
_______________________________________
duration
illiterates 0
incomplete primary schooling 2
primary schooling 5
lower secondary (EGB) 8
basic vocational training (FP I) 10
upper secondary (bachillerato) 12
advanced vocational training (FP II) 13
university, 1st cycle (diplomatura) 15
university, 2nd cycle (licenciatura) 17
university 3r cycle (doctorate) 21
_______________________________________
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Table A.20: Average years of schooling by cohort, 2001
______________________________________________________________
25+ 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Andalucía 7.19 9.83 8.66 7.19 5.41 3.68
Aragón 8.20 11.21 10.12 8.66 6.91 4.90
Asturias 8.12 11.20 10.11 8.48 6.72 5.01
Baleares 8.02 9.94 9.22 8.17 6.88 4.90
Canarias 7.74 9.77 8.89 7.66 6.03 4.25
Cantabria 8.46 10.92 10.01 8.69 7.26 5.52
C.-León 7.99 11.16 9.89 8.33 6.61 4.97
C.-Mancha 6.62 9.72 8.60 7.02 4.88 3.17
Cataluña 8.12 10.73 9.82 8.25 6.51 4.87
Valencia 7.71 10.25 9.21 7.87 6.18 4.48
Extremadura 6.59 9.76 8.44 6.81 4.91 3.24
Gal ic ia 7.28 10.65 9.22 7.48 5.79 4.11
Madrid 9.23 11.71 10.83 9.17 7.51 5.46
Murcia 7.43 9.78 9.00 7.51 5.59 3.81
Navarra 8.86 11.43 10.37 8.95 7.47 5.73
P. Vasco 8.96 11.88 10.77 8.95 7.23 5.58
Rioja 8.38 11.03 10.00 8.62 7.03 5.32
Spain 7.93 10.61 9.56 8.07 6.32 4.55
25+ 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Andalucía 90.7 92.6 90.6 89.1 85.5 80.8
Aragón 103.4 105.6 105.8 107.3 109.3 107.8
Asturias 102.4 105.5 105.7 105.1 106.2 110.2
Baleares 101.1 93.7 96.4 101.3 108.8 107.6
Canarias 97.6 92.0 92.9 95.0 95.4 93.4
Cantabria 106.7 102.8 104.7 107.7 114.8 121.3
C.-León 100.7 105.2 103.4 103.3 104.6 109.3
C.-Mancha 83.5 91.6 89.9 87.0 77.1 69.6
Cataluña 102.5 101.1 102.6 102.3 102.9 107.0
Valencia 97.3 96.6 96.2 97.6 97.7 98.4
Extremadura 83.1 92.0 88.2 84.4 77.6 71.2
Gal ic ia 91.8 100.4 96.4 92.7 91.5 90.4
Madrid 116.4 110.3 113.2 113.7 118.7 119.9
Murcia 93.7 92.1 94.1 93.0 88.4 83.8
Navarra 111.8 107.7 108.4 110.9 118.2 125.9
P. Vasco 113.0 111.9 112.6 110.9 114.3 122.6
Rioja 105.7 103.9 104.6 106.9 111.2 117.0
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
coeff. of var. 9.2 6.8 7.6 8.7 12.9 17.0
max 116.4 111.9 113.2 113.7 118.7 125.9
min 83.1 91.6 88.2 84.4 77.1 69.6
max/min 1.40 1.22 1.28 1.35 1.54 1.81
______________________________________________________________
- Note: The upper panel of the table shows average years of schooling, estimated using the durations given in
Table A.52. The lower panel shows values normalized by the overall Spanish average (which includes
Ceuta and Melilla as well as the 17 autonomous regions shown in the table).
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Table A.21: Lower secondary attainment or better by cohort, 2001
_____________________________________________________________________
25+ 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Andalucía 31.37% 84.70% 83.87% 77.71% 61.15% 41.24% 21.45%
Aragón 33.83% 91.70% 94.20% 99.26% 87.40% 60.33% 28.32%
Asturias 33.48% 92.79% 95.03% 96.27% 84.50% 56.25% 27.69%
Baleares 42.07% 84.70% 82.17% 86.48% 77.82% 58.23% 34.30%
Canarias 35.48% 83.12% 81.80% 78.66% 66.40% 46.78% 27.60%
Cantabria 38.60% 92.00% 92.72% 95.98% 88.01% 64.97% 35.99%
C.-León 30.52% 91.50% 92.60% 94.19% 78.45% 52.80% 25.35%
C.-Mancha 26.91% 85.41% 87.35% 78.53% 60.21% 34.78% 13.69%
Cataluña 35.03% 87.09% 87.01% 91.52% 81.32% 55.13% 31.20%
Valencia 34.99% 86.90% 88.15% 86.10% 71.03% 48.57% 24.83%
Extremadura 26.39% 87.39% 88.53% 76.18% 55.60% 33.49% 13.99%
Gal ic ia 28.94% 91.41% 94.37% 89.00% 66.98% 41.16% 19.58%
Madrid 38.57% 90.79% 89.35% 94.06% 87.04% 63.30% 39.50%
Murcia 33.29% 83.72% 83.42% 81.46% 67.00% 43.92% 21.29%
Navarra 38.74% 92.60% 97.04% 98.04% 92.61% 70.17% 40.96%
P. Vasco 36.07% 94.09% 97.33% 100.50% 93.36% 66.30% 37.83%
Rioja 36.51% 90.10% 93.76% 95.11% 87.46% 63.47% 33.88%
Spain 33.57% 87.93% 88.09% 87.84% 75.02% 51.50% 27.61%
25+ 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Andalucía 93.4 96.3 95.2 88.5 81.5 80.1 77.7
Aragón 100.8 104.3 106.9 113.0 116.5 117.1 102.6
Asturias 99.7 105.5 107.9 109.6 112.6 109.2 100.3
Baleares 125.3 96.3 93.3 98.5 103.7 113.1 124.3
Canarias 105.7 94.5 92.9 89.5 88.5 90.8 100.0
Cantabria 115.0 104.6 105.3 109.3 117.3 126.1 130.4
C.-León 90.9 104.1 105.1 107.2 104.6 102.5 91.8
C.-Mancha 80.2 97.1 99.2 89.4 80.3 67.5 49.6
Cataluña 104.3 99.0 98.8 104.2 108.4 107.0 113.0
Valencia 104.2 98.8 100.1 98.0 94.7 94.3 90.0
Extremadura 78.6 99.4 100.5 86.7 74.1 65.0 50.7
Gal ic ia 86.2 104.0 107.1 101.3 89.3 79.9 70.9
Madrid 114.9 103.3 101.4 107.1 116.0 122.9 143.1
Murcia 99.2 95.2 94.7 92.7 89.3 85.3 77.1
Navarra 115.4 105.3 110.2 111.6 123.5 136.2 148.4
P. Vasco 107.5 107.0 110.5 114.4 124.4 128.7 137.1
Rioja 108.7 102.5 106.4 108.3 116.6 123.2 122.7
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
coeff. of var. 12.2 3.9 5.6 9.0 15.4 20.8 28.9
max 125.3 107.0 110.5 114.4 124.4 136.2 148.4
min 78.6 94.5 92.9 86.7 74.1 65.0 49.6
max/min 1.59 1.13 1.19 1.32 1.68 2.10 2.99
______________________________________________________________
- Note: The upper panel of the table shows the percentage of each age group that has completed lower
secondary schooling or a higher degree. The lower panel shows values normalized by the overall Spanish
average (which includes Ceuta and Melilla as well as the 17 autonomous regions shown in the table).
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Table A.22: Upper secondary attainment or better by cohort, 2001
_____________________________________________________________________
25+ 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Andalucía 26.57% 49.80% 45.51% 34.60% 23.35% 13.39% 6.79%
Aragón 31.90% 67.20% 63.06% 48.00% 29.80% 15.52% 6.32%
Asturias 32.21% 66.37% 62.14% 49.40% 30.80% 16.37% 7.85%
Baleares 29.81% 45.10% 47.10% 38.38% 26.83% 18.10% 9.09%
Canarias 30.23% 48.75% 46.36% 37.00% 26.40% 16.88% 8.80%
Cantabria 33.56% 63.10% 60.45% 48.15% 31.27% 17.90% 8.19%
C.-León 30.18% 64.30% 60.65% 45.95% 29.20% 15.00% 6.38%
C.-Mancha 21.75% 49.75% 43.00% 32.44% 20.08% 8.90% 3.32%
Cataluña 33.09% 59.46% 58.55% 46.65% 29.06% 16.78% 8.36%
Valencia 28.29% 53.90% 49.84% 38.16% 25.27% 14.20% 7.49%
Extremadura 21.58% 50.75% 42.68% 31.20% 19.70% 9.49% 3.88%
Gal ic ia 26.11% 60.94% 54.43% 38.88% 23.10% 11.98% 5.72%
Madrid 43.28% 65.57% 66.28% 56.64% 38.70% 26.00% 14.65%
Murcia 27.46% 47.55% 45.46% 37.00% 24.00% 12.41% 6.11%
Navarra 36.33% 70.90% 64.41% 51.65% 33.17% 18.60% 7.76%
P. Vasco 39.85% 75.78% 70.87% 57.36% 35.80% 20.00% 9.67%
Rioja 32.76% 66.00% 60.61% 48.00% 30.27% 15.80% 7.06%
Spain 31.43% 57.76% 54.97% 43.36% 28.39% 16.30% 7.93%
25+ 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Andalucía 84.5 86.2 82.8 79.8 82.3 82.1 85.7
Aragón 101.5 116.3 114.7 110.7 105.0 95.2 79.8
Asturias 102.5 114.9 113.0 113.9 108.5 100.4 99.1
Baleares 94.8 78.1 85.7 88.5 94.5 111.0 114.7
Canarias 96.2 84.4 84.3 85.3 93.0 103.6 111.0
Cantabria 106.8 109.2 110.0 111.0 110.2 109.8 103.4
C.-León 96.0 111.3 110.3 106.0 102.9 92.0 80.5
C.-Mancha 69.2 86.1 78.2 74.8 70.7 54.6 41.9
Cataluña 105.3 102.9 106.5 107.6 102.4 103.0 105.4
Valencia 90.0 93.3 90.7 88.0 89.0 87.1 94.5
Extremadura 68.7 87.9 77.6 72.0 69.4 58.2 48.9
Gal ic ia 83.1 105.5 99.0 89.7 81.4 73.5 72.2
Madrid 137.7 113.5 120.6 130.6 136.3 159.5 184.8
Murcia 87.4 82.3 82.7 85.3 84.6 76.1 77.1
Navarra 115.6 122.7 117.2 119.1 116.8 114.1 98.0
P. Vasco 126.8 131.2 128.9 132.3 126.1 122.7 122.0
Rioja 104.2 114.3 110.3 110.7 106.6 96.9 89.0
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
coeff. of var. 17.8 15.2 16.0 18.1 18.1 25.1 32.4
max 137.7 131.2 128.9 132.3 136.3 159.5 184.8
min 68.7 78.1 77.6 72.0 69.4 54.6 41.9
max/min 2.01 1.68 1.66 1.84 1.96 2.92 4.41
_____________________________________________________________________
- Note: The upper panel of the table shows the percentage of each age group that has completed uppper
secondary schooling (including lower or upper vocational training) or a higher degree. The lower panel
shows values normalized by the overall Spanish average (which includes Ceuta and Melilla as well as the
17 autonomous regions shown in the table).
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Table A.23: University attainment by cohort, 2001
______________________________________________________________
25+ 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Andalucía 11.98% 19.95% 14.90% 11.58% 6.69% 3.24%
Aragón 14.38% 28.01% 20.30% 14.20% 7.91% 3.21%
Asturias 13.40% 26.85% 18.76% 12.60% 7.39% 3.71%
Baleares 10.97% 17.56% 13.63% 10.11% 6.70% 3.40%
Canarias 12.04% 17.05% 14.90% 11.70% 7.49% 3.78%
Cantabria 12.85% 22.25% 17.72% 12.49% 7.80% 3.66%
C.-León 13.92% 28.58% 19.42% 13.20% 7.70% 3.54%
C.-Mancha 9.48% 18.59% 12.87% 9.49% 4.70% 1.77%
Cataluña 13.54% 23.81% 18.58% 12.73% 7.19% 3.20%
Valencia 12.10% 21.18% 15.58% 11.69% 6.40% 3.18%
Extremadura 10.51% 20.84% 14.00% 10.00% 5.49% 2.15%
Gal ic ia 10.96% 22.15% 15.53% 10.30% 5.69% 2.75%
Madrid 21.57% 33.94% 26.87% 19.40% 13.70% 7.02%
Murcia 11.67% 18.33% 14.90% 11.60% 6.21% 3.10%
Navarra 16.15% 29.68% 21.72% 14.19% 8.50% 3.85%
P. Vasco 16.49% 30.89% 23.72% 13.50% 7.70% 3.95%
Rioja 13.48% 25.72% 18.50% 12.49% 6.90% 3.04%
Spain 13.84% 24.17% 18.24% 13.01% 7.73% 3.62%
25+ 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Andalucía 86.6 82.5 81.7 89.0 86.6 89.6
Aragón 103.9 115.9 111.3 109.2 102.3 88.7
Asturias 96.8 111.1 102.8 96.9 95.5 102.6
Baleares 79.3 72.6 74.7 77.7 86.7 93.9
Canarias 87.0 70.5 81.7 90.0 96.9 104.4
Cantabria 92.9 92.0 97.1 96.0 100.9 101.0
C.-León 100.6 118.2 106.5 101.5 99.6 97.8
C.-Mancha 68.5 76.9 70.6 73.0 60.8 48.8
Cataluña 97.8 98.5 101.9 97.8 93.0 88.4
Valencia 87.4 87.6 85.4 89.9 82.8 87.8
Extremadura 75.9 86.2 76.7 76.9 71.1 59.4
Gal ic ia 79.2 91.6 85.1 79.2 73.6 75.9
Madrid 155.8 140.4 147.3 149.2 177.2 194.0
Murcia 84.3 75.8 81.7 89.2 80.3 85.6
Navarra 116.7 122.8 119.1 109.1 110.0 106.3
P. Vasco 119.1 127.8 130.0 103.8 99.6 109.1
Rioja 97.4 106.4 101.4 96.0 89.3 84.0
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
coeff. of var. 20.8 20.8 20.9 17.8 25.5 30.7
max 155.8 140.4 147.3 149.2 177.2 194.0
min 68.5 70.5 70.6 73.0 60.8 48.8
max/min 2.27 1.99 2.09 2.04 2.91 3.98
______________________________________________________________
- Note: The upper panel of the table shows the percentage of each age group that has completed at least the
first cycle of university. The lower panel shows values normalized by the overall Spanish average (which
includes Ceuta and Melilla as well as the 17 autonomous regions shown in the table).
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Attainment data by cohort can be useful in trying to project the future evolution of average
attainment in each region and of educational disparities across regions. It is instructive, in
particular, to compare the average attainment of the adult population (25+) with that of the
youngest cohort that is old enough to have completed each educational level (25-34 or 20-24),
as the second variable can be seen as an estimate of future average attainment, conditional on
the maintenance of current enrollment patterns and on the absence of significant population in
or outflows. One way to gauge the likely future reduction in regional educational disparities
that would be induced by the combination of current policies and demographics is to estimate
a "convergence equation" relating the incremental attainment of the youngest cohort relative
to the entire adult population to currrent average attainment, with those variables measured
in relative terms.
More specifically, let atti(C) be the average attainment of cohort C in region i measured in
percentage deviations from average national attainment for the same cohort. We now define
the incremental relative attainment of the youngest cohort by
(A.2) Datti(youngest) = atti(youngest) - atti(25+)
and estimate an equation of the form
(A.3) Datti(youngest) = -b*atti(25+)
The parameter b then measures how quickly regional educational levels are converging as we
move across cohorts. For a hypothetical average region, this coefficient tells us what fraction
of the current deviation from average adult attainment will disappear as we go from the
entire adult population (25+) to the youngest relevant cohort.
Figure A.1 and Figure 6 in the text show the scatter of Datti(youngest)  versus atti(25+) for
four alternative attainment measures: average years of schooling, lower secondary
attainment or better, upper secondary or better and university attainment. Table A.24 shows
the estimated ("beta") convergence coefficients. Notice that for each attainment level we
estimate two separate convergence coefficients, one for a sample comprised by all the regions
and a second one for a sample that excludes Madrid. The reason for this is that, as is apparent
from Figures A.1c or Figure 6 in the text, Madrid displays a rather atypical behaviour.
Table A.24: Beta convergence in attainment across cohorts
__________________________________________
all regions w/o Madrid
avge. years of schooling 0.373 0.373
(3.82) (3.34)
lower sec. or better 0.945 0.959
(11.74) (11.19)
upper sec. or better 0.382 0.286
(2.35) (1.50)
university attainment 0.119 -0.006
(0.96) (0.04)
__________________________________________
- Note: t statics in parentheses below each coefficient.
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Figure A.1: Convergence in relative attainment across cohorts
a. average years of schooling
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Our estimates of the beta convergence parameter reinforce the conclusions drawn in the text
from a comparison of regional educational disparities across cohorts. As a result of compulsory
schooling laws, lower secondary attainment is practically universal in all regions for younger
cohorts. This homogeneization can be expected to contribute significantly to convergence across
regions in average years of schooling in the future. On the other hand, convergence is much
less clear for post-compulsory attainment levels, and the expected reduction in regional
disparities is only of the order of one third. Hence, current enrollment patterns would still
leave substantial regional differences in average attainment in the future.
Other educational indicators
Table A.25 shows the raw (non-normalized) values of the educational indicators given in
Table 5 of the text.
Table A.25: Selected educational indicators
______________________________________________________________________
pre-school
years
enr17pc
%
enr20univ
%
adeq12
%
adeq15
%
uppsec
%
univ
%
Andalucía 2.553 59.4 27.6 87.8 57.7 56.9 65.1
Aragón 3.043 74.5 34.6 91.9 65.1 55.2 58.9
Asturias 2.974 71.0 36.7 92.6 66.5 49.7 96.2
Baleares 3.066 52.4 20.4 85.2 54.8 45.3 41.3
Canarias 2.938 60.6 19.7 85.2 58 35.8 53.5
Cantabria 2.954 63.7 24.4 92.2 61.5 43.9 66.0
C.-León 3.042 69.0 37.4 91.4 60.3 44.9 79.9
C.-Mancha 2.987 56.8 29.9 89.6 57 47.9 61.4
Cataluña 3.761 64.4 25.9 93.6 82.9 48.1 85.7
Valencia 2.896 57.8 27.8 90.4 61.3 46.4 80.0
Extremadura 2.949 55.9 26.4 90.6 57.3 45.3 50.9
Gal ic ia 2.866 64.0 21.0 89.5 60.6 42.0 58.8
Madrid 3.242 70.8 30.0 91.3 63.7 49.3 89.8
Murcia 3.118 58.8 22.8 89 57.6 43.6 59.6
Navarra 2.978 79.5 38.1 93.8 72.2 65.9 76.2
P. Vasco 3.599 81.4 37.9 92.6 72.7 62.4 82.6
Rioja 3.049 70.6 22.6 92.5 65.3 51.7 58.9
Spain 3.073 63.9 32.0 90.1 63.9 49.1 77.7
______________________________________________________________________
3. Schooling, wages and employment, detailed results
Tables A.26-A.31 show the detailed results of the estimation of the wage equations and
the participation and employment probits discussed in sections 3.a and 3.b of the text. In the
last two cases, the coefficients we report are not the direct estimates of the original
parameters of the probit model, but the estimated marginal effects (calculated at the sample
means of all the regressors) that measure the expected change in the relevant probability in
response to a marginal increase in each of the explanatory variables.
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It is somewhat surprising at first sight that the coefficient of the dummy for non-
university students in the participation equation is smaller than that of the dummy for
university students. One possible explanation may be that, in addition to young people
enrolled in upper secondary courses, the non-university group also includes many adults who
are enrolled part-time in non-standard courses (theater and dance, foreign languages,
computers...).
4. Reliability ratios for two alternative attainment series
Mas et al (MPUSS, 2002) construct educational attainment series for the Spanish regions
using the data taken from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) of the National Statistical Institute.
These series cover the period 1964-2001 at an annual frequency and break down the working-
age population (16-65) into inactive, unemployed and employed workers.
Using the MPUSS series for the working-age population, we have constructed a series of
average years of educational attainment that we have compared with our own attainment
series in order to obtain measures of the information content of both data sets as given by their
estimated reliability ratios. Following the methodology proposed by Krueger and Lindhal
(2001) and briefly reviewed in de la Fuente and Ciccone (2002), we estimate the reliability
ratio rk of a given series of average years of schooling (say Sk) by using Sk to try to explain
alternative estimates of the same variable (Sj with j π k). In particular, our estimate of the
reliability ratio of data set k is the slope coefficient in a regression of the form
(A.4)  Sj = c + rkjSk
where j denotes the "reference" data set.
The exercise we have just described is repeated for several transformations of average years
of schooling using data covering the period 1965-95 at two-year intervals.55 In particular, we
estimate reliability ratios for years of schooling measured in levels (Sit) and in logs (sit), for
average annual changes in both levels and logs measured across successive (biennial)
observations (DSit and Dsit), for log years of schooling and for their annualized changes
measured in deviations from their respective country means (sit - si and Dsit - Dsi).  Notice that
D sit corresponds to annual growth rates and that sit - si and D sit - D si are the "within"
transformations often used to remove fixed effects. We also estimate all the reliability ratios
twice, once with the raw data and a second time after removing the period means from the
different schooling series. Since all our growth estimates (reported in the text and in de la
Fuente and Doménech, 2003) include fixed period effects, this second set of reliability ratios is
the relevant one for the analysis of the sensitivity of human capital estimates to data quality
we will carry out in a later section.
55
 Our own attainment data are originally constructed for quinquennial intervals. We interpolate years of
schooling linearly between benchmark years to construct the biennial series prior to estimating equation
(A.6).
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Table A.32: Reliability ratios for the D&D (2003) and MPUSS (2002) attainment series
_______________________________________________________________________
raw data Sit sit DSit Dsit sit-si Dsit-Dsi average
D&D (2003) 1.216 1.088 1.258 0.979 1.203 0.996 1.123
MPUSS (2002) 0.701 0.785 0.392 0.367 0.719 0.357 0.554
deviations from period means:
D&D (2003) 0.874 0.770 1.019 0.885 0.825 0.900 0.879
MPUSS (2002) 1.001 1.150 0.047 0.071 0.467 0.035 0.462
_______________________________________________________________________
- Note: the upper half of the table corresponds to the variables as originally measured. The estimates shown
in the lower part of the table are obtained after removing the corresponding period means. This is done by
introducing period dummies in equation (A.4).
The results are shown in Table A.32, both for the raw data and for the data in deviations
from period means. The last column of the table shows the average value of the reliability
ratio of each data set taken across data transformations. Somewhat surprisingly, the
information content of our census-based data seems to be about twice that of the LFS-based
MPSS series.  We hypothesize that the relatively small size of the LFS regional samples may
introduce spurious variability in the MPUSS attainment estimates. The increase in the
estimated reliability ratio is particularly marked for the data in differences, a fact that
helps explain the pattern of results shown in the text.56
 It is interesting to note that the information content of our census-based regional data
seems  to be higher than that of de la Fuente and Doménech's (2002) cross-country data set.
The average reliability ratio for the data in deviations from period means is almost 40%
higher for the regional data set (0.879 vs. 0.633). This result should be interpreted with some
caution because our estimataes of reliability ratios can be expacted to be less precise at the
regional level than at the national one, where more alternative attainment estimates are
available. At any rate, the finding is not surprising given that cross-country heterogeneity in
classification criteria and reporting practices, which is a major source of noise in the
international data, should not be a problem at the regional level, and it does suggest that
measurement error bias should be a somewhat less important problem when regional data are
used.
56
 It should be noted that, while reliability ratios must lie between zero and one, some of the estimates
reported in Table A.48 fall outside these bounds. We interpret these results as an indication that
measurement error is likely to be positively correlated across data sets.
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5. The private rate of return to schooling. Additional details.
a. Average earnings of full-time salaried employees in manufacturing, construction and 
services
Table A.33: Average gross earnings and working hours
________________________________________________________
hourly wage
ptas.
full-time
hours
yearly
earnings, ptas.
yearly
earnings euros
Andalucía 1,470 1,717.1 2,524,137 15,170
Aragón 1,631 1,737.7 2,834,189 17,034
Asturias 1,747 1,721.4 3,007,286 18,074
Baleares 1,451 1,735.2 2,517,775 15,132
Canarias 1,363 1,763.2 2,403,242 14,444
Cantabria 1,579 1,731.7 2,734,354 16,434
Cast.-Mancha 1,358 1,741.7 2,365,229 14,215
Cast. y León 1,579 1,726.3 2,725,828 16,383
Cataluña 1,673 1,746.2 2,921,393 17,558
Valencia 1,433 1,763.0 2,526,379 15,184
Extremadura 1,343 1,730.5 2,324,062 13,968
Gal ic ia 1,413 1,742.5 2,462,153 14,798
Madrid 1,882 1,736.8 3,268,658 19,645
Murcia 1,323 1,744.4 2,307,841 13,870
Navarra 1,762 1,717.2 3,025,706 18,185
P. Vasco 1,967 1,710.9 3,365,340 20,226
Rioja 1,495 1,750.5 2,616,998 15,728
Spain 1,620 1,738.0 2,815,560 16,922
________________________________________________________
The first column of Table A.33 shows the average gross hourly earnings (before income
taxes and employee social security contributions are witheld) of salaried employees working
in establishments employing five or more workers in the manufacturing, construction and
service sectors in the year 2000, measured in pesetas. These data are taken from the Encuesta
de Salarios en la Industria y los Servicios, published by the National Statistical Institute
(INE).57 The second column shows the average number of working hours per year for full-time
workers, as established in collective agreements and labour contracts, according to the INE's
Encuesta sobre el Tiempo de Trabajo en España 2000. Multiplying these two columns, we obtain
average gross yearly earnings in each region measured in pesetas.58 The last column shows
the same quantity converted to euros.
57
 These data are available on-line at http://www.ine.es/inebase/cgi/um?M=%2Ft22%2Fp131&O=
inebase&N=&L=.
58
 The average yearly wage computed in this manner is 12.8% higher than APW average earnings as
reported by the OECD for the same year. The discrepancy may arise from differences in the sectoral
coverage of both statistics, but we find it a bit surprising that focusing on manufacturing as the OECD does
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b. The Spanish tax system in 2000 and calculation of the marginal tax rate
In 2000, labour income in (most regions of) Spain was taxed as follows. First, mandatory
social security contributions paid by employees are levied on gross wage income at a flat rate
of 6.35%.59 Income tax, which includes both a national and a regional component, is
calculated by applying a progressive schedule to taxable income. Taxable income is
calculated by substracting from gross income social security contributions, a fixed personal
allowance and a deduction for work-related expenses. This deduction is a fixed amount for
individuals with incomes above a given ceiling or below a given floor, and falls with income
(net of social security tax) for those with labour earnings in between these two levels. There
are additional allowances and deductions for dependants, housing expenditure and other
reasons, but these will be ignored here.
Within each income bracket i, total tax liability (T) is a linear function of gross income (y)
given by
(A.4)  
  
T y y T y y A A a y B Bi ss i i ss o i i ss i i( ) ( )min min= + + - - + - - -( )[ ] -{ }t t t t1 1 1
where tss is the social security tax rate, ti  the marginal rate of income tax applicable to the
relevant bracket and Tmini the amount of income tax due at the lower limit of the bracket for
taxable income (Bmini). The term inside brackets is the difference between taxable income and
this lower limit, with taxable income calculated by subtracting from gross income social
security contributions, the personal allowance (Ao), and the deduction for work-related
expenses. Notice that the formula allows this deduction to fall with income (if ai > 0), but
this only happens for a certain interval of relatively low incomes (that is, ai = 0 in most
cases). Differentiating (A.4), the marginal tax rate is given by
(A.5)    T y a ai ss i ss i ss ss i ss i©( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )= + - + -{ } = + - +t t t t t t t1 1 1 1
which is the expression used to calculate the values of T'  used in the rate of return
calculations.
As noted elsewhere, the Foral regions of Navarra and Basque Country have a slightly
different tax system. In Navarra, the personal allowance is a bit higher than in the rest of
Spain, and the allowance for work-related expenses in the tax base is replaced by a fixed
deduction from the quota for all wage earners. In the Basque country there is a single tax
allowance that, for a certain income bracket, decreases with net wage income (as the
allowance for work expenses does in the general case). The tax schedules for these two regions
are slightly different from those applied in the rest of Spain.
should yield lower wages. Since we divide expenditure per student by yearly earnings to calculate the
private rate of return to schooling, this difference will affect our normalized expenditure variable and
hence the estimated rate of return.
59
 This flat rate applies for incomes within a floor and a ceiling, the latter of which is relevant for our
calculations of the returns to university schooling in a few regions. For incomes about the ceiling, the
marginal social security tax rate is zero.
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The net replacement ratio induced by unemployment benefits is calculated as the ratio
between net income after taxes in employment and out of employment for an individual who
earns ASW earnings when employed. Unemployment benefits are paid at a rate of 70% of
reference earnings, defined as average gross earnings over the last six months of employment,
with a floor and a ceiling that becomes binding at relatively low income levels. Benefits are
considered wage income and are therefore taxable but generate deductions for work expenses.
Social security contributions are paid (at a reduced rate) not on benefits themselves but on
reference earnings.
c. Detailed results for average years of schooling
The upper panel of Table A.34 shows the observed rate of return to schooling in each
Spanish region and its four cost and benefit "components." To interpret this table, recall the
rate of return formula given in equation (10) in the text,
R' 
  
∫
- -
R
e RH1   
=
+
+
q enet net
OPPC DIRC   
∫ NUM
DENOM
In this expression, qnet and enet capture the net after-tax benefits of a marginal increase in
schooling that are linked, respectively, to higher earnings and to higher employment
probabilities, while OPPC and DIRC measure the opportunity and direct costs of schooling,
with all variables measured as fractions of the expected after-tax earnings of an adult
worker. Thus, NUM  measures the total payoff to an additional year of schooling and
DENOM its total cost. (Notice that qnet and enet are normalized by the average value of their
sum, NUM, and OPPC and DIRC  are normalized by the average value of DENOM).
Inspection of Table A.34 shows that the return to schooling is primarily determined by its
wage-related benefits and its opportunity cost. Direct costs and employment-related effects
play a secondary role, but it must be noted that the relative importance of the latter is
considerably higher than in our previous estimates (de la Fuente (2003), whose values for
Spain are shown in the last row of panel a of the table). For the country as a whole, 90.5% of
the payoff to schooling comes from its impact on earnings and 96.5% of its costs take the form
of foregone wages. There is considerable variation across regions in this respect, however. As
may be expected, direct costs are lower in the poorer territories, both because government
subsidies are higher and because enrollment in non-subsidized private centers are lower in
these regions.
Table A.35 shows estimates of the private rate of return to schooling under each of the
scenarios discussed in section 4.a of the text. The first block of the table gives the actual rates
of return, and the second one a set of normalized rates of return that are obtained by setting
the average value for each scenario to 100. Table A.36 shows the change in the rate of return
as we move across scenarios (i.e. the tax or subsidy wedges defined in the text) and Table A.37
converts these wedges into the implied subsidy or tax rates by dividing them  by the rate of
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return in the baseline scenario (except in the last column, where the denominator is the
observed rate of return).
Table A.34: Observed private rate of return to schooling and its components
a. Observed values
______________________________________________________________________
robs NUM qnet enet DENOM OPPC DIRC
Extremadura 10.73% 8.01% 7.37% 0.65% 85.61% 86.05% -0.45%
Madrid 10.34% 7.90% 7.30% 0.60% 87.77% 82.41% 5.36%
C.-Mancha 10.17% 7.54% 7.17% 0.37% 85.41% 84.68% 0.73%
Baleares 9.76% 7.04% 6.72% 0.32% 83.33% 80.37% 2.96%
Cataluña 9.51% 7.04% 6.45% 0.59% 85.76% 80.55% 5.22%
Murcia 9.42% 7.13% 6.79% 0.35% 87.81% 85.90% 1.91%
Canarias 8.99% 6.40% 6.00% 0.40% 82.82% 81.55% 1.27%
Valencia 8.75% 6.47% 5.99% 0.48% 86.13% 83.56% 2.57%
C.-León 8.43% 6.26% 5.80% 0.45% 86.65% 84.77% 1.88%
Gal ic ia 8.41% 6.46% 6.03% 0.43% 89.78% 87.94% 1.83%
Andalucía 8.36% 6.19% 5.40% 0.79% 86.57% 85.35% 1.22%
Rioja 8.29% 6.29% 6.03% 0.26% 88.55% 86.17% 2.37%
País Vasco 7.66% 5.60% 4.86% 0.74% 85.37% 81.94% 3.43%
Cantabria 7.59% 5.78% 5.23% 0.55% 89.16% 86.37% 2.79%
Navarra 7.30% 5.14% 4.92% 0.22% 82.40% 79.14% 3.26%
Aragón 7.22% 5.19% 4.92% 0.28% 84.26% 81.36% 2.90%
Asturias 6.85% 5.16% 4.55% 0.62% 88.34% 86.18% 2.16%
Spain 9.50% 7.11% 6.43% 0.67% 86.63% 83.63% 3.01%
de la F. (2003) 9.36% 7.34% 7.19% 0.15% 90.92% 85.80% 5.12%
______________________________________________________________________
b. Normalized values
______________________________________________________________________
robs NUM qnet enet DENOM OPPC DIRC
Extremadura 112.9 112.7 103.6 9.1 98.8 99.3 -0.5
Madrid 108.8 111.2 102.7 8.5 101.3 95.1 6.2
C.-Mancha 107.1 106.1 100.9 5.2 98.6 97.7 0.8
Baleares 102.7 99.0 94.6 4.5 96.2 92.8 3.4
Cataluña 100.1 99.1 90.8 8.3 99.0 93.0 6.0
Murcia 99.1 100.4 95.5 4.9 101.4 99.2 2.2
Canarias 94.7 90.1 84.4 5.7 95.6 94.1 1.5
Valencia 92.1 91.0 84.3 6.7 99.4 96.5 3.0
C.-León 88.7 88.0 81.7 6.4 100.0 97.8 2.2
Gal ic ia 88.5 90.9 84.9 6.1 103.6 101.5 2.1
Andalucía 87.9 87.1 76.0 11.1 99.9 98.5 1.4
Rioja 87.3 88.5 84.8 3.7 102.2 99.5 2.7
País Vasco 80.6 78.8 68.3 10.5 98.5 94.6 4.0
Cantabria 79.8 81.3 73.6 7.7 102.9 99.7 3.2
Navarra 76.8 72.3 69.2 3.1 95.1 91.3 3.8
Aragón 76.0 73.1 69.2 3.9 97.3 93.9 3.3
Asturias 72.1 72.6 64.0 8.7 102.0 99.5 2.5
Spain 100.0 100.0 90.5 9.5 100.0 96.5 3.5
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.35: Net private rates of return to schooling under different scenarios
-- all levels combined, Mincerian specification
____________________________________________________________
baseline +subsidies + taxes OBS
+ benefits
- diffstU
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Andalucía 12.22% 15.08% 14.23% 8.36% 8.67%
Aragón 7.59% 9.32% 8.66% 7.22% 7.48%
Asturias 8.30% 10.10% 9.52% 6.85% 7.39%
Baleares 10.59% 12.78% 11.77% 9.76% 9.95%
Canarias 10.38% 13.47% 12.50% 8.99% 9.13%
Cantabria 9.16% 11.59% 10.80% 7.59% 8.11%
C.-León 9.66% 11.93% 11.11% 8.43% 8.92%
C.-Mancha 10.53% 13.28% 12.22% 10.17% 10.66%
Cataluña 10.55% 12.65% 11.85% 9.51% 9.71%
Valencia 10.35% 12.94% 12.00% 8.75% 9.10%
Extremadura 12.25% 15.63% 14.60% 10.73% 11.23%
Gal ic ia 10.29% 13.00% 11.94% 8.41% 9.08%
Madrid 11.68% 13.43% 12.61% 10.34% 10.76%
Murcia 9.93% 12.39% 11.31% 9.42% 9.96%
Navarra 7.26% 9.05% 8.34% 7.30% 7.40%
P. Vasco 8.59% 10.66% 10.09% 7.66% 7.96%
Rioja 8.66% 11.27% 10.32% 8.29% 8.92%
Spain 11.32% 13.75% 12.89% 9.50% 9.91%
baseline +subsidies + taxes OBS
+ benefits
- diffstU
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Andalucía 108.0 109.7 110.4 87.9 87.5
Aragón 67.0 67.8 67.2 76.0 75.5
Asturias 73.3 73.4 73.8 72.1 74.6
Baleares 93.6 92.9 91.3 102.7 100.4
Canarias 91.7 98.0 97.0 94.7 92.1
Cantabria 81.0 84.3 83.8 79.8 81.8
C.-León 85.4 86.8 86.2 88.7 90.1
C.-Mancha 93.0 96.6 94.8 107.1 107.6
Cataluña 93.2 92.0 91.9 100.1 98.0
Valencia 91.5 94.1 93.1 92.1 91.9
Extremadura 108.2 113.6 113.2 112.9 113.3
Gal ic ia 90.9 94.5 92.7 88.5 91.7
Madrid 103.2 97.6 97.8 108.8 108.6
Murcia 87.7 90.1 87.7 99.1 100.6
Navarra 64.2 65.8 64.7 76.8 74.7
P. Vasco 75.9 77.5 78.3 80.6 80.3
Rioja 76.5 81.9 80.0 87.3 90.1
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
____________________________________________________________
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Table A.36: tax or subsidy wedge induced by
various public interventions and by differential student unemployment
____________________________________________________________
educational
subsidies
personal
taxes
social
benefits
a l l
gov't
student
unempl.
[2]-[1] [2]-[3] [3]-[4] [1]-[4] [4]-[5]
Andalucía 2.86% 0.86% 5.87% 3.86% 0.32%
Aragón 1.73% 0.66% 1.44% 0.36% 0.26%
Asturias 1.80% 0.58% 2.67% 1.45% 0.54%
Baleares 2.19% 1.00% 2.01% 0.83% 0.19%
Canarias 3.09% 0.97% 3.51% 1.39% 0.14%
Cantabria 2.43% 0.79% 3.21% 1.58% 0.52%
C.-León 2.27% 0.83% 2.68% 1.23% 0.49%
C.-Mancha 2.76% 1.06% 2.05% 0.36% 0.49%
Cataluña 2.10% 0.80% 2.34% 1.04% 0.21%
Valencia 2.59% 0.94% 3.25% 1.60% 0.35%
Extremadura 3.38% 1.03% 3.86% 1.52% 0.50%
Gal ic ia 2.71% 1.05% 3.54% 1.88% 0.68%
Madrid 1.75% 0.81% 2.27% 1.34% 0.42%
Murcia 2.46% 1.08% 1.89% 0.51% 0.54%
Navarra 1.79% 0.71% 1.05% -0.03% 0.11%
P. Vasco 2.07% 0.57% 2.43% 0.92% 0.29%
Rioja 2.61% 0.95% 2.02% 0.37% 0.63%
Spain 2.43% 0.86% 3.39% 1.82% 0.41%
de la F. (2003) 2.47% 1.05% 0.81% 0.61% 0.70%
____________________________________________________________
Table A.37: Net implicit subsidy or tax rate induced by
various public interventions and by differential student unemployment
____________________________________________________________
educational
subsidies
personal
taxes
social
benefits
a l l
gov't
student
unempl.
[2]-[1] [2]-[3] [3]-[4] [1]-[4] [4]-[5]
Andalucía 23.42% 7.01% 48.03% 31.62% 3.79%
Aragón 22.85% 8.66% 18.97% 4.79% 3.59%
Asturias 21.71% 7.03% 32.12% 17.44% 7.92%
Baleares 20.67% 9.49% 19.00% 7.81% 1.92%
Canarias 29.74% 9.34% 33.77% 13.37% 1.50%
Cantabria 26.49% 8.66% 35.06% 17.22% 6.88%
C.-León 23.51% 8.55% 27.71% 12.75% 5.86%
C.-Mancha 26.17% 10.07% 19.47% 3.37% 4.79%
Cataluña 19.94% 7.61% 22.17% 9.84% 2.16%
Valencia 24.97% 9.09% 31.35% 15.47% 4.03%
Extremadura 27.61% 8.43% 31.55% 12.37% 4.62%
Gal ic ia 26.34% 10.24% 34.36% 18.26% 8.03%
Madrid 14.99% 6.98% 19.47% 11.46% 4.08%
Murcia 24.75% 10.86% 19.02% 5.12% 5.78%
Navarra 24.63% 9.77% 14.41% -0.45% 1.49%
P. Vasco 24.08% 6.60% 28.24% 10.77% 3.84%
Rioja 30.08% 11.00% 23.36% 4.28% 7.62%
Spain 21.49% 7.59% 29.94% 16.05% 4.26%
de la F. (2003) 26.11% 8.81% 7.47% -6.41% 6.91%
____________________________________________________________
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The last row of Tables A.36 and A.37 give de la Fuente's (2003) estimates of the same
magnitudes for Spain as a whole. It should be kept in mind that the results of the two studies
are not strictly comparable because the assumptions underlying the different scenarios are a
bit different (see footnote no. 24 in the text). In the case of Table A.37, there are also some
differences in the way the effective tax rates are constructed in the two studies (see footnote
no. 25 in the text).
d. The disincentive effects of student unemployment
In Spain it appears to be relatively difficult for students to find part-time employment
while attending school. This phenomenon lowers the return to schooling by increasing its
oportunity cost. To quantify the resulting disincentives, we can calculate an effective tax rate
similar to those discussed in section 4.a of the text. In particular, we can define the effective
tax rate implicit in the student unemployment differential by
(A.6)  
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Figure A.2: Effective tax rate implicit in differential student unemployment (  etrstU )
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These effective tax rates are displayed in Figure A.2. On the whole, they are fairly
modest. The difficulty of finding part-time work while attending schoool reduces the
expected return of schooling by only 0.4 percentage points for the country as a whole (which
amounts to an effective tax rate of 4.26%), but the effect is almost twice as large in Galicia,
Asturias and Rioja and only half as large in Cataluña, Baleares, Canarias and Navarra.
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e. Data and detailed results for the private return calculations by level
i. Estimation of average wages and employment probabilities for each educational level
When we calculate the rate of return to each educational level, we assume that the
opportunity cost of each year of schooling within a given educational cycle is given by the
average earnings of workers who have completed the immediately preceding school cycle.
Since we do not have data on average earnings by educational level, we estimate this
variable using the estimated wage equations and the overall average wages given in Table
A.33 (Wavge). The estimation procedure is as follows: First, we use the Mincerian version of
the wage equation to estimate average earnings for the lowest attainment category (Wo) as
(A.7)  ln Woi = ln Wavgei - qi(Si - So)
where qi is the estimated Mincerian parameter for region i (first column of Table 8 in the
text), So = 5 the average attainment of the lowest-skill category in the WSS sample and Si
the average attainment in region i calculated using the WSS sample and the cumulative
durations given in Table 7 in the text. Next, we recover an estimate of the average wage of
workers with qualification q in region i using
(A.8)  ln Wqi = ln Woi  + Gqi
where Gqi is the estimated coefficient of the dummy corresponding to educational level q in
region i in the second version of the wage equation (or rather, the marginal effect recovered
from the coefficient of the dummy). Notice that we use directly the coefficients that measure
the total contribution of each schooling cycle rather than the annualized effects given in
Table 8 of the text. Prior to the calculation, however, the original coefficients given in Table
A.27 are corrected to eliminate negative marginal returns in the manner discussed in footnote
14 of the text.
The procedure used to estimate average employment probabilities by educational level is
exactly the same. We adjust the estimates of overall average employment probabilities
obtained in the previous section using both versions of the estimated employment equation
(and correcting the relevant dummy coefficients if necessary to eliminate any negative
marginal returns).
Tables A.38 and A.39 show the estimates of average wages and employment probabilities
by educational level constructed in this manner. The upper panel of each table shows actual
values, and the second one relative values normalized by the Spanish average for each
variable.
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Table A.38: Observed average wage and estimated average wage by educational level
a. millions of pesetas
______________________________________________________________________
all levels primary lower
sec
upper
sec
lower
voc
upper
voc
lower
univ
upper
univ
P. Vasco 3.365 2.623 2.682 3.691 3.236 3.618 4.725 6.456
Madrid 3.269 2.013 2.102 3.129 2.538 3.279 4.396 5.983
Navarra 3.026 2.411 2.483 3.220 3.043 3.512 4.337 5.593
Asturias 3.007 2.452 2.467 3.389 3.087 3.267 4.675 5.318
Cataluña 2.921 2.119 2.251 3.402 2.875 3.394 4.531 5.857
Aragón 2.834 2.305 2.305 3.237 2.718 3.226 4.023 5.348
Cantabria 2.734 2.110 2.395 3.416 3.001 3.180 4.016 5.996
C.-León 2.726 2.085 2.284 3.409 2.825 3.431 4.273 5.742
Rioja 2.617 2.026 2.200 3.519 2.975 3.116 4.200 5.285
Valencia 2.526 1.911 2.081 3.246 2.531 3.140 4.041 4.927
Andalucía 2.524 1.874 1.958 3.135 2.466 3.085 3.871 5.108
Baleares 2.518 1.838 1.943 3.224 2.997 2.997 4.047 4.466
Galicia 2.462 1.860 2.062 3.224 2.750 3.172 4.271 5.422
Canarias 2.403 1.851 2.010 3.085 2.409 2.809 4.151 5.629
C.-Mancha 2.365 1.848 2.023 3.302 2.635 3.359 4.302 4.918
Extremadura 2.324 1.767 2.116 3.299 2.651 2.812 4.019 5.554
Murcia 2.308 1.780 2.205 3.236 2.638 2.796 3.760 4.935
Spain 2.816 2.010 2.131 3.307 2.738 3.301 4.335 5.889
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values, Spain = 100
______________________________________________________________________
all levels primary lower
sec
upper
sec
lower
voc
upper
voc
lower
univ
upper
univ
P. Vasco 119.5 130.5 125.8 111.6 118.2 109.6 109.0 109.6
Madrid 116.1 100.2 98.7 94.6 92.7 99.3 101.4 101.6
Navarra 107.5 120.0 116.5 97.4 111.1 106.4 100.0 95.0
Asturias 106.8 122.0 115.7 102.5 112.8 99.0 107.8 90.3
Cataluña 103.8 105.4 105.6 102.9 105.0 102.8 104.5 99.5
Aragón 100.7 114.7 108.1 97.9 99.3 97.7 92.8 90.8
Cantabria 97.1 105.0 112.4 103.3 109.6 96.3 92.6 101.8
C. y León 96.8 103.7 107.2 103.1 103.2 103.9 98.6 97.5
Rioja 92.9 100.8 103.2 106.4 108.6 94.4 96.9 89.7
Valencia 89.7 95.1 97.6 98.2 92.5 95.1 93.2 83.7
Andalucía 89.6 93.2 91.9 94.8 90.0 93.5 89.3 86.7
Baleares 89.4 91.5 91.2 97.5 109.5 90.8 93.4 75.8
Galicia 87.4 92.5 96.8 97.5 100.4 96.1 98.5 92.1
Canarias 85.4 92.1 94.3 93.3 88.0 85.1 95.8 95.6
C.-Mancha 84.0 92.0 94.9 99.8 96.2 101.7 99.2 83.5
Extremadura 82.5 87.9 99.3 99.7 96.8 85.2 92.7 94.3
Murcia 82.0 88.6 103.5 97.8 96.4 84.7 86.7 83.8
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.39: Predicted probability of employment by attainment level
a. actual values
______________________________________________________________________
all levels primary lower
sec
upper
sec
lower
voc
upper
voc
lower
univ
upper
univ
Navarra 90.88% 88.78% 89.25% 89.25% 90.53% 92.93% 93.84% 93.84%
Baleares 90.26% 85.97% 86.90% 91.12% 91.90% 93.78% 92.27% 93.86%
Aragón 89.02% 86.37% 87.92% 91.94% 90.26% 92.23% 92.43% 92.94%
Cataluña 87.17% 80.98% 83.83% 89.76% 86.77% 89.14% 92.19% 92.19%
Rioja 84.23% 81.49% 81.75% 86.87% 86.15% 88.03% 90.37% 90.37%
Madrid 83.67% 76.68% 78.54% 86.69% 83.64% 85.06% 87.42% 87.68%
P. Vasco 83.15% 76.61% 76.61% 84.55% 79.83% 85.96% 89.87% 89.87%
Canarias 82.89% 77.66% 80.51% 86.58% 81.33% 85.72% 90.66% 91.10%
Valencia 82.77% 76.93% 79.00% 86.89% 81.45% 86.45% 89.18% 89.94%
C. y León 82.44% 77.75% 81.27% 87.35% 81.46% 87.18% 88.82% 88.82%
C.-Mancha 82.10% 77.73% 82.56% 87.87% 82.56% 86.65% 90.28% 90.28%
Murcia 80.89% 76.35% 80.42% 85.88% 80.42% 85.11% 88.17% 88.57%
Asturias 79.81% 74.68% 75.54% 83.45% 79.99% 82.52% 86.34% 87.55%
Galicia 78.85% 73.51% 76.06% 81.58% 76.18% 82.77% 87.26% 87.93%
Cantabria 78.11% 72.37% 72.37% 77.24% 72.95% 82.25% 84.82% 85.60%
Extremadura 74.61% 66.49% 74.47% 82.95% 74.47% 82.76% 84.96% 87.73%
Andalucía 72.25% 62.28% 70.29% 79.73% 72.01% 76.96% 84.05% 84.69%
Spain 80.96% 73.60% 78.66% 85.54% 80.86% 85.12% 88.02% 88.24%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values, Spain = 100
______________________________________________________________________
all levels primary lower
sec
upper
sec
lower
voc
upper
voc
lower
univ
upper
univ
Navarra 112.2 120.6 113.5 104.3 112.0 109.2 106.6 106.4
Baleares 111.5 116.8 110.5 106.5 113.7 110.2 104.8 106.4
Aragón 110.0 117.4 111.8 107.5 111.6 108.4 105.0 105.3
Cataluña 107.7 110.0 106.6 104.9 107.3 104.7 104.7 104.5
Rioja 104.0 110.7 103.9 101.5 106.5 103.4 102.7 102.4
Madrid 103.3 104.2 99.8 101.3 103.4 99.9 99.3 99.4
P. Vasco 102.7 104.1 97.4 98.8 98.7 101.0 102.1 101.9
Canarias 102.4 105.5 102.4 101.2 100.6 100.7 103.0 103.2
Valencia 102.2 104.5 100.4 101.6 100.7 101.6 101.3 101.9
C. y León 101.8 105.6 103.3 102.1 100.7 102.4 100.9 100.7
C.-Mancha 101.4 105.6 105.0 102.7 102.1 101.8 102.6 102.3
Murcia 99.9 103.7 102.2 100.4 99.5 100.0 100.2 100.4
Asturias 98.6 101.5 96.0 97.6 98.9 96.9 98.1 99.2
Galicia 97.4 99.9 96.7 95.4 94.2 97.2 99.1 99.7
Cantabria 96.5 98.3 92.0 90.3 90.2 96.6 96.4 97.0
Extremadura 92.2 90.3 94.7 97.0 92.1 97.2 96.5 99.4
Andalucía 89.2 84.6 89.4 93.2 89.1 90.4 95.5 96.0
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
ii. Data used in the rate of return calculations by level and detailed results
Tables A.40-A.45 show the data used in the rate of return calculations by level. Tables
A.46-A.55 contain the detailed results, that is, the estimates of the all-in and baseline rates
of return and the effective tax wedges and tax rates.
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Table A.40: Data used in the calculation of the private rate of return to lower secondary
schooling
______________________________________________________________________
U H qls ms m po ps
Andalucía 60.5 46.5 1.47% 0.20% 22.96% 62.28% 44.31%
Aragón 60.5 46.5 0.00% 1.14% 25.54% 86.37% 70.28%
Asturias 60.5 46.5 0.20% 0.87% 22.35% 74.68% 42.02%
Baleares 60.5 46.5 1.85% 1.51% 29.94% 85.97% 76.60%
Canarias 60.5 46.5 2.75% 0.84% 32.31% 77.66% 69.13%
Cantabria 60.5 46.5 4.22% 0.40% 25.61% 72.37% 38.18%
Cast. y León 60.5 46.5 3.04% 0.59% 26.48% 77.75% 53.56%
Cast.-Mancha 60.5 46.5 3.01% 0.08% 26.55% 77.73% 56.00%
Cataluña 60.5 46.5 2.01% 2.77% 28.38% 80.98% 71.06%
Valencia 60.5 46.5 2.84% 1.20% 28.31% 76.93% 58.20%
Extremadura 60.5 46.5 6.01% -0.35% 24.54% 66.49% 44.03%
Gal ic ia 60.5 46.5 3.45% 0.81% 31.23% 73.51% 39.13%
Madrid 60.5 46.5 1.45% 3.19% 23.07% 76.68% 53.13%
Murcia 60.5 46.5 7.14% 0.27% 25.22% 76.35% 47.95%
Navarra 60.5 46.5 0.98% 0.67% 32.52% 88.78% 84.18%
P. Vasco 60.5 46.5 0.74% 1.96% 31.42% 76.61% 61.20%
Rioja 60.5 46.5 2.75% 0.54% 27.48% 81.49% 47.36%
Spain 60.5 46.5 1.96% 1.32% 26.53% 73.60% 54.14%
h e to T' ts a b
Andalucía 0.712 4.29% 14.41% 33.15% 6.35% 75.70% 0.00%
Aragón 0.814 0.60% 17.60% 28.83% 6.35% 76.00% 0.00%
Asturias 0.563 0.39% 18.27% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 74.47%
Baleares 0.891 0.36% 14.05% 33.15% 6.35% 75.61% 0.00%
Canarias 0.890 1.22% 14.18% 33.15% 6.35% 75.64% 0.00%
Cantabria 0.528 0.00% 16.51% 33.15% 6.35% 76.14% 0.00%
C.-León 0.689 1.51% 16.31% 33.15% 6.35% 76.12% 0.00%
C.-Mancha 0.721 2.07% 14.16% 33.15% 6.35% 75.63% 0.00%
Cataluña 0.878 1.17% 16.58% 33.15% 6.35% 76.14% 0.00%
Valencia 0.757 0.90% 14.78% 33.15% 6.35% 75.79% 0.00%
Extremadura 0.662 4.00% 13.28% 33.15% 6.35% 75.41% 0.00%
Gal ic ia 0.532 1.16% 14.27% 33.15% 6.35% 75.66% 0.00%
Madrid 0.693 0.81% 15.71% 33.15% 6.35% 76.04% 0.00%
Murcia 0.628 1.78% 13.42% 33.15% 6.35% 75.45% 0.00%
Navarra 0.948 0.18% 17.57% 29.76% 6.35% 0.00% 74.78%
P. Vasco 0.799 0.00% 18.55% 34.91% 6.35% 0.00% 71.48%
Rioja 0.581 0.11% 15.82% 33.15% 6.35% 76.06% 0.00%
Spain 0.736 2.29% 15.68% 33.15% 6.35% 76.03% 0.00%
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: Reference wages (used to compute the tax and benefit parameters and to normalize expenditure per
student) and employment probabilities (po and ps) are those corresponding to the average worker with
primary or no schooling.
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Table A.41: Data used in the calculation of the private rate of return to upper secondary
schooling
______________________________________________________________________
U H qus ms m po ps
Andalucía 60.5 42.5 11.76% 0.19% 21.96% 70.29% 52.33%
Aragón 60.5 42.5 8.49% 1.14% 25.54% 87.92% 71.83%
Asturias 60.5 42.5 7.95% 0.87% 22.22% 75.54% 42.89%
Baleares 60.5 42.5 12.66% 1.42% 28.33% 86.90% 77.52%
Canarias 60.5 42.5 10.71% 0.77% 29.75% 80.51% 71.98%
Cantabria 60.5 42.5 8.87% 0.36% 22.57% 72.37% 38.18%
Cast. y León 60.5 42.5 10.01% 0.53% 24.17% 81.27% 57.08%
Cast.-Mancha 60.5 42.5 12.25% 0.07% 24.25% 82.56% 60.84%
Cataluña 60.5 42.5 10.33% 2.61% 26.72% 83.83% 73.91%
Valencia 60.5 42.5 11.12% 1.10% 26.00% 79.00% 60.28%
Extremadura 60.5 42.5 11.10% -0.29% 20.49% 74.47% 52.01%
Gal ic ia 60.5 42.5 11.17% 0.73% 28.15% 76.06% 41.69%
Madrid 60.5 42.5 9.94% 3.06% 22.09% 78.54% 54.99%
Murcia 60.5 42.5 9.59% 0.22% 20.36% 80.42% 52.03%
Navarra 60.5 42.5 6.51% 0.65% 31.58% 89.25% 84.64%
P. Vasco 60.5 42.5 7.98% 1.92% 30.73% 76.61% 61.20%
Rioja 60.5 42.5 11.74% 0.50% 25.30% 81.75% 47.63%
Spain 60.5 42.5 10.98% 1.24% 25.01% 78.66% 59.20%
h e to T' ts a b
Andalucía 0.744 3.36% 15.22% 33.15% 6.35% 75.91% 0.00%
Aragón 0.817 1.14% 17.60% 28.83% 6.35% 76.00% 0.00%
Asturias 0.568 2.62% 18.34% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 74.07%
Baleares 0.892 1.21% 15.08% 33.15% 6.35% 75.87% 0.00%
Canarias 0.894 1.88% 15.68% 33.15% 6.35% 76.03% 0.00%
Cantabria 0.528 1.68% 18.03% 28.83% 6.35% 75.92% 0.00%
C.-León 0.702 1.87% 17.50% 28.83% 6.35% 76.02% 0.00%
C.-Mancha 0.737 1.61% 15.80% 33.15% 6.35% 76.06% 0.00%
Cataluña 0.882 1.77% 17.33% 28.83% 6.35% 76.05% 0.00%
Valencia 0.763 2.50% 16.28% 33.15% 6.35% 76.11% 0.00%
Extremadura 0.698 2.85% 16.56% 33.15% 6.35% 76.14% 0.00%
Gal ic ia 0.548 1.81% 16.13% 33.15% 6.35% 76.10% 0.00%
Madrid 0.700 2.60% 16.45% 33.15% 6.35% 76.13% 0.00%
Murcia 0.647 1.70% 17.09% 28.83% 6.35% 76.09% 0.00%
Navarra 0.948 0.00% 17.92% 29.76% 6.35% 0.00% 72.84%
P. Vasco 0.799 2.59% 18.89% 29.76% 6.35% 0.00% 70.12%
Rioja 0.583 1.56% 17.07% 28.83% 6.35% 76.09% 0.00%
Spain 0.753 2.19% 16.68% 33.15% 6.35% 76.15% 0.00%
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: Reference wages (used to compute the tax and benefit parameters and to normalize expenditure per
student) and employment probabilities (po and ps) are those corresponding to the average worker with
lower secondary schooling.
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Table A.42: Data used in the calculation of the private rate of return to lower vocational
training
______________________________________________________________________
U H qlv ms m po ps
Andalucía 60.5 44.5 11.52% 0.19% 21.96% 70.29% 52.33%
Aragón 60.5 44.5 8.26% 1.14% 25.54% 87.92% 71.83%
Asturias 60.5 44.5 11.22% 0.87% 22.22% 75.54% 42.89%
Baleares 60.5 44.5 21.68% 1.42% 28.33% 86.90% 77.52%
Canarias 60.5 44.5 9.05% 0.77% 29.75% 80.51% 71.98%
Cantabria 60.5 44.5 11.27% 0.36% 22.57% 72.37% 38.18%
Cast. y León 60.5 44.5 10.63% 0.53% 24.17% 81.27% 57.08%
Cast.-Mancha 60.5 44.5 13.21% 0.07% 24.25% 82.56% 60.84%
Cataluña 60.5 44.5 12.24% 2.61% 26.72% 83.83% 73.91%
Valencia 60.5 44.5 9.80% 1.10% 26.00% 79.00% 60.28%
Extremadura 60.5 44.5 11.28% -0.29% 20.49% 74.47% 52.01%
Gal ic ia 60.5 44.5 14.38% 0.73% 28.15% 76.06% 41.69%
Madrid 60.5 44.5 9.40% 3.06% 22.09% 78.54% 54.99%
Murcia 60.5 44.5 8.97% 0.22% 20.36% 80.42% 52.03%
Navarra 60.5 44.5 10.17% 0.65% 31.58% 89.25% 84.64%
P. Vasco 60.5 44.5 9.39% 1.92% 30.73% 76.61% 61.20%
Rioja 60.5 44.5 15.07% 0.50% 25.30% 81.75% 47.63%
Spain 60.5 44.5 12.53% 1.24% 25.01% 78.66% 59.20%
h e to T' ts a b
Andalucía 0.744 1.23% 15.22% 33.15% 6.35% 75.91% 0.00%
Aragón 0.817 1.33% 17.60% 28.83% 6.35% 76.00% 0.00%
Asturias 0.568 2.95% 18.34% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 74.07%
Baleares 0.892 2.88% 15.08% 33.15% 6.35% 75.87% 0.00%
Canarias 0.894 0.51% 15.68% 33.15% 6.35% 76.03% 0.00%
Cantabria 0.528 0.40% 18.03% 28.83% 6.35% 75.92% 0.00%
C.-León 0.702 0.12% 17.50% 28.83% 6.35% 76.02% 0.00%
C.-Mancha 0.737 0.00% 15.80% 33.15% 6.35% 76.06% 0.00%
Cataluña 0.882 1.76% 17.33% 28.83% 6.35% 76.05% 0.00%
Valencia 0.763 1.55% 16.28% 33.15% 6.35% 76.11% 0.00%
Extremadura 0.698 0.00% 16.56% 33.15% 6.35% 76.14% 0.00%
Gal ic ia 0.548 0.08% 16.13% 33.15% 6.35% 76.10% 0.00%
Madrid 0.700 3.25% 16.45% 33.15% 6.35% 76.13% 0.00%
Murcia 0.647 0.00% 17.09% 28.83% 6.35% 76.09% 0.00%
Navarra 0.948 0.72% 17.92% 29.76% 6.35% 0.00% 72.84%
P. Vasco 0.799 2.10% 18.89% 29.76% 6.35% 0.00% 70.12%
Rioja 0.583 2.69% 17.07% 28.83% 6.35% 76.09% 0.00%
Spain 0.753 1.40% 16.68% 33.15% 6.35% 76.15% 0.00%
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: Reference wages (used to compute the tax and benefit parameters and to normalize expenditure per
student) and employment probabilities (po and ps) are those corresponding to the average worker with
lower secondary schooling.
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Table A.43: Data used in the calculation of the private rate of return to upper vocational
training
______________________________________________________________________
U H quv ms m po ps
Andalucía 60.5 41.5 7.47% 0.15% 17.45% 72.01% 54.05%
Aragón 60.5 41.5 5.71% 0.96% 21.65% 90.26% 74.17%
Asturias 60.5 41.5 1.89% 0.69% 17.75% 79.99% 47.34%
Baleares 60.5 41.5 0.00% 0.92% 18.36% 91.90% 82.52%
Canarias 60.5 41.5 5.13% 0.65% 24.82% 81.33% 72.80%
Cantabria 60.5 41.5 1.93% 0.28% 18.01% 72.95% 38.76%
Cast. y León 60.5 41.5 6.47% 0.43% 19.54% 81.46% 57.28%
Cast.-Mancha 60.5 41.5 8.09% 0.06% 18.62% 82.56% 60.84%
Cataluña 60.5 41.5 5.53% 2.04% 20.92% 86.77% 76.86%
Valencia 60.5 41.5 7.18% 0.90% 21.37% 81.45% 62.72%
Extremadura 60.5 41.5 1.97% -0.23% 16.35% 74.47% 52.01%
Gal ic ia 60.5 41.5 4.76% 0.55% 21.12% 76.18% 41.80%
Madrid 60.5 41.5 8.55% 2.53% 18.30% 83.64% 60.09%
Murcia 60.5 41.5 1.94% 0.18% 17.01% 80.42% 52.03%
Navarra 60.5 41.5 4.78% 0.53% 25.77% 90.53% 85.93%
P. Vasco 60.5 41.5 3.73% 1.59% 25.47% 79.83% 64.43%
Rioja 60.5 41.5 1.55% 0.37% 18.72% 86.15% 52.03%
Spain 60.5 41.5 6.24% 0.97% 19.47% 80.86% 61.40%
h e to T' ts a b
Andalucía 0.751 2.29% 18.33% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 74.10%
Aragón 0.822 0.72% 19.31% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 67.72%
Asturias 0.592 1.05% 20.45% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 60.09%
Baleares 0.898 0.68% 20.19% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 61.80%
Canarias 0.895 1.80% 18.09% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 75.68%
Cantabria 0.531 4.25% 20.21% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 61.72%
C.-León 0.703 2.34% 19.67% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 65.32%
C.-Mancha 0.737 1.65% 19.01% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 69.71%
Cataluña 0.886 0.91% 19.83% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 64.27%
Valencia 0.770 2.05% 18.61% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 72.33%
Extremadura 0.698 3.71% 19.07% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 69.32%
Gal ic ia 0.549 2.88% 19.42% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 67.00%
Madrid 0.718 0.57% 18.63% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 72.17%
Murcia 0.647 1.95% 19.02% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 69.63%
Navarra 0.949 0.88% 20.10% 29.76% 6.35% 0.00% 60.47%
P. Vasco 0.807 2.56% 20.75% 29.76% 6.35% 0.00% 58.92%
Rioja 0.604 0.73% 20.13% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 62.24%
Spain 0.759 1.75% 19.38% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 67.27%
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: Reference wages (used to compute the tax and benefit parameters and to normalize expenditure per
student) and employment probabilities (po and ps) are those corresponding to the average worker with
lower vocational training.
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Table A.44: Data used in the calculation of the private rate of return to lower university
schooling
______________________________________________________________________
U H qlu ms m po ps
Andalucía 60.5 39.5 7.03% 1.99% 13.43% 79.73% 71.87%
Aragón 60.5 39.5 7.25% 4.26% 17.55% 91.94% 85.93%
Asturias 60.5 39.5 10.72% 2.96% 15.71% 83.45% 68.96%
Baleares 60.5 39.5 7.58% 3.78% 12.13% 91.12% 89.27%
Canarias 60.5 39.5 9.89% 1.33% 16.50% 86.58% 85.91%
Cantabria 60.5 39.5 5.39% 4.52% 21.70% 77.24% 74.23%
Cast. y León 60.5 39.5 7.53% 2.72% 15.52% 87.35% 72.00%
Cast.-Mancha 60.5 39.5 8.82% 1.14% 15.17% 87.87% 76.61%
Cataluña 60.5 39.5 9.55% 6.80% 17.70% 89.76% 83.62%
Valencia 60.5 39.5 7.30% 3.24% 17.36% 86.89% 76.84%
Extremadura 60.5 39.5 6.58% -0.36% 13.78% 82.95% 74.46%
Gal ic ia 60.5 39.5 9.38% 2.31% 14.36% 81.58% 60.83%
Madrid 60.5 39.5 11.34% 8.24% 20.93% 86.69% 84.71%
Murcia 60.5 39.5 5.01% 2.92% 16.84% 85.88% 75.53%
Navarra 60.5 39.5 9.92% 6.10% 13.40% 89.25% 84.72%
P. Vasco 60.5 39.5 8.23% 4.07% 13.09% 84.55% 73.04%
Rioja 60.5 39.5 5.90% 3.47% 27.12% 86.87% 70.98%
Spain 60.5 39.5 9.02% 4.17% 16.27% 85.54% 76.33%
h e to T' ts a b
Andalucía 0.901 1.80% 20.57% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 59.22%
Aragón 0.935 0.18% 20.83% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 57.45%
Asturias 0.826 1.15% 21.33% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 55.06%
Baleares 0.980 0.42% 20.80% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 57.67%
Canarias 0.992 1.57% 20.44% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 60.13%
Cantabria 0.961 3.27% 21.42% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 54.67%
C.-León 0.824 0.56% 21.39% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 54.77%
C.-Mancha 0.872 0.91% 21.02% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 56.39%
Cataluña 0.932 0.90% 21.37% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 54.87%
Valencia 0.884 0.88% 20.86% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 57.29%
Extremadura 0.898 0.81% 21.01% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 56.44%
Gal ic ia 0.746 2.32% 20.80% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 57.67%
Madrid 0.977 0.28% 20.56% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 59.34%
Murcia 0.879 0.89% 20.83% 28.83% 6.35% 0.00% 57.46%
Navarra 0.949 1.72% 20.63% 29.76% 6.35% 0.00% 57.34%
P. Vasco 0.864 2.10% 21.92% 34.45% 6.35% 0.00% 52.01%
Rioja 0.817 1.35% 21.75% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 53.20%
Spain 0.892 0.97% 21.04% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 56.31%
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: Reference wages (used to compute the tax and benefit parameters and to normalize expenditure per
student) and employment probabilities (po and ps) are those corresponding to the average worker with
upper secondary schooling.
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Table A.45: Data used in the calculation of the private rate of return to upper university
schooling
______________________________________________________________________
U H quu ms m po ps
Andalucía 60.5 37.5 13.86% 1.61% 10.87% 84.05% 76.18%
Aragón 60.5 37.5 14.23% 3.43% 14.11% 92.43% 86.42%
Asturias 60.5 37.5 6.44% 2.14% 11.39% 86.34% 71.85%
Baleares 60.5 37.5 4.92% 3.01% 9.66% 92.27% 90.42%
Canarias 60.5 37.5 15.23% 0.99% 12.26% 90.66% 90.00%
Cantabria 60.5 37.5 20.04% 3.85% 18.46% 84.82% 81.81%
Cast. y León 60.5 37.5 14.78% 2.17% 12.38% 88.82% 73.46%
Cast.-Mancha 60.5 37.5 6.70% 0.87% 11.64% 90.28% 79.01%
Cataluña 60.5 37.5 12.84% 5.11% 13.29% 92.19% 86.05%
Valencia 60.5 37.5 9.91% 2.60% 13.95% 89.18% 79.13%
Extremadura 60.5 37.5 16.18% -0.29% 11.31% 84.96% 76.48%
Gal ic ia 60.5 37.5 11.93% 1.74% 10.84% 87.26% 66.51%
Madrid 60.5 37.5 15.41% 5.86% 14.90% 87.42% 85.44%
Murcia 60.5 37.5 13.60% 2.51% 14.49% 88.17% 77.82%
Navarra 60.5 37.5 12.72% 4.53% 9.95% 93.84% 89.32%
P. Vasco 60.5 37.5 15.61% 3.18% 10.22% 89.87% 78.37%
Rioja 60.5 37.5 11.49% 2.91% 22.72% 90.37% 74.49%
Spain 60.5 37.5 15.32% 3.18% 12.41% 88.02% 78.81%
h e to T' ts a b
Andalucía 0.906 0.38% 22.76% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 48.68%
Aragón 0.935 0.27% 23.14% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 46.95%
Asturias 0.832 0.70% 24.27% 28.30% 6.35% 0.00% 40.70%
Baleares 0.980 0.86% 23.20% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 46.68%
Canarias 0.993 0.24% 23.44% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 45.58%
Cantabria 0.964 0.46% 23.13% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 47.03%
C.-León 0.827 0.00% 23.71% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 44.34%
C.-Mancha 0.875 0.00% 23.77% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 44.05%
Cataluña 0.933 0.00% 24.14% 28.30% 6.35% 0.00% 41.93%
Valencia 0.887 0.42% 23.19% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 46.76%
Extremadura 0.900 1.63% 23.13% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 47.00%
Gal ic ia 0.762 0.38% 23.71% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 44.35%
Madrid 0.977 0.15% 23.97% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 43.14%
Murcia 0.883 0.22% 22.46% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 50.03%
Navarra 0.952 0.00% 24.38% 32.57% 6.35% 0.00% 43.83%
P. Vasco 0.872 0.00% 24.39% 30.00% 6.35% 0.00% 41.41%
Rioja 0.824 0.00% 23.55% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 45.07%
Spain 0.895 0.12% 23.84% 32.85% 6.35% 0.00% 43.73%
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: Reference wages (used to compute the tax and benefit parameters and to normalize expenditure per
student) and employment probabilities (po and ps) are those corresponding to the average worker with
lower university schooling.
- In Asturias, País Vasco and Cataluña, the upper ceiling on Social Security contributions is binding for
estimated average earnings at this level (i.e. those corresponding to the average worker with lower
university attainment). As a result, the marginal Social Security tax rate is zero. This accounts for the
atypically low value given for T' in the table for these regions.
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Table A.46: Estimated private returns to schooling, summary of resuls, Mincerian and by level
all-in rates of return (OBS)
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Extremadura 10.73% 7.03% 12.67% 11.76% 2.01% 7.51% 18.92%
Madrid 10.34% -0.15% 10.24% 10.31% 8.65% 11.80% 16.50%
C.-Mancha 10.17% 3.29% 7.80% 13.64% 8.93% 10.10% 7.83%
Baleares 9.76% 0.74% 13.60% 22.54% -6.46% 9.07% 6.17%
Cataluña 9.51% 1.46% 11.91% 14.15% 6.46% 10.36% 15.24%
Murcia 9.42% 7.70% 10.07% 10.06% 1.16% 5.78% 14.75%
Canarias 8.99% 2.70% 11.71% 9.95% 5.58% 12.12% 17.95%
Valencia 8.75% 2.57% 13.11% 10.67% 7.85% 8.54% 11.37%
C.-León 8.43% 3.18% 12.17% 11.96% 7.57% 8.24% 16.14%
Galicia 8.41% 3.29% 12.14% 14.06% 5.22% 10.76% 13.21%
Andalucía 8.36% 1.36% 12.21% 12.00% 7.28% 8.26% 15.06%
Rioja 8.29% 2.10% 11.52% 16.57% -0.06% 6.84% 12.70%
País Vasco 7.66% -3.41% 10.62% 9.53% 4.80% 9.49% 17.93%
Cantabria 7.59% 4.09% 11.08% 12.23% 2.63% 6.81% 21.03%
Navarra 7.30% -1.49% 7.28% 11.49% 6.06% 11.52% 14.64%
Aragón 7.22% -7.27% 8.36% 10.08% 6.71% 8.45% 16.08%
Asturias 6.85% -5.97% 13.04% 10.73% 0.77% 11.40% 8.21%
Spain 9.50% 1.66% 11.93% 13.23% 6.96% 9.73% 16.76%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Extremadura 112.9 423.6 106.1 88.8 28.9 77.1 112.9
Madrid 108.8 -8.8 85.8 77.9 124.2 121.2 98.5
Cast. la M. 107.1 198.1 65.4 103.1 128.2 103.8 46.7
Baleares 102.7 44.3 113.9 170.3 -92.7 93.2 36.8
Cataluña 100.1 87.8 99.8 107.0 92.8 106.4 90.9
Murcia 99.1 463.8 84.4 76.1 16.7 59.4 88.0
Canarias 94.7 162.9 98.2 75.2 80.1 124.5 107.1
Valencia 92.1 154.9 109.9 80.7 112.7 87.8 67.9
Cast. y León 88.7 191.3 102.0 90.4 108.8 84.7 96.3
Galicia 88.5 198.4 101.7 106.3 74.9 110.6 78.8
Andalucía 87.9 81.9 102.3 90.7 104.5 84.8 89.9
Rioja 87.3 126.2 96.5 125.2 -0.8 70.3 75.8
País Vasco 80.6 -205.1 89.0 72.0 69.0 97.5 107.0
Cantabria 79.8 246.4 92.9 92.4 37.8 70.0 125.5
Navarra 76.8 -89.9 61.0 86.8 87.0 118.3 87.4
Aragón 76.0 -437.9 70.0 76.2 96.3 86.8 96.0
Asturias 72.1 -359.7 109.3 81.1 11.1 117.1 49.0
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.47: Estimated private returns to schooling, summary of resuls, Mincerian and by level
raw rates of return (NO GOV'T)
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Extremadura 12.25% 9.39% 13.72% 11.31% 5.91% 8.52% 20.17%
Andalucía 12.22% 5.45% 14.44% 12.36% 10.20% 10.15% 16.47%
Madrid 11.68% 1.08% 12.37% 12.50% 9.70% 12.46% 17.42%
Baleares 10.59% 0.94% 13.52% 22.90% -3.76% 9.71% 7.08%
Cataluña 10.55% 2.53% 11.97% 13.70% 6.91% 11.65% 14.81%
C.-Mancha 10.53% 4.86% 13.51% 12.95% 10.30% 11.02% 7.88%
Canarias 10.38% 3.36% 11.95% 9.28% 7.03% 12.93% 17.98%
Valencia 10.35% 3.13% 12.98% 11.01% 9.53% 9.10% 11.84%
Galicia 10.29% 3.79% 11.66% 12.90% 7.51% 12.76% 14.06%
Murcia 9.93% 8.63% 11.40% 9.23% 3.57% 6.47% 15.41%
C.-León 9.66% 4.21% 11.63% 10.64% 9.19% 9.09% 16.62%
Cantabria 9.16% 3.62% 10.02% 11.04% 6.12% 9.06% 21.49%
Rioja 8.66% 1.87% 12.55% 16.37% 0.79% 7.12% 11.86%
P. Vasco 8.59% -3.20% 9.77% 10.60% 6.14% 11.85% 18.08%
Asturias 8.30% -3.80% 10.23% 13.44% 1.99% 12.98% 8.32%
Aragón 7.59% -3.58% 9.79% 9.79% 6.83% 8.42% 16.46%
Navarra 7.26% -1.52% 6.39% 10.70% 5.81% 13.51% 15.31%
Spain 11.32% 3.80% 12.68% 13.37% 8.42% 11.16% 17.51%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Extremadura 108.2 247.1 108.1 84.6 70.2 76.4 115.2
Andalucía 108.0 143.4 113.9 92.5 121.0 91.0 94.0
Madrid 103.2 28.4 97.6 93.5 115.1 111.7 99.5
Baleares 93.6 24.8 106.6 171.3 -44.6 87.0 40.4
Cataluña 93.2 66.6 94.3 102.5 82.0 104.4 84.6
C.-Mancha 93.0 127.8 106.5 96.9 122.3 98.8 45.0
Canarias 91.7 88.4 94.2 69.4 83.4 115.9 102.7
Valencia 91.5 82.5 102.4 82.4 113.1 81.5 67.6
Galicia 90.9 99.9 91.9 96.5 89.1 114.4 80.3
Murcia 87.7 227.3 89.8 69.0 42.4 58.0 88.0
C.-León 85.4 111.0 91.7 79.6 109.1 81.5 94.9
Cantabria 81.0 95.3 79.0 82.6 72.6 81.2 122.7
Rioja 76.5 49.3 98.9 122.5 9.4 63.8 67.7
P. Vasco 75.9 -84.2 77.0 79.3 72.8 106.2 103.3
Asturias 73.3 -100.0 80.6 100.6 23.7 116.4 47.5
Aragón 67.0 -94.3 77.2 73.3 81.0 75.5 94.0
Navarra 64.2 -40.1 50.4 80.0 69.0 121.1 87.4
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.48: Estimated tax wedge --total (all government)
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Andalucía 3.86% 4.09% 1.78% 0.36% 2.92% 1.89% 1.41%
Galicia 1.88% 0.50% 0.14% -1.16% 2.29% 2.00% 0.85%
Valencia 1.60% 0.56% 0.85% 0.33% 1.68% 0.55% 0.47%
Cantabria 1.58% -0.47% -0.05% -1.19% 3.49% 2.25% 0.46%
Extremadura 1.52% 2.35% 1.51% -0.45% 3.90% 1.02% 1.24%
Asturias 1.45% 2.18% 2.43% 2.71% 1.22% 1.59% 0.11%
Canarias 1.39% 0.65% 0.04% -0.67% 1.45% 0.81% 0.03%
Madrid 1.34% 1.22% 1.75% 2.19% 1.05% 0.66% 0.92%
C.-León 1.23% 1.04% -0.09% -1.32% 1.61% 0.85% 0.48%
Cataluña 1.04% 1.07% -0.21% -0.46% 0.45% 1.29% -0.42%
P. Vasco 0.92% 0.21% 1.41% 1.07% 1.33% 2.36% 0.15%
Baleares 0.83% 0.21% -0.08% 0.36% 2.70% 0.63% 0.91%
Murcia 0.51% 0.93% 0.31% -0.84% 2.41% 0.68% 0.66%
Rioja 0.37% -0.22% -0.49% -0.20% 0.85% 0.28% -0.84%
Aragón 0.36% 3.69% -0.45% -0.28% 0.12% -0.03% 0.38%
C.-Mancha 0.36% 1.57% 0.40% -0.69% 1.38% 0.92% 0.05%
Navarra -0.03% -0.03% -0.90% -0.79% -0.25% 1.99% 0.67%
Spain 1.82% 2.14% 0.75% 0.14% 1.46% 1.42% 0.75%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Andalucía 212.8 191.3 236.8 269.0 199.9 133.0 186.2
Galicia 103.4 23.4 19.2 -859.7 156.7 140.3 112.6
Valencia 88.2 26.3 113.1 247.9 114.9 38.9 61.9
Cantabria 86.9 -22.1 -7.0 -882.2 238.8 158.1 61.4
Extremadura 83.4 110.0 201.4 -332.2 267.1 71.4 164.9
Asturias 79.7 101.8 323.3 2008.6 83.4 111.7 13.9
Canarias 76.4 30.6 5.1 -495.2 99.3 57.0 4.4
Madrid 73.7 57.3 233.5 1623.7 71.7 46.5 121.3
C.-León 67.8 48.5 -11.3 -978.8 110.5 59.5 63.6
Cataluña 57.1 50.2 -27.5 -337.9 30.8 90.7 -55.8
P. Vasco 50.9 9.7 187.9 791.5 91.2 166.0 19.8
Baleares 45.5 9.7 -10.5 265.7 184.6 44.5 120.4
Murcia 28.0 43.6 41.4 -619.2 164.7 48.0 87.6
Rioja 20.4 -10.5 -65.8 -147.6 58.1 19.4 -110.7
Aragón 20.0 172.7 -59.7 -210.1 8.2 -2.3 50.4
C.-Mancha 19.5 73.2 53.5 -512.4 94.1 64.9 6.3
Navarra -1.8 -1.3 -119.3 -587.6 -17.1 140.1 88.8
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.49: Estimated wedge induced by educational subsidies
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Extremadura 3.38% 3.67% 4.06% 3.33% 1.68% 1.75% 3.14%
Canarias 3.09% 2.19% 4.68% 3.66% 2.53% 2.55% 2.55%
Andalucía 2.86% 2.39% 4.76% 4.04% 2.66% 1.63% 2.00%
C.-Mancha 2.76% 2.11% 4.20% 4.01% 2.51% 1.96% 1.17%
Galicia 2.71% 2.16% 4.23% 4.65% 2.23% 1.98% 1.57%
Rioja 2.61% 1.49% 3.88% 5.10% 1.03% 2.28% 2.80%
Valencia 2.59% 1.82% 4.30% 3.63% 2.61% 1.66% 1.66%
Murcia 2.46% 2.93% 2.98% 2.43% 1.27% 1.33% 2.27%
Cantabria 2.43% 1.82% 3.14% 3.40% 1.78% 2.24% 4.05%
C.-León 2.27% 1.91% 3.54% 3.23% 2.35% 1.49% 2.06%
Baleares 2.19% 1.45% 4.53% 7.91% 0.75% 1.01% 0.67%
Cataluña 2.10% 1.57% 3.65% 4.16% 1.82% 1.48% 1.40%
P. Vasco 2.07% 1.22% 3.89% 4.15% 2.27% 1.34% 1.52%
Asturias 1.80% 0.89% 2.95% 3.82% 1.12% 2.10% 1.06%
Navarra 1.79% 1.33% 2.76% 4.09% 2.16% 1.16% 0.96%
Madrid 1.75% 1.10% 3.03% 3.04% 1.93% 1.87% 1.91%
Aragón 1.73% 0.93% 2.95% 2.91% 1.90% 1.40% 2.07%
Spain 2.43% 1.88% 4.01% 4.21% 2.15% 1.69% 1.98%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Extremadura 139.0 195.0 101.1 78.9 78.0 103.3 158.2
Canarias 127.0 116.4 116.6 86.8 117.5 150.6 128.5
Andalucía 117.7 127.2 118.6 95.9 123.5 96.4 101.0
C.-Mancha 113.3 112.4 104.7 95.1 116.7 115.7 59.2
Galicia 111.4 115.0 105.4 110.4 103.7 116.8 79.0
Rioja 107.1 79.0 96.6 120.9 47.7 134.6 141.1
Valencia 106.3 96.9 107.2 86.2 121.2 98.2 83.8
Murcia 101.0 155.8 74.1 57.8 58.9 78.8 114.5
Cantabria 99.8 96.8 78.2 80.7 82.6 132.1 204.3
C.-León 93.4 101.7 88.3 76.6 109.0 88.1 103.7
Baleares 90.0 77.0 112.8 187.7 35.0 59.7 33.8
Cataluña 86.5 83.3 91.0 98.8 84.4 87.4 70.7
P. Vasco 85.0 64.7 96.8 98.4 105.3 79.3 76.9
Asturias 74.1 47.1 73.6 90.7 51.8 124.0 53.6
Navarra 73.6 70.6 68.8 96.9 100.3 68.6 48.2
Madrid 72.0 58.3 75.5 72.2 89.7 110.7 96.4
Aragón 71.3 49.2 73.5 69.2 88.1 82.8 104.3
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.50: Estimated wedge induced by personal taxes
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Murcia 1.08% 1.85% 1.37% 1.35% 0.24% 0.50% 1.68%
C.-Mancha 1.06% 0.84% 2.72% 2.98% 0.90% 1.28% 0.73%
Galicia 1.05% 1.04% 2.41% 3.11% 0.52% 0.82% 1.26%
Extremadura 1.03% 1.50% 2.31% 2.45% 0.12% 0.95% 1.51%
Baleares 1.00% 0.85% 2.99% 5.06% -0.13% 0.71% 0.59%
Canarias 0.97% 0.87% 2.43% 2.13% 0.65% 0.79% 1.42%
Rioja 0.95% 1.00% 1.69% 2.13% 0.27% 0.88% 1.28%
Valencia 0.94% 0.91% 2.39% 2.14% 0.85% 0.67% 1.13%
Andalucía 0.86% 0.32% 2.66% 2.67% 0.89% 0.60% 1.57%
C.-León 0.83% 0.79% 1.36% 1.50% 0.65% 1.15% 1.53%
Madrid 0.81% 0.59% 2.13% 2.00% 1.12% 1.21% 1.63%
Cataluña 0.80% 0.61% 1.45% 1.71% 0.61% 1.46% 0.38%
Cantabria 0.79% 1.20% 1.18% 1.50% 0.12% 0.73% 2.25%
Navarra 0.71% 0.39% 1.05% 1.45% 0.54% 1.10% 1.15%
Aragón 0.66% -0.08% 1.17% 1.13% 0.68% 0.72% 1.59%
Asturias 0.58% 0.10% 1.00% 1.39% 0.26% 1.54% 0.11%
P. Vasco 0.57% 0.68% 1.02% 1.21% 0.34% 1.32% 0.74%
Spain 0.86% 0.52% 2.31% 2.64% 0.68% 1.43% 1.55%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Murcia 125.5 358.8 59.5 51.3 35.6 34.7 107.9
C.-Mancha 123.4 163.2 118.0 112.8 132.2 89.2 46.8
Galicia 122.6 200.9 104.6 117.8 76.7 57.3 80.8
Extremadura 120.2 291.6 100.0 92.7 18.0 66.6 96.8
Baleares 116.9 164.6 129.7 191.5 -19.2 49.4 38.0
Canarias 112.9 169.3 105.2 80.7 95.4 54.9 91.5
Rioja 110.9 193.2 73.0 80.6 38.8 61.3 82.3
Valencia 109.6 177.0 103.4 81.0 125.1 47.1 72.5
Andalucía 99.8 61.6 115.4 101.0 130.9 41.8 101.2
C.-León 96.2 153.4 58.9 56.7 94.6 80.3 98.4
Madrid 94.8 115.3 92.2 75.5 164.1 84.9 104.9
Cataluña 93.5 117.9 62.9 64.8 89.0 102.0 24.8
Cantabria 92.3 232.2 51.0 56.9 17.2 51.1 144.7
Navarra 82.6 75.9 45.4 55.0 79.2 77.0 74.2
Aragón 76.5 -14.8 50.8 42.7 100.0 50.4 102.4
Asturias 67.9 18.6 43.4 52.6 38.3 107.6 7.2
P. Vasco 66.0 132.3 44.2 45.8 49.8 91.9 47.6
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.51: Estimated wedge induced by unemployment benefits
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Andalucía 5.87% 6.16% 3.87% 1.74% 4.69% 2.93% 1.83%
Extremadura 3.86% 4.52% 3.26% 0.43% 5.46% 1.81% 2.88%
Galicia 3.54% 1.63% 1.96% 0.38% 4.00% 3.15% 1.16%
Canarias 3.51% 1.97% 2.29% 0.86% 3.33% 2.57% 1.16%
Valencia 3.25% 1.47% 2.77% 1.83% 3.43% 1.54% 1.00%
Cantabria 3.21% 0.15% 1.91% 0.71% 5.15% 3.75% 2.26%
C.-León 2.68% 2.16% 2.10% 0.41% 3.31% 1.19% 1.01%
Asturias 2.67% 2.97% 4.38% 5.15% 2.07% 2.15% 1.06%
P. Vasco 2.43% 0.74% 4.28% 4.01% 3.26% 2.39% 0.93%
Cataluña 2.34% 2.03% 1.99% 2.00% 1.66% 1.31% 0.60%
Madrid 2.27% 1.73% 2.65% 3.24% 1.86% 1.32% 1.19%
C.-Mancha 2.05% 2.84% 1.88% 0.33% 2.98% 1.60% 0.49%
Rioja 2.02% 0.27% 1.70% 2.77% 1.61% 1.68% 0.68%
Baleares 2.01% 0.81% 1.45% 3.21% 3.58% 0.94% 0.99%
Murcia 1.89% 2.01% 1.91% 0.24% 3.43% 1.52% 1.25%
Aragón 1.44% 4.69% 1.33% 1.50% 1.33% 0.65% 0.86%
Navarra 1.05% 0.91% 0.82% 1.84% 1.37% 2.05% 0.47%
Spain 3.39% 3.50% 2.46% 1.71% 2.93% 1.68% 1.18%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Andalucía 173.2 176.0 157.7 101.7 159.9 173.8 155.1
Extremadura 114.0 128.9 132.7 25.1 186.3 107.6 243.2
Galicia 104.3 46.4 79.8 22.3 136.4 187.2 98.1
Canarias 103.4 56.3 93.3 50.3 113.6 152.9 97.8
Valencia 95.8 42.0 112.6 107.1 117.2 91.6 84.7
Cantabria 94.8 4.3 77.7 41.4 175.7 222.9 191.4
C.-León 79.0 61.7 85.5 23.9 113.1 70.6 85.1
Asturias 78.6 84.7 178.3 301.5 70.7 127.6 89.3
P. Vasco 71.6 21.2 174.1 234.7 111.2 141.8 79.0
Cataluña 69.0 58.0 81.2 117.0 56.6 77.8 50.4
Madrid 67.1 49.3 108.0 189.9 63.4 78.4 101.1
C.-Mancha 60.5 81.0 76.6 19.6 101.8 95.3 41.7
Rioja 59.7 7.6 69.2 162.2 54.9 99.6 57.6
Baleares 59.4 23.0 59.2 188.0 122.2 55.6 83.5
Murcia 55.7 57.4 77.9 14.3 117.1 90.3 105.9
Aragón 42.5 134.0 54.1 88.1 45.5 38.4 72.5
Navarra 30.9 25.9 33.3 107.6 46.7 121.9 40.0
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
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Table A.52: Estimated effective tax rate --total (all government)
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Andalucía 31.62% 43.90% 12.30% 2.94% 28.65% 18.64% 8.54%
Galicia 18.26% 56.98% 1.24% -9.00% 30.51% 15.64% 6.05%
Asturias 17.44% 23.72% 20.18% 61.16% 12.23% 1.26%
Cantabria 17.22% 50.28% -0.53% -10.79% 57.03% 24.82% 2.16%
Valencia 15.47% 58.11% 6.54% 3.04% 17.63% 6.09% 3.95%
Canarias 13.37% 65.18% 0.32% -7.21% 20.64% 6.27% 0.18%
C.-León 12.75% 45.38% -0.73% -12.43% 17.57% 9.31% 2.89%
Extremadura 12.37% 39.06% 11.02% -3.97% 66.01% 11.92% 6.17%
Madrid 11.46% 101.60% 14.16% 17.54% 10.81% 5.31% 5.26%
P. Vasco 10.77% 14.43% 10.09% 21.73% 19.93% 0.83%
Cataluña 9.84% 61.87% -1.72% -3.33% 6.51% 11.08% -2.84%
Baleares 7.81% 153.53% -0.58% 1.57% 6.52% 12.84%
Murcia 5.12% 33.93% 2.73% -9.06% 67.45% 10.56% 4.29%
Aragón 4.79% -4.57% -2.90% 1.75% -0.39% 2.31%
Rioja 4.28% 79.39% -3.94% -1.22% 107.12% 3.88% -7.05%
C.-Mancha 3.37% 43.54% 2.97% -5.34% 13.35% 8.37% 0.61%
Navarra -0.45% -14.01% -7.42% -4.30% 14.75% 4.38%
Spain 16.05% 56.28% 5.92% 1.01% 17.35% 12.75% 4.31%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Andalucía 197.1 78.0 207.9 290.8 165.2 146.2 198.0
Galicia 113.8 101.2 20.9 -890.9 175.9 122.7 140.3
Asturias 108.7 400.9 1997.1 352.6 95.9 29.3
Cantabria 107.3 89.3 -8.9 -1068.1 328.7 194.7 50.1
Valencia 96.4 103.2 110.5 301.0 101.6 47.8 91.6
Canarias 83.3 115.8 5.4 -713.4 119.0 49.2 4.3
C.-León 79.4 80.6 -12.4 -1230.1 101.3 73.1 67.0
Extremadura 77.1 69.4 186.2 -392.7 380.5 93.5 143.1
Madrid 71.4 180.5 239.3 1736.1 62.3 41.6 121.9
P. Vasco 67.1 244.0 998.5 125.2 156.3 19.2
Cataluña 61.3 109.9 -29.1 -329.8 37.5 86.9 -65.9
Baleares 48.7 272.8 -9.8 155.1 51.1 297.8
Murcia 31.9 60.3 46.1 -896.9 388.8 82.8 99.5
Aragón 29.9 -77.3 -286.7 10.1 -3.1 53.6
Rioja 26.6 141.1 -66.6 -120.5 617.5 30.4 -163.5
C.-Mancha 21.0 77.4 50.2 -528.8 77.0 65.7 14.1
Navarra -2.8 -236.9 -734.2 -24.8 115.7 101.6
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: some entries are blank because the tax rate is not computed for those regions where baseline returns
are negative.
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Table A.53: Estimated effective subsidy rate induced by educational subsidies
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Rioja 30.08% 79.39% 30.91% 31.13% 129.63% 32.01% 23.58%
Canarias 29.74% 65.18% 39.16% 39.44% 36.00% 19.72% 14.17%
Extremadura 27.61% 39.06% 29.57% 29.41% 28.39% 20.51% 15.55%
Cantabria 26.49% 50.28% 31.32% 30.80% 29.07% 24.69% 18.84%
Galicia 26.34% 56.98% 36.28% 36.08% 29.74% 15.49% 11.14%
C.-Mancha 26.17% 43.54% 31.11% 30.95% 24.38% 17.77% 14.88%
Valencia 24.97% 58.11% 33.15% 33.01% 27.38% 18.28% 14.03%
Murcia 24.75% 33.93% 26.11% 26.38% 35.52% 20.62% 14.72%
Navarra 24.63% 43.22% 38.19% 37.17% 8.60% 6.24%
P. Vasco 24.08% 39.80% 39.15% 36.94% 11.32% 8.43%
C.-León 23.51% 45.38% 30.48% 30.37% 25.53% 16.41% 12.37%
Andalucía 23.42% 43.90% 32.95% 32.68% 26.07% 16.09% 12.16%
Aragón 22.85% 30.10% 29.76% 27.78% 16.65% 12.56%
Asturias 21.71% 28.88% 28.44% 56.00% 16.17% 12.77%
Baleares 20.67% 153.53% 33.48% 34.54% 10.41% 9.46%
Cataluña 19.94% 61.87% 30.52% 30.41% 26.29% 12.70% 9.46%
Madrid 14.99% 101.60% 24.49% 24.34% 19.92% 15.03% 10.97%
Spain 21.49% 49.51% 31.64% 31.53% 25.55% 15.17% 11.32%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Rioja 140.0 160.4 97.7 98.7 507.4 210.9 208.3
Canarias 138.4 131.7 123.8 125.1 140.9 129.9 125.2
Extremadura 128.5 78.9 93.4 93.3 111.1 135.2 137.4
Cantabria 123.3 101.6 99.0 97.7 113.8 162.7 166.5
Galicia 122.6 115.1 114.7 114.5 116.4 102.1 98.4
C.-Mancha 121.8 87.9 98.3 98.2 95.4 117.1 131.5
Valencia 116.2 117.4 104.8 104.7 107.2 120.5 123.9
Murcia 115.2 68.5 82.5 83.7 139.0 135.9 130.1
Navarra 114.6 136.6 121.1 145.5 56.7 55.2
P. Vasco 112.1 125.8 124.2 144.6 74.6 74.5
C.-León 109.4 91.7 96.3 96.3 99.9 108.1 109.3
Andalucía 109.0 88.7 104.1 103.7 102.1 106.0 107.4
Aragón 106.3 95.1 94.4 108.7 109.8 111.0
Asturias 101.0 91.3 90.2 219.2 106.6 112.9
Baleares 96.2 310.1 105.8 109.6 68.6 83.6
Cataluña 92.8 125.0 96.5 96.5 102.9 83.7 83.6
Madrid 69.8 205.2 77.4 77.2 78.0 99.1 96.9
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: some entries are blank because the tax rate is not computed for those regions where baseline returns
are negative.
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Table A.54: Estimated effective tax rate  induced by personal taxes
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Rioja 11.00% 53.22% 13.44% 13.01% 33.48% 12.32% 10.79%
Murcia 10.86% 21.43% 12.04% 14.67% 6.81% 7.67% 10.88%
Galicia 10.24% 27.31% 20.70% 24.14% 6.98% 6.43% 8.93%
C.-Mancha 10.07% 17.33% 20.16% 23.02% 8.76% 11.58% 9.24%
Navarra 9.77% 16.42% 13.60% 9.31% 8.16% 7.54%
Baleares 9.49% 90.00% 22.14% 22.09% 7.28% 8.35%
Canarias 9.34% 25.98% 20.31% 22.98% 9.27% 6.08% 7.92%
Valencia 9.09% 29.10% 18.38% 19.44% 8.96% 7.42% 9.51%
Aragón 8.66% 11.97% 11.51% 10.01% 8.57% 9.67%
Cantabria 8.66% 33.07% 11.74% 13.61% 1.91% 8.08% 10.47%
C.-León 8.55% 18.76% 11.69% 14.10% 7.03% 12.65% 9.20%
Extremadura 8.43% 16.02% 16.82% 21.66% 2.08% 11.18% 7.46%
Cataluña 7.61% 24.02% 12.14% 12.49% 8.79% 12.53% 2.60%
Asturias 7.03% 9.78% 10.33% 13.13% 11.86% 1.35%
Andalucía 7.01% 5.82% 18.43% 21.58% 8.77% 5.89% 9.55%
Madrid 6.98% 55.07% 17.20% 15.96% 11.55% 9.75% 9.37%
P. Vasco 6.60% 10.45% 11.43% 5.54% 11.10% 4.10%
Spain 7.59% 13.57% 18.19% 19.77% 8.10% 12.83% 8.88%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Rioja 144.9 392.1 73.9 65.8 413.1 96.0 121.6
Murcia 143.0 157.9 66.2 74.2 84.0 59.8 122.6
Galicia 134.9 201.2 113.8 122.1 86.1 50.1 100.6
C.-Mancha 132.7 127.7 110.8 116.5 108.1 90.3 104.0
Navarra 128.8 90.2 68.8 114.8 63.6 84.9
Baleares 125.0 663.1 121.7 111.8 56.8 94.0
Canarias 123.1 191.4 111.6 116.2 114.4 47.4 89.2
Valencia 119.8 214.4 101.1 98.4 110.6 57.8 107.2
Aragón 114.1 65.8 58.2 123.5 66.8 108.9
Cantabria 114.0 243.7 64.5 68.9 23.6 63.0 117.9
C.-León 112.7 138.2 64.3 71.3 86.7 98.5 103.7
Extremadura 111.1 118.0 92.4 109.6 25.6 87.1 84.1
Cataluña 100.3 177.0 66.7 63.2 108.5 97.7 29.3
Asturias 92.6 53.8 52.3 162.0 92.4 15.2
Andalucía 92.4 42.9 101.3 109.2 108.2 45.9 107.6
Madrid 91.9 405.7 94.6 80.7 142.6 76.0 105.5
P. Vasco 87.0 57.5 57.8 68.3 86.5 46.1
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: some entries are blank because the tax rate is not computed for those regions where baseline returns
are negative.
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Table A.55: Estimated effective tax rate induced by unemployment benefits
a. observed values
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Andalucía 48.03% 113.13% 26.81% 14.04% 45.96% 28.83% 11.14%
Cantabria 35.06% 4.15% 19.06% 6.40% 84.18% 41.43% 10.53%
Galicia 34.36% 42.84% 16.82% 2.94% 53.27% 24.70% 8.25%
Canarias 33.77% 58.67% 19.18% 9.25% 47.37% 19.91% 6.43%
Asturias 32.12% 42.81% 38.28% 104.04% 16.54% 12.69%
Extremadura 31.55% 48.11% 23.77% 3.79% 92.32% 21.25% 14.26%
Valencia 31.35% 46.93% 21.30% 16.61% 36.04% 16.95% 8.46%
P. Vasco 28.24% 43.78% 37.81% 53.13% 20.15% 5.16%
C.-León 27.71% 51.24% 18.06% 3.84% 36.08% 13.08% 6.06%
Rioja 23.36% 14.19% 13.54% 16.91% 203.27% 23.56% 5.74%
Cataluña 22.17% 80.27% 16.67% 14.58% 24.01% 11.25% 4.02%
C.-Mancha 19.47% 58.44% 13.92% 2.58% 28.96% 14.55% 6.25%
Madrid 19.47% 160.02% 21.44% 25.92% 19.18% 10.59% 6.86%
Murcia 19.02% 23.30% 16.80% 2.64% 96.16% 23.51% 8.13%
Baleares 19.00% 85.50% 10.76% 14.01% 9.65% 13.96%
Aragón 18.97% 13.56% 15.35% 19.53% 7.69% 5.20%
Navarra 14.41% 12.79% 17.18% 23.57% 15.19% 3.09%
Spain 29.94% 92.22% 19.36% 12.77% 34.79% 15.09% 6.75%
______________________________________________________________________
b. normalized values (Spain = 100)
______________________________________________________________________
all lower sec upper sec lower voc upper voc lower univ upper univ
Andalucía 160.4 122.7 138.5 109.9 132.1 191.1 165.0
Cantabria 117.1 4.5 98.4 50.1 242.0 274.5 155.9
Galicia 114.8 46.5 86.9 23.1 153.1 163.7 122.2
Canarias 112.8 63.6 99.0 72.5 136.2 131.9 95.3
Asturias 107.3 221.1 299.8 299.0 109.6 188.0
Extremadura 105.4 52.2 122.7 29.7 265.4 140.8 211.1
Valencia 104.7 50.9 110.0 130.1 103.6 112.3 125.3
P. Vasco 94.3 226.1 296.1 152.7 133.5 76.5
C.-León 92.5 55.6 93.2 30.1 103.7 86.7 89.7
Rioja 78.0 15.4 69.9 132.4 584.2 156.1 85.0
Cataluña 74.0 87.0 86.1 114.2 69.0 74.5 59.6
C.-Mancha 65.0 63.4 71.9 20.2 83.3 96.4 92.6
Madrid 65.0 173.5 110.7 203.0 55.1 70.2 101.6
Murcia 63.5 25.3 86.7 20.7 276.4 155.8 120.4
Baleares 63.4 92.7 55.6 109.7 63.9 206.7
Aragón 63.4 70.0 120.2 56.1 50.9 77.1
Navarra 48.1 66.0 134.5 67.7 100.7 45.7
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: some entries are blank because the tax rate is not computed for those regions where baseline returns
are negative.
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6. The social returns to schooling. Detailed results
Table A.56: Observed social rate of return to schooling (baseline estimate) and its components
a. Observed values
______________________________________________________________________
rs (OBS) NUM r EXT e DENOM OPPC DIRC
C.-Mancha 12.55% 12.42% 9.01% 0.96% 2.44% 111.69% 96.49% 15.21%
Extremadura 12.53% 12.79% 9.04% 0.97% 2.79% 115.31% 97.82% 17.48%
Andalucía 12.37% 12.40% 8.49% 0.98% 2.93% 113.37% 97.01% 16.36%
Canarias 11.60% 11.36% 7.93% 1.03% 2.40% 111.46% 94.11% 17.34%
C.-León 11.54% 11.25% 7.89% 1.03% 2.33% 111.05% 95.68% 15.37%
Valencia 11.40% 11.06% 8.07% 1.04% 1.95% 110.59% 94.67% 15.92%
Murcia 11.37% 11.24% 8.25% 1.04% 1.95% 112.74% 96.45% 16.29%
Gal ic ia 11.29% 11.61% 8.42% 1.05% 2.14% 117.37% 97.55% 19.82%
Cataluña 11.16% 10.51% 7.65% 1.06% 1.80% 107.54% 94.23% 13.31%
Aragón 11.09% 10.51% 7.74% 1.06% 1.70% 108.25% 94.01% 14.24%
Asturias 11.04% 11.41% 7.70% 1.07% 2.64% 118.15% 99.39% 18.75%
Baleares 10.94% 10.14% 7.80% 1.08% 1.26% 106.10% 95.35% 10.75%
P. Vasco 10.58% 10.39% 7.16% 1.10% 2.13% 112.57% 95.88% 16.70%
Navarra 10.55% 10.06% 7.30% 1.11% 1.65% 109.40% 95.15% 14.25%
Rioja 10.37% 10.59% 7.72% 1.12% 1.75% 117.31% 99.29% 18.02%
Cantabria 10.33% 10.63% 7.53% 1.12% 1.98% 118.30% 99.52% 18.78%
Madrid 10.10% 9.63% 6.80% 1.15% 1.69% 109.69% 97.95% 11.75%
Spain 11.41% 11.15% 7.81% 1.04% 2.30% 111.41% 96.23% 15.18%
______________________________________________________________________
b. Normalized values
______________________________________________________________________
rs (OBS) NUM r EXT e DENOM OPPC DIRC
C.-Mancha 110.0 111.4 80.8 8.6 21.9 100.3 86.6 13.6
Extremadura 109.8 114.7 81.0 8.7 25.0 103.5 87.8 15.7
Andalucía 108.4 111.2 76.1 8.8 26.3 101.8 87.1 14.7
Canarias 101.7 101.9 71.1 9.2 21.5 100.0 84.5 15.6
C.-León 101.1 100.9 70.7 9.3 20.9 99.7 85.9 13.8
Valencia 100.0 99.2 72.4 9.3 17.5 99.3 85.0 14.3
Murcia 99.7 100.8 74.0 9.4 17.5 101.2 86.6 14.6
Gal ic ia 99.0 104.1 75.5 9.4 19.2 105.4 87.6 17.8
Cataluña 97.8 94.2 68.6 9.5 16.2 96.5 84.6 12.0
Aragón 97.2 94.2 69.4 9.5 15.3 97.2 84.4 12.8
Asturias 96.8 102.3 69.1 9.6 23.7 106.0 89.2 16.8
Baleares 95.8 90.9 70.0 9.7 11.3 95.2 85.6 9.7
P. Vasco 92.7 93.1 64.2 9.9 19.1 101.0 86.1 15.0
Navarra 92.4 90.2 65.5 9.9 14.8 98.2 85.4 12.8
Rioja 90.9 94.9 69.2 10.1 15.7 105.3 89.1 16.2
Cantabria 90.6 95.4 67.5 10.1 17.8 106.2 89.3 16.9
Madrid 88.5 86.3 60.9 10.3 15.1 98.5 87.9 10.5
Spain 100.0 100.0 70.0 9.3 20.6 100.0 86.4 13.6
______________________________________________________________________
Table A.56 gives the values of the baseline estimate of the all-in social return to
schooling, rs ,and of its various cost and benefit components (see equation (7) in Box 1). As in
140
the case of the private rate of return, productivity effects and opportunity costs are the
dominant determinants of the social rate of return to schooling. For the country as a whole,
level effects on productivity (r) account for 70% of the total benefits of schooling and
employment effects (e) for an additional 20.6%, while opportunity costs (OPPC) make up
almost 87% of total costs. Table A.57 shows the detailed baseline and min results by region
under the different scenarios.
Table A.57: Social rate of return to schooling under different scenarios
______________________________________________________________
                                                         level effects                         + empl. eff.                      + rate eff. = OBS
min baseline min baseline min baseline
Andalucía 5.87% 8.73% 8.87% 11.48% 9.97% 12.37%
Aragón 5.56% 8.35% 7.47% 10.06% 8.79% 11.09%
Asturias 5.01% 7.64% 7.74% 10.09% 8.93% 11.04%
Baleares 5.74% 8.58% 7.18% 9.86% 8.57% 10.94%
Canarias 5.55% 8.32% 8.11% 10.64% 9.31% 11.60%
Cantabria 4.86% 7.45% 6.96% 9.32% 8.26% 10.33%
C.-León 5.53% 8.30% 8.04% 10.57% 9.25% 11.54%
C.-Mancha 6.35% 9.36% 8.85% 11.67% 9.97% 12.55%
Cataluña 5.53% 8.31% 7.56% 10.13% 8.87% 11.16%
Valencia 5.71% 8.52% 7.81% 10.42% 9.06% 11.40%
Extremadura 6.16% 9.11% 8.93% 11.66% 10.01% 12.53%
Gal ic ia 5.60% 8.39% 7.78% 10.35% 8.97% 11.29%
Madrid 4.66% 7.23% 6.63% 8.97% 8.07% 10.10%
Murcia 5.72% 8.54% 7.78% 10.40% 9.01% 11.37%
Navarra 5.12% 7.80% 7.00% 9.47% 8.38% 10.55%
P. Vasco 4.83% 7.43% 7.19% 9.53% 8.51% 10.58%
Rioja 5.06% 7.70% 6.92% 9.35% 8.23% 10.37%
Spain 5.45% 8.19% 7.93% 10.43% 9.15% 11.41%
de la F. (2003) 8.87% 11.34%
                                                        level effects                         + empl. eff.                      + rate eff. = OBS
min baseline min baseline min baseline
Andalucía 107.7 106.5 111.9 110.0 108.9 108.4
Aragón 102.1 101.9 94.2 96.4 96.0 97.2
Asturias 92.0 93.2 97.6 96.7 97.5 96.8
Baleares 105.4 104.7 90.6 94.6 93.6 95.8
Canarias 101.9 101.5 102.3 102.0 101.7 101.7
Cantabria 89.2 90.9 87.9 89.3 90.2 90.6
C.-León 101.5 101.3 101.4 101.3 101.1 101.1
C.-Mancha 116.5 114.2 111.7 111.8 108.9 110.0
Cataluña 101.5 101.4 95.3 97.1 96.9 97.8
Valencia 104.7 104.0 98.5 99.9 99.0 100.0
Extremadura 113.0 111.2 112.7 111.8 109.4 109.8
Gal ic ia 102.8 102.3 98.2 99.2 98.0 99.0
Madrid 85.5 88.2 83.7 86.0 88.2 88.5
Murcia 105.0 104.2 98.2 99.7 98.5 99.7
Navarra 94.0 95.2 88.3 90.7 91.6 92.4
P. Vasco 88.6 90.7 90.8 91.4 93.0 92.7
Rioja 92.8 94.0 87.3 89.6 89.9 90.9
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
______________________________________________________________
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Table A.58: Social rate of return to schooling and other assets
_________________________________________________________
                                                               schooling (all in)                    phys. capital                infrastr.
min baseline min baseline baseline
Andalucía 9.97% 12.37% 4.51% 10.05% 9.17%
Aragón 8.79% 11.09% 4.07% 9.38% 10.67%
Asturias 8.93% 11.04% 2.64% 7.22% 8.99%
Baleares 8.57% 10.94% 4.33% 9.76% 27.68%
Canarias 9.31% 11.60% 4.99% 12.48% 16.27%
Cantabria 8.26% 10.33% 3.07% 10.76% 9.86%
C.-León 9.25% 11.54% 3.27% 7.87% 9.62%
C.-Mancha 9.97% 12.55% 2.93% 7.66% 6.85%
Cataluña 8.87% 11.16% 5.73% 8.17% 20.89%
Valencia 9.06% 11.40% 6.13% 11.88% 15.99%
Extremadura 10.01% 12.53% 1.85% 6.03% 6.86%
Gal ic ia 8.97% 11.29% 3.81% 8.98% 13.28%
Madrid 8.07% 10.10% 8.92% 16.70% 30.71%
Murcia 9.01% 11.37% 6.16% 12.53% 13.16%
Navarra 8.38% 10.55% 4.45% 9.96% 11.48%
P. Vasco 8.51% 10.58% 3.58% 8.64% 13.78%
Rioja 8.23% 10.37% 6.62% 13.22% 10.80%
Spain 9.15% 11.41% 5.09% 10.91% 14.46%
______________________________________________________________
Table A.58 reproduces our estimates of the all-in social return to schooling and the returns
to non-infrastructure and infrastructure physical capital (rk and rx). The estimates of these
magnitudes that are labeled as baseline have been obtained using the baseline values of the
relevant output elasticities shown in italics in Table 23 (that is, ak = 0.258, ax = 0.056, as =
0.587 and g = 0.15%). The min estimate of the return on human capital uses the value of as
estimated by de la Fuente and Doménech (2002) without correcting for measurement error bias
(0.394), and that of ak is based on the uncorrected estimate of 0.171 given in Table 12 in section
3.c of the text.
